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Visual processing is not fixed, but changes dynamically depending on the spatiotemporal con-
text of the presented stimulus, and the behavioural task being performed. In this thesis, I
describe theoretical and experimental work that was conducted to investigate how and why
visual perception and neural responses are altered by the behavioural and statistical context of
presented stimuli.
The process by which stimulus expectations are acquired and then shape our sensory ex-
periences is not well understood. To investigate this, I conducted a psychophysics experiment
where participants were asked to estimate the direction of motion of presented stimuli, with
some directions presented more frequently than others. I found that participants quickly de-
veloped expectations for the most frequently presented directions and that this altered their
perception of new stimuli, inducing biases in the perceived motion direction as well as visual
hallucinations in the absence of a stimulus. These biases were well explained by a model
that accounted for their behaviour using a Bayesian strategy, combining a learned prior of the
stimulus statistics with their sensory evidence using Bayes’ rule.
Altering the behavioural context of presented stimuli results in diverse changes to visual
neuron responses, including alterations in receptive field structure and firing rates. While these
changes are often thought to reflect optimization towards the behavioural task, what exactly is
being optimized and why different tasks produce such varying effects is unknown. To account
for the effects of a behavioural task on visual neuron responses, I extend previous Bayesian
models of visual processing, hypothesizing that the brain learns an internal model that predicts
how both the sensory input and the reward received for performing different actions are deter-
mined by a common set of explanatory causes. Short-term changes in visual neural responses
would thus reflect optimization of this internal model to deal with changes in the sensory en-
vironment (stimulus statistics) and behavioural demands (reward statistics), respectively. This
framework is used to predict a range of experimentally observed effects of goal-orientated at-
tention on visual neuron responses.
Together, these studies provide new insight into how and why sensory processing adapts in
response to changes in the environment. The experimental results support the idea of a very
plastic visual system, in which prior knowledge is rapidly acquired and used to shape percep-
tion. The theoretical work extends previous Bayesian models of sensory processing, to under-
stand how visual neural responses are altered by the behavioural context of presetned stimuli.
Finally, these studies provide a unified description of ‘expectations’ and ‘goal-orientated atten-
tion’, as corresponding to continuous adaptation of an internal generative model of the world
to account for newly received contextual information.
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The sensory signals that we receive at each moment in time depend on our environment. In a
forest, we will see more green trees than grey buildings; in low light we will not receive much
information about colour at all. Contextual information about our environment also influences
how incoming sensory signals should best be interpreted. A rectangular object is more likely
to correspond to a book if we are in a library, and a brick if we are in a construction site.
There is a growing body of evidence that our sensory system takes such contextual infor-
mation into account in order to shape and constrain our perception of the world. Contextual
changes to visual perception are given a number of different cognitive labels (e.g. ‘adaptation’,
‘expectations or ‘learning’), depending on their effect, and the timescale over which they oc-
cur. In this thesis, I define expectation-dependent changes to sensory processing, as changes
to perception and/or neural responses that depend on acquired contextual information about
the organism’s sensory environment (i.e. the stimulus statistics). In chapter 3, I describe a
psychophysics experiment that was conducted to investigate how implicitly learned expecta-
tions alter the perceived appearance of simple visual stimulus features. The perceptual changes
observed in this experiment can be accounted for by assuming that participants followed a
Bayesian strategy, combining their received sensory signals with their learned expectations in
a probabilistically optimal manner.
Arguably, the ultimate goal of sensory processing is not to infer the identity or location of
objects or features, but to allow us to interact with our environment and perform actions that
will lead to a delayed or immediate reward. Thus, under the assumption that the visual system
is unable to process information about all aspects of a visual scene (although see section 2.1 for
further discussion of this claim), it makes sense to prioritize image features or locations that are
relevant in determining which action to perform, at the expense of neglecting information about
behaviourally irrelevant image features or locations. Consequently, we would expect visual
processing to be modulated by the behavioural as well as the statistical context of presented
visual stimuli. Supporting this claim, is a huge experimental literature on sensory attention,
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showing how visual perception and neural responses are modulated by the behavioural goals
of the observer.
In this thesis, I use a Bayesian modelling framework (see section 1.2) to investigate why
top-down goal-orientated attention alters visual neuron responses as it does. While the word
attention is used in the literature to describe many different neural and perceptual changes, in
this thesis I investigate goal-orientated attention, defined as changes to visual perception and
neural responses that depend on the observer’s task or behavioural objectives. Thus, I make
a distinction between expectations, that depend on the subject’s belief about the presented
stimulus statistics (i.e. how ‘likely’ different stimuli are), and goal-orientated attention, that
depends on how stimuli are used to decide which action to perform (i.e. how ‘behaviourally
relevant’ different stimuli are). While previous Bayesian models of visual processing are able
to account for the former case, it is not obvious why visual processing should be altered by
behavioural demands when the stimulus statistics are unchanged. In chapter 4 I show how a
Bayesian framework for modelling visual processing can be extended to account for the effects
of behavioural context on sensory neural responses. I use this framework to construct a simple
model of visual processing that is able to replicate a number of attention-dependent changes to
the responses neurons in the mid-level visual cortices. I show that this model is consistent with,
and provides a normative explanation for previous phenomenological models of attention.
1.1 Models of neural processing and cognition
Theoretical models can be used for many different purposes in computational neuroscience.
The type of model that is used must be chosen carefully depending on the scientific question
that is being addressed. Important choices that must be considered include the level of ab-
straction, the data that is used to construct the model, and how the model it to be validated or
falsified. In this thesis we use two very different types of model to ask questions about the role
of behavioural and stimulus context in visual processing and perception.
In chapter 3 I use computational modelling approach to understand subjects’ behaviour in
a psychophysics task. The goal here is both to understand the strategy that subjects took in per-
forming the task, and to rule out ‘trivial’ explanations for our data. To this end, I constructed
several high-level models of subjects’ behaviour, which each model representing a different
hypothesis about how subject’s incorporate learned information about the presented stimulus
distribution with incoming sensory information to estimate the presented stimulus feature. I
compare these different models using standard statistical tests (such as the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion), which implicitly assume a trade-off between how well each model fits the data,
and the number of model parameters, under the assumption that, if two models fit the data
equally well, the model with fewer parameters is to be preferred.
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While the computational models proposed in chapter 3 were specifically designed to cap-
ture subject’s behaviour in our psychophysics task, they also make predictions how people’s ex-
pectations should influence their perception under a broader range of experimental conditions.
Therefore, in considering whether the proposed models provide an appropriate description of
subject’s behaviour, it was important to also consider how well these models are able to explain
known experimental results. In chapter 5 I discuss how the Bayesian model that we propose
to explain subject’s behaviour in our task could be extended to account for other forms of per-
ceptual bias reported in the experimental literature, and in particular, whether such a model
could account for the repulsive perceptual biases that occur following with visual adaptation to
a strong motion stimulus.
In chapter 4 I use a normative modelling approach to investigate why goal-orientated atten-
tion alters visual neural responses as it does. Normative models rely on the assumption that the
brain is well adapted, through evolution and development, to solve the computational problems
that it is faced with. The hope is that, by first trying to find good or ‘optimal’ solutions to an
underlying computational problem, we may gain some insight into the computations that actu-
ally take place in the brain, and ultimately obtain a functional explanation for experimentally
observed neural behaviour.
Care must be taken when using normative models to make predictions about neural ac-
tivity. In addition to finding an ‘optimal’ solution to a particular computational problem, the
researcher must also make assumptions about how the problem is solved in the brain. For ex-
ample, the researcher must make assumptions about how the information required to solve a
particular problem is computed and encoded in the activity of neural populations. As a result,
it may be difficult to make falsifiable predictions about neural activity: if the predictions of the
model do not match the data, then this could be because the initial hypothesis about the ‘goal’
of the system was incorrect, because assumptions about how the system solves the computa-
tional problem were incorrect, or even because the underlying normative assumption, that the
system behaves in a near-optimal way, was incorrect. However, while it may be difficult to con-
struct a fully falsifiable normative model of neural processing, these models may nonetheless
be useful for formalizing and comparing and testing the implications of intuitive ideas about
why neural systems behave the way they do. Indeed, a normative modelling framework is par-
ticularly useful when it allows us to explain a large range of results within a single explanatory
framework.
In common with the work described in chapter 3, in chapter 4 I use a normative Bayesian
framework (see next section) to model visual processing. However, in contrast to the work
described in chapter 3, the main goal in chapter 4 was not to account for the results of a
particular experiment, but rather to show in principle how a Bayesian framework can be used to
model the effects of behavioural demands on sensory neural responses. In order to demonstrate
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Which is furthest away?
Figure 1.1: Prior information about the ‘true’ size of each object must be combined with available
sensory information (the apparent size of each circle) in order to estimate their distance. As the
leftmost circle does not represent a real object in the world, we cannot know how far away it is.
how our modelling framework can be used in practice to make predictions about attention-
dependent changes to neural activity, we needed to make a number of assumptions about how
Bayesian inference is performed in the brain. While not all of our assumptions may hold
true in reality, our work provides an illustrative example of how Bayesian models of visual
processing can be extended to make a number of predictions about the effects of task-dependent
attention on visual neuron responses, hopefully opening the door for future work in this area.
Interestingly, the results of our simulations are very similar to several existing models of visual
attention(Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Lee and Maunsell, 2009; Ghose, 2009), allowing us to
make a link between functional and phenomenological levels of description of visual attention.
1.2 Bayesian models of perceptual processing
In this thesis I consider a Bayesian description of visual processing (Neisser, 1970; Gregory,
1970; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Knill and Pouget, 2004), in which the assumed ‘goal’ of the
visual system is to infer the true state of the world from received sensory signals. Because
of the inherent ambiguity of sensory signals (figure 1.1), knowledge about the world is ex-
pressed in the form of a probability distribution: the organism combines their available sensory
information with prior knowledge about the world in order to evaluate the posterior probabil-
ity distribution over possible world-states. In the following sections, I describe this Bayesian
modeling framework in more detail, before outlining the open questions to be addressed in this
thesis.
1.2.1 Introduction to Bayesian inference and decision making
Bayesian theory describes explicitly how ambiguous sensory information should be combined
with prior knowledge about the world in order to make optimal perceptual decisions (Jaynes,
1986; MacKay, 2003). The posterior probability associated with different states of the world
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(p(world-state|sensory signal)) is computed by combining prior beliefs about the world (p(world-state))
with a likelihood model that describes how sensory signals are generated (p(sensory signal|world-state)),
according to Bayes’ rule:
p(world-state|sensory signal) = p(sensory signal|world-state) p(world-state)
p(sensory signal)
. (1.1)
The denominator in this expression represents a normalization constant, which ensures that the
posterior probability over all different possible world-states sums to one.
In order to use the posterior probability distribution to make optimal decisions, or percep-
tual judgments, we need to specify a function (U (decision; world-state)) that quantifies the
utility associated with making different decisions, given a particular state of the world (Yuille
and Bulthoff, 1996; Körding and Wolpert, 2006). A decision is then made to maximize the
expected utility, averaged over the posterior distribution over world-states:
decision = arg max
decision
〈U (decision;world-state)〉p(world-state|sensory signal). (1.2)
Thus, to formulate how perceptual decisions can be made optimally from ambiguous sen-
sory information, we must specify three ingredients (Simoncelli, 2009):
• The prior probability for different states of the world: p(world-state).
• The likelihood function, describing how sensory signals are generated:
p(sensory signal|world-state).
• A utility function, describing the value associated with different perceptual decisions,
given the state of the world: U (decision;world-state).
To see how each of these ingredients impact on decision making, consider a doctor tasked
with diagnosing a patient. In this case, possible diseases correspond to the ‘world-state’, while
observed symptoms correspond to the ‘sensory signal’. The probability that a patient has a par-
ticular disease will depend on both the likelihood that the disease produces the observed symp-
toms, and how rare the disease is. For example, there may be a high probability that meningitis
causes an increase in temperature (i.e. p(high temp|meningitis) is large), but meningitis is very
rare (i.e. p(meningitis) is small) the posterior probability that it is responsible for the observed
symptoms will also be small (as p(meningitis|high temp) ∝ p(high temp|meningitis) p(meningitis)).
However, the doctor’s diagnosis will also be influenced by the cost associated with making dif-
ferent errors (U (diagnosis;disease)): wrongly diagnosing the patient as having meningitis may
not be a problem, compared to the cost of wrongly diagnosing them as being well. Thus, the
utility function may bias the doctor towards diagnosing the patient as having meningitis, despite
the small posterior probability associated with this eventuality.
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Figure 1.2: Schematic illustration of the Bayesian view of perception (adapted from (Whiteley,
2008)). A generative model (likelihood ; p(x|s)) describes how the state of the world (s) pro-
duces the sensory signal (x). The brain is hypothesized to learn a recognition model (posterior ;
p(s|x)), which takes existing beliefs (priors; p(s)) into account in order to make inferences
about the state of the world.
1.2.2 Bayesian inference in the brain
In the previous section we described how, in theory, optimal decisions can be made from am-
biguous sensory information. The Bayesian brain hypothesis (‘BBH’) postulates that decision
making in the brain operates according to these same principles. Thus, sensory processing is
hypothesized to correspond to a process of unconscious inference, where incoming sensory
signals are used to infer the posterior probability associated with different states of the world,
according to Bayes’ rule (equation 1.1) (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Knill and Richards, 1996a).
This information is then propagated to higher areas of the brain, where decisions are made in
order to maximize the expected utility (equation 1.2) (Yuille and Bulthoff, 1996; Körding and
Wolpert, 2006; Platt and Glimcher, 1999).
Figure 1.2 illustrates the Bayesian view of sensory processing. Objects in the world (s)
generate the received sensory signals (x) with probability, p(x|s). The hypothesized goal of
sensory processing is to invert this model, inferring the posterior distribution of world states,
given the received sensory signal (p(s|x)). To do this, the brain is assumed to learn an internal
model describing how sensory signals are generated, which is combined with prior beliefs
about the world (p(s)) according to equation 1.1.
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The BBH makes a number of predictions about how we should perceive the world. First, it
implies that we learn an internal model of the world, with prior beliefs that reflect the statistics
of the sensory signals that we experience. These prior beliefs should be combined probabilisti-
cally with our received sensory signals according to Bayes’ rule: the more ambiguous or noisy
sensory signals are, the more strongly prior knowledge about the world should influence what
we perceive (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006a; Weiss et al., 2002; Girshick et al., 2011). Second,
different sources of sensory information should be combined probabilistically, with their im-
pact on perception depending on how reliable they are. For example, in low light, we should
rely more on our sense of hearing than on our sight (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Battaglia et al.,
2010). A number of psychophysics experiments have been conducted which support these
behavioural predictions (discussed in section 2.4).
In addition to investigating the behavioural predictions of the BBH, researchers have also
tried to understand how Bayesian inference might be implemented in the brain. One approach
has been to investigate how probability distributions are encoded via neural population re-
sponses (Ma et al., 2006; Fiser et al., 2010; Deneve, 2008a; Rao, 2004) (discussed in sec-
tion 5.3). Another approach has been to try and ‘derive’ the response properties of sensory
neurons from first principles, based on the statistics of natural images (Hyvärinen, 2010; Si-
moncelli and Olshausen, 2001; Karklin and Lewicki, 2009; Olshausen and Field, 1996) (dis-
cussed in section 5.1). The assumption here is that the brain learns an internal model describing
how sensory signals are generated by a limited number of primitive image features. Thus, the
features encoded by neurons in the early visual cortex can be learned directly from the statistics
of the sensory signals themselves.
1.2.3 Overview of thesis
In this thesis I examine how and why changes to behavioural and stimulus context alter visual
processing and perception. In chapter 2, I review existing approaches to modelling sensory
attention and expectations. In chapter 3, I provide experimental evidence indicating that visual
perception is highly adaptable, such that the perceptual appearance of simple visual features
varies constantly depending on what we expect to see. I use a Bayesian modeling framework to
investigate the functional role of these perceptual changes (why do they occur?). In chapter 4, I
investigate how Bayesian models of visual processing can be extended to account for the effects
of behavioural demands; providing a functional explanation for observed attention-dependent
changes to visual neuron responses. Finally, in chapter 5 I discuss the implications of my
experimental and theoretical work, its limitations, and the scope for using Bayesian models in
the future to investigate contextual changes to visual processing and perception.
Chapter 2
Theories of goal-orientated attention
and expectations
In 1890, William James began his famous description of attention with the claim, “Everyone
knows what attention is” (James, 1890). This is hard to contest: from our earliest schooldays
we are told to ‘pay attention’ to our teacher, under the assumption that this will help us to hear
more clearly and retain in our memory what they have to say. The same can be said of expecta-
tions: we all know what it feels like to expect a stimulus (e.g. when we complete an unfinished
sentence), or to have our expectations violated (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). However, de-
spite (or perhaps because of) this everyday understanding, defining precisely what expectations
and attention are, and why they are necessary, is not easy. Indeed, just six years after William
James’ famous quote, Groos wrote, “To the question ‘What is Attention?’ there is not only no
generally recognized answer, but the different attempts at a solution even diverge in the most
disturbing manner” (Groos, 1896). This is arguably as true today as it was then (Sutherland,
1998; Anderson et al., 2011).
One reason for this confusion is that attention is implicated in a huge range of cognitive
phenomena, ranging from perception (Raymond, 2000), to learning and memory (Crist et al.,
2001; Desimone, 1996). Attention can be directed towards external stimuli, or internal thoughts
(Chun et al., 2011); be controlled voluntarily, based on internal goals, or involuntarily, based
on the salience of presented stimuli (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Yantis, 2000). As a result,
it has been suggested that attention is not unitary, but rather, corresponds to multiple different
perceptual and cognitive processes that govern how information is selectively processed in the
brain (Chun et al., 2011).
Despite the diverse effects of attention, certain themes are observed throughout the litera-
ture. In particular, a general assumption is that the brain receives more information than it is
able to deal with, and therefore, must select some sources of information for further processing,
while discarding others. This leads to several questions, which we discuss separately in each
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Figure 2.1: Simple schematic of perceptual processing. Arrows denote the direction of feed-
forward processing. Early theories of attention assumed that there is a bottleneck which restricts
how much information can be propagated through the processing hierarchy. Attention would
act as a selective filter, ensuring that only important information was able to reach short term
memory and influence behaviour. There has been much debate about the stage of processing
that attentional selection occurs (i.e. where the processing ‘bottleneck’ lies): selection could
occur at an early on, very late, or in a graded manner, at multiple stages of processing.
of the following sections. First, where does the bottleneck lie: under what circumstances, and
at what stage of processing, is attentional selection necessary? Second, what factors determine
which information is selected? Third, how does selective attention give rise to the perceptual
and neurophysiological effects that are observed experimentally? A final question, concern-
ing the low-level neural mechanisms underlying attentional selection, is considered beyond the
scope of this review.
In this thesis we are interested in how visual processing and perception are influenced by
the context of presented stimuli. Indeed, which stimuli are attended to will depend on the
context of the organism’s current behavioural demands (which stimuli are behaviourally rele-
vant?) and their sensory environment (which stimuli are statistically likely?). In chapter 1 we
distinguished between the perceptual effects of behavioural and statistical context, which we
labelled as ‘goal-orientated attention’ and ‘expectations’ respectively. In section 2.4 we discuss
whether this distinction is indeed necessary to describe the neural and perceptual changes that
are observed experimentally: do similar cognitive phenomena underlie the perceptual changes
that occur in each case?
2.1 Why attend?
Why is attention necessary? Initially, the answer seems intuitively obvious: in a crowded
restaurant, we need to attend to the person speaking to us in order to hear them clearly, while fil-
tering out distractions from other nearby voices (the so-called ‘cocktail-party’ problem (Cherry,
1953)). On further reflection however, it becomes apparent that this intuitive explanation makes
strong assumptions about the limited resources that are available to process sensory informa-
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tion. If there were no limited resources it would be possible to fully process all incoming
sensory information, without needing to filter out irrelevant distractions (although see later for
a discussion of how selective attention could be in the absence of limited resource constraints).
Early attempts to define how perceptual processing is limited, and thus why attention is
necessary, were strongly influenced by the newly emerging mathematical theory of informa-
tion (Shannon, 1948; MacKay, 2003). A central idea in information theory is that communica-
tion channels have a limited capacity: a fundamental limit to the rate at which information can
be transferred. The concept of a limited capacity channel provided the basis for Broadbent’s
‘filter theory’ (Broadbent, 1958), which was one of the first attempts to describe formally why
attentional selection is necessary. Broadbent hypothesized that perceptual processing is divided
into two qualitatively distinct stages: an initial stage, where ‘simple’ properties of sensory sig-
nals (e.g. pitch and location of sounds) are extracted in parallel, and a second stage, where more
complex properties (e.g. the identity or meaning of spoken words) are extracted (figure 2.1).
Crucially, the second stage of processing is assumed to have a very limited capacity, so that it
is unable to process information about multiple stimuli simultaneously. Attention deals with
this limited capacity constraint by selectively filtering incoming sensory information, so that
only information about attended stimuli reaches high-level processing, while information about
unattended stimuli is discarded.
Broadbent’s filter theory involves early selection, with only attended stimuli undergoing
high-level processing. Therefore, experimental results indicating that, contrary to Broadbent’s
theory, subjects are sometimes able to perceive high-level features of unattended stimuli (Cor-
teen and Dunn, 1974), led some researchers to propose an alternative theory, that attentional
selection occurs at a late stage of perceptual processing (late selection) (Deutsch and Deutsch,
1963; Duncan, 1980). According to these researchers, all sensory signals undergo high-level
processing, regardless of whether they are attended or not. Attention then acts to select which
information reaches short term memory and therefore, is able to influence responses. Indeed,
the question of whether selection occurs at an early or at a late stage of perceptual processing
was debated for many years (see (Driver, 2001) for a historical review), with experimental evi-
dence found to support both views (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Francolini and Egeth, 1980). To
account for seemingly contradictory experimental results on both sides of this debate, Treisman
suggested an intermediate possibility, where selection occurs in a graded manner, at multiple
levels of processing (attenuation) (Treisman, 1960, 1969).
More recently Gottlieb et al. proposed that attention could be viewed as a form of cognitive
decision: in the same way that a motor decision requires selecting one of many many possi-
ble actions, an ‘attentional-decision’ would involve selecting only the most important sensory
information for further processing (Gottlieb and Balan, 2010). This idea is closely related to
earlier limited capacity theories of attention: it assumes that only a subset of incoming sensory
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information can be processed effectively, and that the role of selective attention is to determine
which sensory information will be passed on for high-level processing.
While attractive in their simplicity, a potential criticism of these theories is that the concepts
that they rely on – limited capacity and perceptual load – are extremely difficult to quantify.
Further, these concepts are unlikely to be constrained by information theory alone: informa-
tion theory describes ‘how much’ information is present in sensory signals, but does not say
anything about their semantic content (e.g. their behavioural relevance, or how to extract high-
level features). Thus, a full understanding of attentional selection requires a richer description
of perceptual processing, explaining how useful high-level representations are computed from
incoming sensory signals.
One way to make the ‘limited resource’ constraint more concrete is to set out explicitly
the computational problem faced by the visual system. Thus, the necessity for attention is
dictated by the complexity of the problem that must be solved. Tsotsos et al. posited that the
general ‘vision problem’ can be formulated as an unbounded visual search (i.e. locating objects
within a scene). They showed that the problem is computationally intractable in general, such
that the time taken to locate a given object or feature scales very quickly with the size of the
image (Tsotsos, 1989). Tsotsos et al. proposed that, by limiting the search to selected regions
of interest, visual attention reduces the complexity of the problem, facilitating the construction
of a tractable algorithm that approximates the general search problem (Tsotsos, 1990; Tsotsos
et al., 1995). A potential criticism of this approach is that, complexity theory just provides a
way of quantifying how the number of steps required to solve a problem scales with its size.
However, the visual system only has to solve problems of a maximum fixed size, and thus, how
the problem scales may not be important.
Another approach, that avoids making explicit assumptions about the limited available re-
sources, is to consider how the visual system extracts high-level representations from incoming
sensory signals. In this approach, attentional selection emerges as part of an algorithm to com-
pute high-level representations of a particular desired form. For example it has been proposed
that, by dynamically selecting which sensory information is propagated to higher cortical ar-
eas, attention could provide a mechanism for computing high-level representations that are
invariant to the position and scale of objects in the visual world (Hudson et al., 1997; Anderson
and Van Essen, 1987; Olshausen et al., 1993; Deco, 2004). An alternative idea, that has been
highly influential in models of attention, is that selective attention is required to compute high-
level representations in which low-level features (e.g. colour, location) are bound together into
coherent unitary percepts (Treisman, 1960, 1969; Reynolds and Desimone, 1999).
There is a large degree of overlap between models which view the role of attention as
shaping the high-level representation, and models in which attention is required to find the
solutions to a particular computational problem: a high-level representation that is invariant
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to the size and location of visual objects, or in which low-level features are bound together
into a coherent whole, will enable many of the computational problems faced by the visual
system, such as object recognition and visual search, to be performed more easily. Arguably,
both classes of model provide a richer description of attention than earlier theories based on
the concept of a limited capacity channel. However, they also face the potential criticism
of presenting too narrow a view of visual processing; as a mechanism to solve a particular
computational problem, or to construct high-level representations of a particular form.
2.1.1 Bayesian models of attention
Most theories of attention assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that the necessity for atten-
tional selection comes from the fact that the brain is unable to fully process all incoming sen-
sory information. In contrast, recent ‘Bayesian’ models of attention have argued that in many
cases, attentional selection represents the optimal strategy, even in the absence of any limited
resource constraints (Dayan et al., 2000). As discussed earlier (section 1.2), these models are
based on the hypothesis that visual processing corresponds to a process of probabilistic infer-
ence, where the hidden state of the world is inferred by combining sensory signals with prior
beliefs according to Bayes’ rule (equation 1.1). Thus, perceptual inference depends on both
the observer’s internal model describing how their received sensory signals are generated (the
likelihood), and the probability that they associate with different states of the world (the prior).
In order to make optimal inferences about the hidden state of the world, the observer’s internal
model should be updated to incorporate new information about their environment. This infor-
mation could be delivered explicitly, through instructions or sensory cues that indicate which
stimuli are most likely to be presented (Yu and Dayan, 2005a,b); or it could be inferred directly
from the sensory signals themselves, for example, when the observer is presented with novel
stimuli that violate the statistics of the natural environment (Yu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009). In
both cases, attention-dependent changes to perceptual processing would correspond to changes
in the observer’s internal model that take place in order to account for newly received informa-
tion about their environment.
Experimentally, it is clear that selective attention can be influenced by the behavioural rel-
evance of sensory signals, as well as their statistics (Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005). However, an
ideal Bayesian observer who has learned a perfect internal model of their environment should
not alter their perceptual inference strategy depending on behavioural demands: they should
use Bayes’ rule to infer the hidden state of both task-relevant, and task-irrelevant aspects of
the world. In other words, if the computational resources available for perceptual processing
are unlimited, there is no need to throw away task-irrelevant sensory information. Thus, to
understand how attention is shaped by behavioural demands, we need to consider the ‘limited
resource’ that prevents the observer from making optimal inferences about the world. In the
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context of the BBH, perceptual processing can be constrained in three different ways: by the
structure of the internal model that can be learned, by the limited quantity of available training
data (e.g. when the external environment changes very fast), or by the computational power
required to compute the posterior probability distribution from Bayes’ rule. These factors are
closely related: the complexity of the internal model is likely to be constrained by the limited
data available to learn model parameters, as well as the feasibility of perceptual inference. The
way in which computational resources are limited may also depend how Bayesian inference is
implemented in the brain: for example, by the limited number of neurons available to encode
the posterior distribution, the high metabolic cost of firing a neural spike (Lennie, 2003), or
due to constraints on cortical connectivity.
In one of the first Bayesian models of selective attention, Dayan & Zemel proposed that
perceptual processing is constrained by the limited number, and therefore, the necessarily broad
tuning of neural receptive fields (RFs) (Dayan and Zemel, 1999). They hypothesized that the
broad RFs of visual neurons result in a mismatch between the hidden causes in the internal
model, which extend over a large region of space, and the stimuli typically used to study visual
attention, which are more spatially localized. They proposed that attention compensates for this
mismatch by imposing a ‘task-dependent’ prior which favours behaviourally-relevant spatial
locations. As a result, sensory signals from irrelevant spatial locations are filtered out, so
that the features (e.g. the orientation) of stimuli presented at attended locations are estimated
more accurately and with greater certainty than the features of stimuli presented at unattended
locations. Given certain assumptions about how probability distributions are encoded by neural
activity, Dayan & Zemel showed that this reduction in uncertainty could lead to an increase in
the activity of neurons tuned to attended locations.
Several Bayesian models of attention have been proposed to account for perceptual per-
formance in the ‘Eriksen task’ (Yu et al., 2009; Dayan and Solomon, 2010; Dayan, 2008; Liu
et al., 2009), where subjects are asked to report the identity of a target letter presented amongst
nearby distractors (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). As with the work of Dayan & Zemel, these
models hypothesize that perceptual performance is limited by the broad size of neural RFs,
which integrate sensory signals from both target and distractor stimuli. As a result, when
subjects make a rapid response in the task, their performance is strongly degraded by the dis-
tractors. However, as more sensory observations are accumulated, these models predict that
the subject will learn to disregard information from neurons with broad RFs. Thus, given more
time to make their responses, task-irrelevant sensory signals from nearby distractors will be
filtered out, so that perceptual performance is not diminished by the distractors. Interestingly,
these models do not include an explicit attentional mechanism to filter out irrelevant sensory
signals; attentional effects emerge automatically as the observer updates the inferred posterior
distribution to account for newly received sensory information.
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Interestingly, Bayesian models have been used to account for aspects of attention that ap-
pear to be suboptimal. For example, Lavie et al. found that in easy tasks, subjects are often
unable to ignore irrelevant stimuli that they are able to ignore when the task is hard. To explain
these results, Lavie proposed that the degree to which unattended sensory information is fil-
tered depends on the perceptual load: when the task is easy, irrelevant sensory information is
always processed (even at the cost of worse performance on the relevant information), while in
difficult tasks, no capacity remains, and irrelevant information is effectively removed (Lavie,
2005). An alternative explanation was proposed by Dayan (Dayan, 2008), who showed that a
similar effect is predicted for a Bayesian observer which optimally integrated information from
neurons of varying receptive field (RF) size. In the ‘low load’ case, where a task-relevant target
stimulus is presented alone, neurons with large RFs are informative about the target, and thus
automatically play a role in perceptual inference. Since these neurons are also be influenced by
a distractor, there is a reduction in performance when a distractor is presented. In the high-load
case, where multiple irrelevant stimuli are presented near to the target, only neurons with small
RFs that provide reliable information about the target are used for inference, and the deleterious
effect of a distractor is decreased.
In addition to the limited number (and thus, the broad tuning) of neural receptive fields
(RFs), there have been various other suggestions as to how the internal model could be con-
strained. For example, Whiteley et al. proposed that certain dependencies between hidden
variables are neglected by the visual system, which represents a factorized approximation of
the true posterior. In this view, attentional effects emerge as part of an approximate inference
algorithm that selectively improves aspects of the internal model that are most relevant to the
organism (Sahani and Whiteley, 2007, 2011; Whiteley, 2008). Other researchers have pro-
posed that the visual system is constrained to learn a simplified internal model, in which the
identity and location of visual objects are assumed to be independent (Rao, 2005; Chikkerur
et al., 2010). Alternatively, it has been proposed that the visual system learns an internal model
in which only one object at a time is explicitly represented (Reichert et al., 2011a; Chikkerur
et al., 2010).
In chapter 3 we describe an experiment that was conducted to investigate how visual per-
ception is altered when subjects are presented with novel stimulus statistics. In this case, we
would expect changes in visual perception even in the absence of any limited resource con-
straints, as the internal model is adapted to reflect the presented stimulus statistics (see sec-
tion 2.4). Indeed, while it is possible that the behavioural task that subjects were asked to
perform played a role in producing the perceptual changes that were observed, a purely ‘task-
independent’ Bayesian model, in which subjects’ are assumed to learn the presented stimulus
statistics (irrespective of their behavioural relevance), is sufficient to explain our results.
In chapter 4 we describe modeling work investigating how visual perception is influenced
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by behavioural demands, in the absence of any changes to the presented stimulus statistics.
As discussed previously, if people were to learn a perfect internal model of their sensory envi-
ronment, we would not expect visual processing to be altered by changes to their behavioural
demands alone. In our work, we postulate that attentional modulation occurs because the stim-
uli that are relevant to the task differ from the image features in the agent’s internal model.
While there are many possible ways that the internal model could differ from their external
environment, we postulate a particular form of model mismatch, in which the high-level fea-
tures in the agent’s internal model are more spatially localized than the image features that are
relevant to the particular task. As argued by Dayan & Zemel (described above), such a model
mismatch could occur due to the limited number of visual neurons, which forces them to have
large RFs (Dayan and Zemel, 1999). Alternatively, such a model mismatch could emerge if the
visual system tries to learn a simple internal representation for learning new behavioural tasks,
in which the reward received for a given action is assumed to depend on a limited number of
spatially distributed image features. A final possibility is that broad RFs do not come about as
a result of a resource bottleneck at all, but reflect the fact that the image features relevant to
most real-world tasks (e.g. objects & faces) are distributed over a broad region of space.
2.2 What should be attended?
Assuming that we understand why attentional selection is necessary, how does the brain know
what sensory information to select, and what to discard? Broadly speaking, attention can be
controlled in two different ways: voluntarily, depending on the task-demands and goals of
the observer (“look for the red target”), and involuntarily, depending on the properties of the
sensory signals themselves (e.g. an intrinsically conspicuous stimulus, such as the red jacket in
figure 2.2, will automatically attract attention) (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
In our work, we are interested in how visual processing adapts in response to changes in the
behavioural or statistical context of presented stimuli. Thus, we focus on voluntary attention,
which we view as corresponding to short-term changes in visual processing, that allow the
visual system to preferentially process information about stimulus features or locations that are
task-relevant or statistically likely. In contrast, involuntary attention, where certain stimulus
features are automatically selected regardless of their contextual likelihood or relevance to
the task at hand, could emerge due to evolutionary optimization of the visual system towards
typically encountered behavioural tasks (see section 5.1 for further discussion).
An experimental paradigm that has been particularly important in understanding top-down
attentional control is visual search, where people are asked to detect a target stimulus as quickly
as possible, from among a varying number of non-target distractors (analogous to figure 2.2b).
Visual search experiments provided the main impetus for Treisman’s feature integration the-





Image Focus of attention
Figure 2.2: Illustration of involuntary and voluntary attentional control. (a) Attention is automat-
ically directed towards the red jacket in the image, as it differs strongly from the (mostly white)
background. (b) In this cluttered market scene, attention can be directed towards different lo-
cations, depending on the goal of the observer (i.e. whether they are searching for bananas
or umbrellas). Visual search experiments, where subjects have to search for a target stimulus
presented amongst distractors, provide a simple analogue of this real life scenario.
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Figure 2.3: Schematic of experimental paradigm to investigate how attentional control is learned
from experience (from (Yu and Dayan, 2005b)). On each trial, multiple sensory cues are pre-
sented, followed by a target stimulus presented at one of two locations after a variable delay.
The subject’s task is to detect the target stimulus as quickly as possible. Unknown to the sub-
ject, only one of the cues is predictive of the target location. The identity of the task-relevant cue
changes in each block of trials. The subject must use their acquired experience in the task to
infer which cue is relevant, so that they can direct attention towards the location that the target
is most likely to be presented.
ory, in which attention is required to group together simple features (e.g. colour, orientation)
into coherent percepts (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Wolfe et al., 1989; Cave and Wolfe, 1990;
Mozer and Baldwin, 2008) (see previous section). Related to the issue of perceptual grouping,
there has been much debate about whether attentional control is primarily space-based (Posner
et al., 1980), or object-based (Duncan, 1984). Conventionally, people were assumed to perform
visual search by attending to each spatial location in turn (i.e. a moving ‘spotlight’ of attention).
However, this idea was challenged by experiments showing that when one aspect of an object is
attended (e.g. its shape), other features associated with the object (e.g. colour, motion) are also
selected, even when the attended and ignored objects are spatially superimposed (O’Craven
et al., 1999; Roelfsema et al., 1998). However, space-based and object-based models of at-
tentional control are not necessarily mutually exclusive – people may use different attentional
strategies in different situations. Indeed, how the attentional control strategy depends on the
experimental setup (i.e. task and stimulus), and whether similar neural mechanisms underlie
both space-based and object-based attentional control are active areas of research (Yantis and
Serences, 2003; Hopfinger et al., 2000).
Top-down attention is generally assumed to select behaviourally relevant stimuli for in-
creased perceptual processing. However, in realistic situations, where people are not told what
to attend to, they must use their accumulated sensory experience and behavioural feedback to
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infer which stimuli are the most relevant and therefore, should be attended. Experimentally,
it has been shown that implicitly learned (i.e. subconscious) information about previously ob-
served stimulus contexts can help guide selective attention, resulting in improved behavioural
performance (Chun and Jiang, 1998; Chun, 2000; Chun and Nakayama, 2000). Recent the-
oretical work has proposed that this ‘attentional learning’ could be explained by assuming
that people accumulate sensory information about their environment in a statistically optimal
way (Dayan et al., 2000; Yu and Dayan, 2005b; Eckstein et al., 2004; Gershman et al., 2010).
For example, Yu & Dayan considered a hypothetical extension to the ‘Posner task’ (Posner
et al., 1980), in which a subject is presented with multiple sensory cues, followed by a target
presented at one of two spatial locations (figure 2.3). Unknown to the subject, only one of
the sensory cues provides task-relevant information about the spatial location that the target
stimulus is most likely to be presented. Further, the identity of the task-relevant cue changes
after a random number of trials. Yu & Dayan constructed a normative model to describe how
the subject should use their acquired sensory experience to infer which cue is task-relevant. In-
terestingly, the model differentiated between two kinds of uncertainty: ‘expected uncertainty’,
which comes from the known unreliability of the predictive cue; and ‘unexpected uncertainty’,
due to changes in context (i.e. the identity of the task-relevant cue) that produce unexpected
observations. While both types of uncertainty would promote learning about the context, they
would interact in a complex manner; for example, if the cue was known to be very unreliable
(i.e. high ‘expected uncertainty’), changes in context (that introduce ‘unexpected uncertainty’)
would have less impact on learning. Yu & Dayan’s work highlights the potential complexity of
attentional learning, which will likely depend not only on the subject’s knowledge of the stim-
ulus context, but also on the reliability of contextual information, and how much the subject
trusts their own knowledge.
We conducted a psychophysics experiment in which subjects were not explicitly told which
stimuli were most likely to be presented, but had to learn the stimulus statistics from experience
(chapter 3). Later, we simulated a behavioural task in which subjects were required to learn
which stimuli were task-relevant from feedback in the task (chapter 4). In both these studies,
our main aim was not to understand the learning process itself (although see section 5.2), but
rather, how acquired sensory experience and task-feedback is used to control visual attention
and expectations. In our psychophysics experiment, we sought to understand how implicitly
learned stimulus expectations alter visual perception (see section 2.3.1). The purpose of our
modeling work was to construct a theoretical framework that could predict the effects of atten-
tion directly from the properties of the behavioural task. This work was motivated by recent
experimental evidence indicating that small changes to the behavioural task, leading different
sizes of ‘attentional focus’, can produce qualitatively different changes in neural responses and
perception (see section 2.3.2).
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2.3 How does attention affect visual processing?
2.3.1 Does attention alter appearance?
A huge degree of experimental effort has been expended on studying how selective attention
alters perception. Providing a comprehensive review of such a large body of literature is beyond
the scope of this thesis (see (Pashler, 1998; Driver, 2001) for a historical overview). Instead,
we focus our discussion on a single area of debate that is relevant to our experimental work
(chapter 3): does attention alter the subjective appearance of visual stimuli?
Testing whether attention alters visual appearance is not as simple as it might at first seem.
Quantifying the subjective appearance of visual stimuli requires relying on people’s self-reports
about what they perceive, which could also be influenced by decision biases, memory, or eye
movements (Prinzmetal et al., 1997, 1998). Carrasco et al. conducted an experiment to in-
vestigate whether attention alters perceived stimulus contrast, which was designed carefully
to avoid these potential confounds (Carrasco et al., 2004). Subjects were presented with two
gratings, each at a different orientation and contrast, located to either side of a central fixa-
tion point. They were asked to “report the orientation of the stimulus that is higher/lower in
contrast”. This question was designed to reduce bias by placing emphasis on the orientation
discrimination task, while ‘disguising’ the comparative judgement of contrast that was the main
interest of the study. On some trials, a dot (the ‘cue’) appeared briefly at one of the grating sites
immediately before the gratings were presented, attracting involuntary attention towards this
location. Carrasco et al. found that the point of subjective equality (‘PSE’), where subjects
are equally likely to report the orientation of either grating, was shifted by the cue; for the
two gratings to appear to have the same contrast, the physical contrast of the uncued (i.e. unat-
tended) grating had to be higher than the cued (i.e. attended) grating. This result led Carrasco et
al. to conclude that attention increases perceived stimulus contrast. Subsequent work, using a
similar experimental design, has reported that involuntary attention can also increase perceived
spatial frequency (Gobell and Carrasco, 2005), colour saturation (Fuller and Carrasco, 2006),
speed (Turatto et al., 2007) and stimulus size (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2007).
Despite the attempts of Carrasco et al. to rule out alternative ‘non-perceptual’ explanations
for their results, some researchers have disputed whether the biases that they observed were
perceptual in origin (Schneider, 2006; Prinzmetal et al., 2008; Schneider and Komlos, 2008).
Schneider et al. hypothesized that, rather than altering the perceived stimulus contrast, attention
could affect the decision mechanism, causing subjects to report the cued stimulus as having a
higher contrast, despite the two stimuli being perceptually identical (Schneider and Komlos,
2008). To test this hypothesis, Schneider et al. changed the type of decision that subjects were
asked to perform from a comparative judgement (“which target has higher contrast?”) to an
equality judgement (“are the two targets equal in contrast”) that is resistant to decision bias.
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When subjects were asked to make a comparative judgement, Schneider et al. obtained similar
results to Carrasco et al., with attention-dependent shifts in the PSE. However, when subjects
were asked to perform an equality judgement, these attentional effects disappeared, and there
was no shift in the PSE. These results were used by Schneider et al. to support their hypothesis
that the reported effects of attention on perceptual appearance can be explained by decision
biases, and that attention does not alter appearance.
A shared characteristic of the reported attention-dependent changes in perceptual appear-
ance is that they are consistent with an increase in the saliency of the attended stimulus (e.g. all
else being equal, a high contrast stimulus will be more salient than a low contrast stimulus).
This fact alone might give rise to concerns of the type raised by Schneider et al.: if the saliency
of the attended stimulus is increased, subjects could be biased to report that they perceive fea-
tures that are consistent with this increase in saliency, despite the perceptual appearance of the
stimulus being unchanged. One way to get around this problem would be to investigate how at-
tention alters the perceptual appearance of visual features that do not impact on saliency, such
as the motion direction or orientation of an isolated stimulus. Indeed, previous studies have
shown that feature-based attention can modulate how different motion stimuli are perceptually
combined, thus altering their perceived direction (Chen et al., 2005; Tzvetanov et al., 2006).
For example, Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2005) found that attending towards one of two overlap-
ping motion signals reduces the degree of repulsion between them, so that the non-attended
motion direction is perceived as being closer to the attended motion direction than it would be
otherwise. However, in these studies, attention acted to select one of two competing motion
stimuli, and thus modified the interaction between processing of these different motion signals.
Whether feature-based attention alters the perceived motion direction in the absence of any
competing stimuli, has not been tested experimentally.
We conducted a psychophysics experiment to investigate how learned expectations alter
perceived motion direction (chapter 3). We found that subjects’ learned expectations altered
their perception of new stimulus motion directions, inducing an attractive perceptual bias to-
wards frequently presented motion directions. While these perceptual changes occurred as a
result of subjects’ ‘expectations’ rather than their ‘attentional state’ per se, a close relation-
ship is often observed between the perceptual effects produced by both phenomena (Downing,
1988; Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005) (i.e. the perceptual quality of both attended or expected
stimuli is increased; see section 3). Our modeling work (chapter 4) lends further support to the
hypothesis that attention alters appearance; it predicts that attention should induce attractive
perceptual biases towards task-relevant stimuli, in the absence of any changes to the presented
stimulus statistics (section 4.2.7).
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% attentional modulation
Figure 2.4: Effect of attention on the firing rate of neurons in visual area V4, with varying stimu-
lus contrast (adapted from (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009)). (a) Reynolds et al. found that atten-
tion increased neural responses at intermediate, but not at high stimulus contrasts – equivalent
to an attention-dependent increase in the effective stimulus contrast (Reynolds et al., 2000).
(b) However, Williford & Maunsell found that attention increased neural firing rates at high stim-
ulus contrasts, which could not be explained by an attention-dependent increase in the effective
stimulus contrast (Williford and Maunsell, 2006).
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2.3.2 Attentional modulation of visual neuron responses
Selective attention modulates neural responses at multiple stages of visual processing (Des-
imone and Duncan, 1995; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004), typically by increasing the firing
rate of neurons that are selective to an attended spatial location (Moran and Desimone, 1985;
Reynolds et al., 2000) or feature (Spitzer et al., 1988; Treue and Martínez Trujillo, 1999).
However, precisely how attentional modulation of neural responses depends on the presented
stimulus and behavioural task has been the subject of much debate (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009). Some results, in which attention is found to increase the responses of visual neurons to
an intermediate but not a high contrast stimulus (figure 2.4a), are consistent with an attention-
dependent shift in neural contrast response functions (neural firing rate plotted against stim-
ulus contrast) (Reynolds et al., 2000; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2002). These results led
Reynolds et al. to propose that attention acts as a ‘spotlight’ that increases the effective con-
trast of attended stimuli (contrast gain) (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2000).
However, other experiments have reported that attention can also increase neural firing rates
at high stimulus contrasts, which cannot be explained by an attention-dependent increase in
the effective stimulus contrast (figure 2.4b) (Williford and Maunsell, 2006; McAdams and
Maunsell, 1999; Motter, 1993). While contradicting the ‘contrast gain’ principle of Reynolds
et al., these experiments are consistent with the proposal that attention increases neural re-
sponses multiplicatively, by applying a fixed response gain factor (response gain) (McAdams
and Maunsell, 1999; Treue and Martínez Trujillo, 1999). Treue et al. proposed that the gain
factor depends on the similarity between the neuron’s stimulus selectivity, and the location or
feature being attended (Treue and Martínez Trujillo, 1999; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004).
They argued that this feature-similarity gain principle can account for the observed sharpening
of neuronal tuning curves when attention is directed towards a particular feature (Spitzer et al.,
1988; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004). Opposing the idea that attention alters responses via
a simple multiplicative gain factor, several studies have reported that the effects of attention
are greatly increased when multiple stimuli appear together within a neuron’s receptive field
(‘RF’) (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Reynolds et al., 1999). These studies find that, when mul-
tiple stimuli are presented within the RF, attention increases or decreases neural responses so
that they behave as though only the attended stimulus was present. To explain these results,
Duncan & Desimone proposed their biased competition theory, in which neurons representing
different stimuli compete, and attention biases competition in favour of neurons that encode
the attended stimulus (section 2.2) (Desimone and Duncan, 1995).
To account for the diverse effects of attention on the responses of visual neurons, Reynolds
& Heeger proposed their normalization model of attention, which combines aspects of many of
the previous proposals within a single framework (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). As this model
is closely related to our work, we describe it in some detail.
Chapter 2. Theories of goal-orientated attention and expectations 23
Normalization models of visual neural responses were initially introduced to provide a
simple explanation for suppressive phenomena observed in the responses of visual neurons (Si-
moncelli and Heeger, 1998; Carandini et al., 1997). These models include a ‘stimulus drive’,
representing the excitatory feedforward input to visual neurons, and a ‘suppressive drive’, rep-
resenting lateral inhibitory connections. The response of a neuron with RF centred at a location
x (‘R(x)’) is computed by dividing the stimulus drive (‘E (x)’) by the suppressive drive (‘S (x)’)
plus a constant (‘σ’) that determines the contrast gain:
R(x) =




where |·|T denotes rectification with respect to a threshold T. The suppressive drive is computed
by pooling the stimulus drive from neurons with RFs centred at a range of spatial locations:
S (x) = s(x)?E (x) , (2.2)
where ? denotes a convolution, and s(x) is the suppressive field, which determines the extent
of the spatial pooling.
To provide some intuition about how neural responses are computed from the model, we
set the excitatory drive E (x) proportional to the stimulus contrast, c. Thus, the response of a





where α is a constant of proportionality. From equation 2.3 we can see that when c is small
(c σ), the response grows linearly with contrast, while for large c (c σ) the response
saturates at a fixed value (r (c)→ α). Thus, the contrast response function (‘CRF’) predicted
by the model is qualitatively similar to what is observed experimentally, with neural firing
rates increasing monotonically at low to intermediate stimulus contrasts, before saturating at
high contrasts (figure 2.4).
Reynolds & Heeger extended this normalization model to account for attentional modu-
lation of neural responses. They hypothesized that an ‘attention field’ (A(x)) multiplicatively






S (x) = s(x)? [A(x)E (x)] . (2.5)
Depending on the relative size of the attended region (determined by the behavioural task), the
stimulus drive (determined by the presented stimulus and neural RFs), and the suppressive field
(the spatial extent of lateral inhibitory connections), Reynolds & Heeger showed that attention
can lead to either a ‘contrast gain’ or a ‘response gain’ modulation of neural responses. In the
following, we provide a simple explanation of how these effects come about in their model.
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First, consider the case where the attention field extends over a much larger region of
space than the presented stimulus. In this case, the attention field will be roughly constant
in magnitude over the spatial extent of the suppressive field, so that the response of a model










where γ > 1 represents the peak of the attention field. Thus, when the attended spatial region
is much larger than the stimulus, attention will increase the contrast gain of the model neuron
by a factor of γ (so that σe f f ≈ σ/γ).
Next, consider the case where the attention field extends over a much smaller region of
space than the stimulus. In this case, in addition to multiplicatively increasing the stimulus
drive at the focus of attention, the spatial extent of the stimulus drive (i.e. the effective stimulus
size) will be reduced by attention. Thus, the response of a model neuron with RF centred at the





where γ > 1 represents the peak of the attention field, and 0 < β < 1 represents the strength
of suppression from the region of the stimulus drive outside the focus of attention. When c is
small (c σ), the neural response is approximated by, r (c) ≈ αγc/σ: it is proportional to to
the attentional gain, γ. When c is large (c σ), the neural response saturates at a value given
by, r (c)≈ αγ/(γ+β), so that increasing γ will still give rise to an increased response.
To summarize, Reynolds & Heeger’s model predicts that when the size of the attentional
focus is large relative to the stimulus, a contrast gain effect should be observed, while when
the size of the attentional focus is small relative to the stimulus, a response gain effect should
be observed. This prediction led Reynolds & Heeger to propose that seemingly contradictory
experimental results, where attention gives rise to either a contrast gain (figure 2.4a) (Reynolds
et al., 2000) or a response gain (figure 2.4b) (Williford and Maunsell, 2006), could be explained
by differences in experimental setup; specifically, due to variations in the relative size of the
attended spatial region and the presented stimulus.
In addition to describing attentional modulation of neural CRFs, Reynolds & Heeger’s
model accounts for the observed effects of attention on neuronal tuning curves (described by the
feature-similarity gain principle of Treue et al. (Treue and Martínez Trujillo, 1999; Martinez-
Trujillo and Treue, 2004)), as well as attentional modulation of neural responses when mul-
tiple stimuli are present within the RF (described by Desimone & Duncan’s biased competi-
tion model (Desimone and Duncan, 1995)). Biased competition comes about in Reynolds &
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Heeger’s model as a consequence of divisive normalization, which ensures that neurons rep-
resenting different stimuli compete. Response gain modulation occurs when there is minimal
surround suppression, due to the simple multiplicative scaling of the excitatory stimulus drive.
Two alternative models of attention have been proposed that share a similar mathematical
form to the normalization model of attention (Lee and Maunsell, 2009; Ghose, 2009). In com-
mon with Reynolds & Heeger, Ghose proposed that attention dynamically modulates the inputs
to visual neurons, which combine nonlinearly to give rise to the observed neural responses (Lee
and Maunsell, 2009). Alternatively, Lee & Maunsell proposed that attention modulates divi-
sive normalization, without affecting the neuronal inputs themselves (Lee and Maunsell, 2009).
The merit of these models comes from the fact that they are able to account for a broad range
of experimentally observed effects of attention, using a small number of assumptions. How-
ever, they make no attempt to explain why attention is required, or how it should be allocated.
One might argue that this is not a valid criticism of these models: they were designed to de-
scribe the effects of attention, not its cause. However, the fact that the attentional state is not
constrained by the models themselves, makes some of their predictions difficult to test exper-
imentally. For example, as discussed, Reynolds & Heeger’s model predicts that the effects of
attention on neural CRFs should depend qualitatively on the size of the attentional focus. How-
ever, as their model does not describe how the size of the attentional focus is determined by
the behavioural task, this prediction will be hard to verify without resorting to vague heuristics
about the assumed allocation of attention.
Recently, Chikkerur et al. showed that Reynolds & Heeger’s normalization model can be
derived from functional principles (Chikkerur et al., 2010), using a normative Bayesian frame-
work. As described previously (section 1.2), Bayesian models of visual processing hypothesize
that the brain learns a generative model describing how the hidden state of the world (‘s’) gen-
erates the observed sensory input (‘I’). The assumed goal of visual processing is to invert this
generative model, inferring the posterior probability distribution over the hidden states (p(s|I)).
Chikkerur et al. hypothesized that each neuron represents a single binary hidden variable, with
firing rate proportional to the posterior probability that the corresponding hidden variable is
active: p(si = 1|I) = p(si = 1, I)/p(I). Given certain additional assumptions about the form
of the internal model, Chikkerur et al. showed that this expression has a very similar mathe-
matical form to the expression for neural firing rates in Reynolds & Heeger’s model. Notably,
while divisive normalization was an assumption in Reynolds & Heeger’s model, it emerges
automatically in the work of Chikkerur et al. as a consequence of the Bayesian formulation
of their model (due to the denominator in Bayes’ rule, p(I)). However, in order to simulate
the effects of attention, Chikkerur et al. had to impose an ad hoc ‘attentional prior’ (patt (s)),
analogous to the ‘attention field’ used by Reynolds & Heeger.
While the model of Chikerrur et al. gives insight into the functional principles that could
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Figure 2.5: Demonstration of the effect of expectations on perceptual appearance. Our strong
expectation for light to come from above determines the perceived three-dimensional shape of
the ellipses shown above (rotate the page to invert the shapes).
underlie Reynolds & Heeger’s normalization model, it suffers from a similar weakness: it does
not describe how the ‘attentional prior’ is determined by behavioural demands and sensory
experience. We address this question in chapter 4. In common with Chikerrur et al., our
Bayesian model of visual processing gives rise to a similar expression for neural firing rates
as Reynolds & Heeger normalization model. However, unlike the work of Chikkerur et al.,
attention-dependent changes to the perceptual prior are predicted as a direct consequence of
optimizing performance in the behavioural task.
Eckstein et al. highlight the difficulty in relating measured changes to neural responses to
high-level psychological theories of attention (Eckstein et al., 2009). They use a statistical de-
cision theoretic framework to compare the neural predictions made by two competing theories
of attentional selection: a ‘limited resources’ model, where attention increases sensory sen-
sitivity to a target stimulus; and a ‘selective weighting’ model, where attention does no alter
sensory sensitivity, rather how information is integrated, giving higher weighting to a target
stimulus. Interestingly, Eckstein et al. find that the predicted changes to neural activity vary
radically depending on their assumptions about the encoded variables, making it very difficult
to distinguish between the two theories.
2.4 Similarities & differences between expectations & goal-orientated
attention
In chapter 1 I made a distinction between goal-orientated attention, which prioritizes percep-
tual processing of behaviourally relevant stimuli, and expectations, which constrain perceptual
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processing depending on the statistical likelihood that different stimuli are presented (Sum-
merfield and Egner, 2009). However, this distinction is not always made in the experimental
literature, where the perceptual and neurophysiological effects of varying stimulus statistics are
often conflated with the effects of varying task context (Posner et al., 1980; Ghose and Maun-
sell, 2002). A potential reason for this is that attention and expectations are generally thought to
be controlled by similar cognitive processes, which allocate increased resources to the percep-
tual processing of stimuli that are either behaviourally relevant or contextually likely (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002). Recently however, Summerfield & Egner challenged this view, pointing
to experimental data indicating that expectations give rise to qualitatively different changes
in neural activity from those produced by attention (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). In this
section, I briefly review the perceptual and neurophysiological changes that occur as a result
of varying the behavioural versus the statistical context of presented stimuli, and discuss the
relation between expectations and goal-orientated attention.
2.4.1 Perceptual effects of expectations
It is well established that expectations modulate perceptual performance; for example, by in-
creasing subjects’ speed and accuracy at detecting stimuli that are presented at an expected
location (Posner et al., 1980; Sekuler and Ball, 1977; Downing, 1988), or by improving the
recognition of objects that are expected within the context of a visual scene (Bar, 2004). In ad-
dition to modulating perceptual performance, expectations can also alter the subjective appear-
ance of visual stimuli, so that stimuli are perceived as being more similar to what is expected
than they actually are (see section 2.3.1 for discussion of the effects of attention on perceptual
appearance). These changes in perceptual appearance are strongest when the available sensory
inputs are ambiguous; when there are multiple competing explanations for the received sensory
input (Haijiang et al., 2006; Sterzer et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2004).
Expectations can be manipulated quickly, through instructions (Sterzer et al., 2008), sen-
sory cues (Posner et al., 1980), or exposure to novel stimulus statistics (Sotiropoulos et al.,
2011). However, in addition to rapidly acquired expectations that reflect the current stimulus
context, people also exhibit global expectations that reflect the statistical structure of natural
images (Sekuler and Ball, 1977; Posner et al., 1980; Downing, 1988). For example, our expec-
tation for light to come from above determines how we perceive the shaded circles shown in
figure 2.5 (Sun and Perona, 1998). This type of expectation is presumably acquired over long
periods of time, during evolution and development, and thus might be assumed to be resistant
to change (Hyvärinen, 2010; Geisler, 2003). Interestingly however, recent work has shown that
long-term expectations can be altered or reversed as a result of acquired sensory experience,
indicating that visual expectations are continuously updated in the light of new information
about the environment (Adams et al., 2004; Sotiropoulos et al., 2011).
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2.4.2 Neurophysiological effects of expectations
Expectations and attention modulate perceptual performance in a qualitatively similar way, in-
creasing detection performance and accuracy in discriminating stimuli that are either attended
or expected. Therefore, one might anticipate that they would give rise to similar neurophysi-
ological changes. However, a recent review by Summerfield & Egner suggests that this is not
the case (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). While attention is consistently observed to increase
visual responses to an attended stimulus (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004), Summerfield & Egner
cite fMRI and EEG data reporting a reduction in visual responses are reduced towards stimuli
that are statistically likely (Yoshiura et al., 1999; Marois et al., 2000).
Summerfield & Egner argue that the observed effects of expectations on neural responses
are consistent with predictive coding: the hypothesis that sensory neurons a ‘prediction error’,
relating to the difference between the sensory input that is expected and the sensory input that is
received (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). If this hypothesis is true, then
an expected stimulus should produce a smaller prediction error, giving rise to a reduction in
neural firing rates. In other words, as the predictive coding framework assumes that the visual
system is set up to process unexpected input (i.e. surprises), goal-directed attention and expec-
tations should produce very different changes to visual processing: the visual system should be
desensitized to expected (i.e. unsurprising) sensory inputs, but sensitized to ‘interesting’ (i.e.
task-relevant or surprising) sensory inputs.
Unfortunately, there has been little experimental investigation into how expectations alter
the activity of single neurons (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). However, there is some evidence
to suggest that, contrary to the imaging data reviewed by Summerfield & Egner, the responses
of visual neurons are increased when the stimuli that they encode are expected (Ghose and
Maunsell, 2002; Ghose and Bearl, 2010; Jaramillo and Zador, 2011). For example, Ghose et
al. conducted experiments investigating how the responses of neurons in V4 and MT depend
on the precise temporal structure of a behavioural task (Ghose and Maunsell, 2002; Ghose and
Bearl, 2010). They used an experimental protocol where monkeys had to detect a stimulus
change (a change in luminance) whose probability of occurrence varied in time. Attention-
dependent increases in the responses of neurons encoding task-relevant stimuli were found to
depend on the probability of stimulus change at each moment in time; largest increases in
response were observed when the probability of stimulus change was high.
Further experimental evidence suggesting that expectations increase neural firing rates
comes from experiments reporting that the responses of visual neurons are increased when the
stimuli that they encode are ‘expected’ from their contextual surroundings (Komatsu, 2006).
For example, the responses of V1 neurons to a low contrast orientated stimulus presented within
their RF are increased by the addition of collinear flankers presented in the surrounding region
of space (Kapadia et al., 2000; Polat et al., 1998) (although the opposite effect is observed at
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high-contrast; see (Seriès et al., 2003) for discussion of experimental controversy).
How can these conflicting experimental data be reconciled? One possibility is that the
qualitative effect of expectations on neural activity depends on the behavioural relevance of
expected stimuli; sensory signals produced by a frequently observed but behaviourally irrele-
vant stimulus could be filtered out during sensory processing, while sensory signals that come
from an expected stimulus that is behaviourally relevant are enhanced. For example, an ex-
perimental paradigm where expectations are consistently found to decrease visual responses
is the ‘odd-ball’ task, in which subjects are required to detect a rare (i.e. unexpected) target
stimulus presented amongst frequent (i.e. expected) distractors (Yoshiura et al., 1999). On the
other hand, Ghose et al. found that the responses of visual neurons are increased when a be-
haviourally relevant change in the encoded stimulus is expected (Ghose and Maunsell, 2002).
If the effects of expectations depend on behavioural demands, then it may be hard to distin-
guish the effects of goal-orientated attention from the effects of expectations. For example, in
our psychophysics task, subjects’ expectations were manipulated by presenting stimuli moving
in some directions more frequently than other directions. However, as subjects were required
to perform a behavioural task, reporting the direction that stimuli were moving in, their per-
ception of presented stimuli could have been altered by the behavioural relevance, as well as
the statistical likelihood of presented stimuli. Nevertheless, a simple Bayesian model, that as-
sumed that subjects’ perception of presented stimuli was altered by learned information about
the stimulus statistics alone was able to provide a good description of their behaviour in this
task.
In chapter 4 we propose a Bayesian model of visual processing that can account for changes
in visual neural responses that occur either due to changes in either the behavioural task or the
presented stimulus statistics. In our simulations we consider an experimental protocol in which
all stimuli are equally likely to be presented but only certain stimuli are relevant to the task. In
this case, and given certain assumptions about the observer’s internal model and neural code,
our model predicts that the firing rate of neurons that are tuned to behaviourally relevant stimuli
should be increased. While the simulated protocol was chosen deliberately to investigate the
neural effects of varying behavioural context in the absence of varying stimulus statistics, in the
future it would be interesting to investigate the case where both the task demands and stimulus
statistics are manipulated simultaneously, as is often the case experimentally.
2.4.3 Bayesian formulation of expectations and attention
We might try to use the available neurophysiological and perceptual data to ask: “what is the
relation between expectations and goal-orientated attention?” However, this question is poorly
defined: there is no reason to assume that a unitary cognitive process associated with either ‘ex-
pectations’ or ‘attention’ exists. Furthermore, the perceptual and neurophysiological effects of
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these phenomena are complex and depend nontrivially on the precise setup of the behavioural
task and the presented stimuli. Alternatively, rather than getting caught in the (possibly false)
dichotomy between ‘expectations’ and ‘attention’, we can choose to abandon these terms al-
together, asking the more concrete question: “how do changes in behavioural demands and
stimulus statistics alter visual processing?” In this view, we would not consider expectations
and attention as the cause of changes in visual processing, but see them as descriptive terms,
referring to the perceptual and neurophysiological consequences of changing stimulus statistics
and behavioural demands (Anderson, 2011).
Note this view is not incompatible with an internal mechanism that causes attention-dependent
changes in perception and neural responses. However, as long as we do not know what this
internal mechanism is, it makes sense to consider the ‘higher cause’ of such internal changes
which are under direct experimental control: namely, the presented stimuli and behavioural
task.Bayesian models provide a natural framework for considering how the statistics of sen-
sory stimuli modulate perceptual processing. In these models, subjects’ expectations are rep-
resented by a prior probability distribution, which denotes the probability that they associate
with different states of the world. Bayesian theory describes how prior expectations should
be combined with sensory signals to perform perceptual inference, as well as how the prior
should be updated when new sensory information is received (Jaynes, 1986; MacKay, 2003).
Thus, Bayesian models make precise predictions about the perceptual biases and changes in
perceptual performance that should be induced by a given perceptual prior.
These predictions have been tested in numerous psychophysical experiments, which indi-
cate that in simple tasks, people combine their prior expectations with available sensory evi-
dence in a probabilistically optimal manner (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006b; Weiss et al., 2002;
Girshick et al., 2011; Knill, 2007; Körding and Wolpert, 2004). Some researchers have inves-
tigated the effect of ‘structural priors’, that reflect the statistics of natural sensory signals. For
example, Simoncelli and colleagues have shown that people exhibit systematic biases in their
estimates of visual features such as orientation and motion direction, which can be explained
by assuming that they use a perceptual prior that is well matched to the statistics of natural sen-
sory signals (Weiss et al., 2002; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006b; Girshick et al., 2011). Other
researchers have investigated the effect of ‘contextual priors’, that reflect the stimulus statistics
in a particular experimental context. These researchers have shown that people are able to learn
prior expectations about novel statistics introduced during a psychophysical task, and that they
combine these expectations with available sensory information in a manner consistent with
Bayesian inference (Adams et al., 2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Knill, 2007; Sotiropoulos
et al., 2011).
However, previous experiments looking at rapidly learned ‘contextual priors’, provided
subjects with additional (haptic) feedback during learning, which could be used to disam-
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Figure 2.6: When viewed at a slant, planar figures (left) project to compressed figures in the
retinal image (right). A statistical tendency for figures to be isotropic (distributed evenly in all
directions) means that the projected retinal image is informative about 3D surface orientation.
Thus, people are more likely to interpret an elliptical retinal image as corresponding to an oblique
circle than a vertical ellipse.
biguate the presented visual stimuli (Adams et al., 2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2004). As,
in most real-world situations people do not receive haptic information about their received vi-
sual input, an important question is whether sensory priors can be acquired quickly from visual
input alone. To address this question, Knill conducted a psychophysics experiment investigat-
ing how subjects’ learned expectations about stimulus shape alter how they interpret pictorial
cues to depth (Knill, 2007). In this experiment, subjects were asked to judge the planar orien-
tation of randomly shaped ellipses (figure 2.6). Under normal conditions, subjects exhibited a
prior expectation for regularly shaped objects, causing elliptical stimuli to be perceived as cir-
cles presented at an oblique angle. Prolonged exposure to a stimulus distribution that included
a large number of randomly shaped ellipses reduced subjects’ prior expectation for circular
stimuli. Consequently, after training, they gave progressively less weight to stimulus shape,
and more weight to stereoscopic cues, in their estimates of stimulus slant.
In Knill’s experiment, subjects’ learned expectations influenced how they combined differ-
ent sources of sensory information (pictorial versus stereoscopic cues): subjects learned that
the stimulus shape was an unreliable cue for judging the stimulus slant, causing them to rely
more strongly on stereoscopic cues. However, as well as altering how different sources of sen-
sory information are combined, subjects’ learned expectations should alter their perception of
simple stimulus features, so that they appear more similar to expected stimulus features than
they actually are. To test this prediction, we examined whether expectations of simple stimulus
features can be developed implicitly through a fast statistical learning procedure, and if so, how
these learned expectations bias subjects’ perception of newly presented stimuli (chapter 3). We
found that subjects rapidly learned to expect frequently presented motion directions, and that
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these learned expectations resulted in estimation biases towards these motion directions, as
well as hallucinations when no stimulus was presented. Subjects’ behaviour in the task was
well explained by a model that assumed that they followed a Bayesian strategy, combining
their learned expectations (the prior) with received sensory data (the likelihood) according to
Bayes’ law.
While Bayesian theory makes unambiguous predictions about how prior expectations should
alter visual perception, the predicted changes to neural responses are less clear. One reason is
that it is not known how (or whether) probability distributions are encoded by neurons (sec-
tion 5.3). Nonetheless, given certain assumptions about the encoding scheme, some researchers
have investigated how prior expectations should alter sensory neural responses (Ganguli and
Simoncelli, 2010; Shi and Griffiths, 2009; Simoncelli, 2009). Indeed, many of the Bayesian
models of attention discussed earlier attribute the effects of attention on neural responses as due
to changes in the perceptual prior (Dayan and Zemel, 1999; Yu and Dayan, 2005a; Rao, 2005;
Chikkerur et al., 2010) (see section 2.1). In these models, the main effect of increasing the prior
probability associated with a particular stimulus feature or location is to increase the firing rate
of model neurons that encode this feature or location. However, in addition to depending on
the assumed encoding scheme, the effect of varying stimulus statistics on neural responses will
also depend on the structure of the internal model in the brain (section 5.1). For example,
Schwartz and others have shown that, if the aim of visual processing is to extract ‘independent’
components of sensory signals, presenting a particular stimulus frequently could give rise to a
reduction in the responses of neurons that are tuned towards this stimulus (Wainwright et al.,
2001; Schwartz and Simoncelli, 2001; Schwartz et al., 2007, 2009). Thus, understanding how
expectations alter neural responses requires asking deep questions about how sensory informa-
tion is represented in the brain, and how this information is encoded neurally.
The behavioural relevance of sensory signals depends on how useful they are in making
decisions, or performing actions. Thus, to understand how behavioural demands should alter
perceptual processing we can consider a Bayesian decision theory framework, which describes
how uncertain sensory information should be used to make perceptual decisions (Yuille and
Bulthoff, 1996; Körding and Wolpert, 2006). Behavioural demands are incorporated in this
framework through the use of a utility function, which denotes the expected utility associated
with each decision, given the hidden state of the world (equation 1.2). However, while Bayesian
decision theory predicts how behavioural demands should influence decisions, it does not nec-
essarily follow that behavioural demands should also influence perceptual processing itself.
That is, if there are no constraints on perceptual processing and the agent is able to learn the
‘true’ model of their environment, the inferred posterior distribution should not be affected
by behavioural demands: if perceptual processing is unlimited, all sensory signals should be
processed, not just those that are behaviourally relevant.
Chapter 2. Theories of goal-orientated attention and expectations 33
Understanding how behavioural demands influence perception requires considering the
limited computational resources that are available to process sensory signals (discussed in sec-
tion 2.1). In contrast, varying the stimulus statistics should alter perceptual processing even
in the absence of any limited computational resources, to improve inferences about intrinsi-
cally ambiguous sensory information. In general, the visual system is faced with both external
limitations on the available sensory information, and internal limitations on the computational
resources available to process this information. Together, expectations and attention describe
the strategies that the brain uses to deal with these limitations; where prior knowledge about the
statistics and behavioural relevance of sensory signals is used to optimize perceptual processing
and improve behavioural performance.
Chapter 3
Effect of learned expectations on
visual motion perception
In this chapter, we describe a psychophysics experiment that was conducted to investigate
whether expectations of simple stimulus features can be developed implicitly through fast sta-
tistical learning, and if so, how these expectations are combined with visual signals to modulate
perception. We examined this question in the context of motion perception, in a design where
some motion directions were more likely to appear than others. Our hypothesis was that par-
ticipants would automatically learn which directions were most likely to be presented and that
these learned expectations would bias their perception of motion direction. A secondary hy-
pothesis was that participants would solve the task using a Bayesian strategy, combining a
learned prior of the stimulus statistics (the expectation) with their sensory evidence (the actual
stimulus) using Bayes’ rule. This work was published in Journal of Vision (Chalk et al., 2010),
and the main findings were replicated by Gekas et al. (Gekas et al., 2011).
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Observers and stimuli
Twenty naive observers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in this experi-
ment. All participants in the study gave informed written consent, received compensation for
their participation and were recruited from the Riverside, CA area. The University of Califor-
nia, Riverside Institutional Review Board approved the methods used in the study, which was
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Visual stimuli were generated using the Matlab programming language and displayed using
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) on Viewsonic P95f monitor running at
1024X768 at 100Hz. The display luminance of the CRT monitor was made linear by means of
an 8-bit lookup table. Participants viewed the display in a darkened room at a viewing distance
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Figure 3.1: (a) Sequence of events in a single trial. Each trial began with a fixation point,
followed by the appearance of a motion stimulus. A central bar projecting from the fixation point
was presented simultaneously with the motion stimulus, and allowed participants to estimate the
direction of motion. After either participants had made an estimation, or a period of 3000ms had
elapsed, the stimulus disappeared and was replaced by a vertical line, with text to either side.
Participants moved a cursor to either side of the line to indicate whether they had perceived the
motion stimulus. (b) Probability distribution of presented motion directions. Two directions, 64°
apart from each other, were presented in a larger number of trials than other directions. Motion
direction is plotted relative to a reference direction at 0°, which was different for each subject.
of 100 cm with their motion constrained by a chin rest. Motion stimuli consisted of a field of
dots (density: 2 dots/deg2 at 100Hz refresh rate) moving coherently at a speed of 9°/sec within
a circular annulus, with minimum and maximum diameter of 2.2° and 7° respectively. The
background luminance of the display was set to 5.2 cd/m2.
3.1.2 Procedure
At the beginning of each trial a central fixation point (0.5° diameter, luminance 12.2cd/m2) was
presented for 400 ms. With the fixation point still onscreen, the motion stimulus was then pre-
sented, along with a red bar which projected out (initial angle of bar randomized for each trial)
from the fixation point (figure 3.1a). The bar was located entirely within the centre of the an-
nulus containing the moving dots (length 1.1°, width 0.03°, luminance 3.4cd/m2). Participants
indicated the direction of motion by orienting the red bar with a mouse, clicking the mouse
button when they had made their estimate (estimation task). The display cleared when either
the participant had clicked on the mouse, or a period of 3000ms had elapsed. On trials where
no motion stimulus was presented, the red bar still appeared and participants were required
to estimate the perceived direction of motion as normal. Participants were instructed to fixate
on the central point throughout this period. Participants’ reaction time in the estimation task
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determined how long the stimulus was presented for. On average this was equal to 1978±85ms
(standard error on the mean; see figure 3.10c for a plot of reaction time versus presented motion
direction).
Note that, while participants’ were requested to maintain fixation throughout the period
while the motion stimuli was displayed, we did not check whether they maintained fixation
on the centre of the screen. Thus it is possible that participants’ eye-movements could have
influenced their behaviour in the task (see section 3.4.4 for discussion).
After the estimation task had finished, there was a 200ms delay before a vertical white line
was presented at the centre of the screen, with text to either side (reading ‘NO DOTS’ and
‘DOTS’ respectively). Participants moved a cursor to the right or left of this line to indicate
whether they had or had not seen a motion stimulus, and clicked the mouse button to indicate
their choice (detection task). The cursor flashed green or red for a correct or incorrect detection
response, respectively. The screen was then cleared and there was a 400 ms blank period before
the beginning of the next trial.
Every 20 trials, participants were presented block feedback on the estimation task, with
text display on screen informing participants their average estimation for the previous 20 trials
(e.g. “In the last 20 trials, your average estimation error was: 20°”). Block feedback, rather
than trial-by-trial feedback was given, because we wanted to encourage participants to do their
best at the estimation task, without interfering with their estimation behaviour on each trial.
After completing both experimental sessions, participants were handed a questionnaire,
where they were asked to comment on the stimuli presented during the experiment, and in
particular, whether they were aware of stimuli moving in some directions more than others
(figure 3.2).
3.1.3 Design
Participants took part in two experimental sessions lasting around one hour each, taken over
successive days. Each session was divided into 5 blocks of 170 trials where all stimulus con-
figurations were presented, making 1700 trials in total (850 trials per session).
Participants were presented with stimuli at 4 different randomly interleaved contrast levels.
The highest contrast level was at 1.7cd/m2 above the 5.2cd/m2 background. For each session
there were 250 trials at zero contrast and 100 trials at high contrast. Contrasts of other stimuli
were determined using a staircase procedure on subjects’ detection performance (García-Pérez,
1998). For each session there were 135 trials using a 2/1 staircase and 365 trials using a
4/1 staircase (an n/1 staircase implies that the stimulus contrast decreases by a fixed step-size
following n correct detection responses, and increases by the same amount following a single
incorrect response).
For the two staircased contrast levels, on a given trial the direction of motion could be
Chapter 3. Effect of learned expectations on visual motion perception 37
Questionnaire
1. Did you find the first or second easier, or were they both the same? (please circle as appropriate)
	 1st session easier	 	 	  	 2nd session easier 	 	 	 about the same
2. Did you notice anything unusual about the number of motion stimuli that were moving in each 
direction? For example, were some directions shown more than others?  If yes, please describe in 
more detail what you saw.
3. If you filled in the last question, then was this the same in both sessions? (circle as appropriate)
  Yes     No      Don’t know
4. How many directions of motion do you think there were? (circle as appropriate)
 1,     2,       3,    between 4 and 10,  more than 10,   don’t know
5. Did you ever think you saw moving dots, and then it turned out there were none there?
  Yes     No       Don’t know
6. Which of the following descriptions best describes the distribution of motion directions that you 
saw? (tick statement that you most agree with)
	 (a)	 There were equal number of stimuli moving in all directions.
	 (b)	 Most of the stimuli were centred around one central direction of motion.
	 (c)	 Most of the stimuli were centred around 2 different directions of motion.
	 (d)	 There were only two possible directions of motion.
 (e) Don’t know.
7. If in the last question you selected (b), (c) or (d), can you draw a line (or lines) from the centre of 
this diagram out to the edge, indicating the direction(s) that were most frequently presented?
 1
Figure 3.2: Experimental questionnaire. The form was completed by participants after complet-
ing their second experimental session.
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0° ±16°, ±32°, ±48° or ±64°, with respect to a central reference angle. To reduce poten-
tial biases in the population averaged results due to reference repulsion from cardinal motion
directions (Rauber and Treue, 1998), this central motion direction was randomized across par-
ticipants. We manipulated participants’ expectations about which motion directions were most
likely to occur by presenting stimuli moving at ±32° more frequently than the others (fig-
ure 3.1b). Therefore, at the 4/1 staircased contrast level, there were 130 trials per session with
motion at -32° and +32°, and 15 trials per session for each of the other directions of motion.
At the 2/1 staircased contrast level there were an equal number of stimuli moving in each of
the predetermined directions: 15 trials per session for each motion direction. At the highest
contrast level there were 25 trials per session with motion at -32° and +32° and 50 trials per ses-
sion at completely random directions (among all possible directions, not just the predetermined
directions used in the rest of the experiment).
3.1.4 Data analysis
In our analysis of the estimation task, we looked only at trials where participants both reported
seeing a stimulus and clicked on the mouse during stimulus presentation to indicate their esti-
mate of motion direction. The first 100 trials from each session (~25 trials from each contrast
staircase) were excluded from analysis, to allow the staircases to converge on stable contrast
levels. Data was analyzed for the 12 (of 20) participants who could adequately perform both
tasks according to our predetermined performance criteria of detection performance greater
than 80% and mean absolute estimation error less than 30° with the highest contrast stimuli
in both experimental sessions (see section 3.2.1 for analysis of excluded participants’ estima-
tion performance). Importantly, our analysis of participants’ performance in the estimation
task looked only at their responses to staircased contrast levels, and not their responses to the
highest contrast stimuli, which we used to determine which participants should be included.
In the estimation task, the variance of participants’ motion direction estimates tended to be
quite large and varied greatly across different participants and motion directions. We postulated
that this was due to the fact that in some trials participants made completely random estimates.
Thus, we fitted participants’ estimation responses to the distribution:
p(θest |µ,κ,a) = (1−a)V (θest ;µ,κ)+ a2π , (3.1)
where ‘a’ denotes the proportion of trials where the participant make random estimates, and
‘V (θest ;µ,κ)’ is a von Mises (circular normal) distribution with mean ‘µ’ and width determined
by ‘1/κ’, given by:
V (θest ;µ,κ) =
1
2πI0 (κ)
exp(κcos(θest −µ)) , (3.2)
where I0 (κ) is the modified Bessel function of order 0. Parameters (a, κ and µ) were fitted for
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Figure 3.3: Population averaged stimulus contrast, relative to background contrast, for the 4/1
(blue) and 2/1 (red) staircased contrast levels, plotted against trial number (from the 1st experi-
mental session only).










where the summation is taken over all trials with a particular presented motion direction. Par-
ticipants’ estimation mean and standard deviation were taken as the circular mean and standard
deviation of the von Mises distribution (µ and σ respectively) The mean estimation biases ob-
tained using this method were qualitatively similar to those obtained by simply averaging across
trials. However, the variances obtained from the parametric fits were significantly smaller and
more consistent across participants, than when the estimation variance was measured directly
from the data. Therefore, in all of the following analysis we used this parametric method to
quantify estimation biases and variances.
There was no significant interaction between experimental session and motion direction on
the estimation bias or standard deviation (p = 0.11 and p = 0.41 respectively, 4-way within-
subjects ANOVA). Therefore, we collapsed data across the two experimental sessions.
There was a considerable degree of overlap between the luminance levels achieved using
both staircases (figure 3.3). After discounting the first 100 trials from each session, the popula-
tion averaged standard deviation in the luminance of the 2/1 and the 4/1 staircased levels over
the course of one experimental session was 0.051±0.001cd/m2 and 0.054±0.001cd/m2 respec-
tively; similar to the average luminance difference between the two levels (0.052±0.004cd/m2).
Further, there was no significant difference between the luminance levels achieved for both
staircases (p = 0.23, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA). This was reflected in the estimation data:
there was no significant difference between participants’ estimation standard deviations for
both staircased contrast levels (p = 0.12, 4-way within-subjects ANOVA). Therefore, we col-
lapsed data across these contrast levels for all of the analysis described in the main text (al-
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though see section 3.2.3 for our analysis of how the stimulus contrast influenced participants’
estimation behaviour).
To analyze the distribution of estimations when no stimulus was present, we constructed
histograms of participants’ responses, binned into 16° windows. We converted these response
histograms into probability distributions, by normalizing them over all motion directions for
each participant individually. There was no significant interaction between experimental ses-
sion and motion direction on the response histograms (p = 0.87, 4-way within-subjects ANOVA).
There was also no significant 3-way interaction between motion direction, experimental ses-
sion and detection-response (p = 0.81, 4-way within-subjects ANOVA). Therefore we collapsed
data across experimental sessions for analysis of the participants’ responses when no stimulus
was present.
We were interested in how the uneven distribution of presented motion directions influ-
enced participants’ perception of the motion stimuli. By design, the probability distribution of
presented motion stimuli was symmetrical around a central motion angle (figure 3.1b). There-
fore, we reasoned that any asymmetry in participants’ estimation and detection behaviour for
stimuli moving to either side of the central motion direction was likely due to factors other
than the distribution of presented stimuli that was used, such as ‘reference biases’ towards or
away from caudal motion directions (Rauber and Treue, 1998; Girshick et al., 2011). Rather
than investigating these systematic biases directly, we attempted to average out their effect, by
averaging data from participants presented with different stimulus distributions (i.e. with a dif-
ferent central motion direction), as well as averaging data from when stimuli were moving to
either side of the central motion direction. For the estimation task, this also required reversing
the sign of the estimation biases for stimuli moving anti-clockwise from the central motion
direction before averaging (see appendix A for ‘unfolded’ versions of figures 3.5a, 3.7a & 3.8).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Performance of subjects in detection and estimation task
In order to ensure that participants performed adequately in the psychophysical task we used
a predetermined performance criteria for inclusion into the study. First, participants were re-
quired to detect the motion stimuli on more than 80% of trials with the high contrast motion
stimuli while also making active estimates of the motion directions by clicking the mouse. Sec-
ond, their average estimation performance on the high contrast stimuli had to be within 30° of
the correct angle.
We discounted 3/20 participants who did not meet our first criterion in either experimental
session. The included participants managed to both detect stimuli and click on the mouse
during stimulus presentation to make an estimation of motion direction, on almost every trial
Chapter 3. Effect of learned expectations on visual motion perception 41










































































Figure 3.4: Performance of different participants in estimation task, with the high contrast stimuli.
(a) The mean absolute estimation error is plotted separately for each experimental session
(session 1 and 2 are plotted in blue and red respectively), and for each participant. Participants
whose rms estimation error was less than 30° in both sessions were included in our analysis,
and are denoted by filled dots while participants who did not meet this criterion were discounted
from our analysis are denoted by crosses. The mean absolute error that corresponds to chance
performance in the task (90°) and our criterion rms error (30°) are denoted by horizontal dashed
lines. (b) Response probability histogram of estimation error with the high contrast stimuli, for
included (red) and excluded participants (red). (c) Fraction of trials where participants moved
the bar less than 1° from its initial position during the estimation task. Included and excluded
participants are shown in red and black respectively.
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with the high contrast stimuli (97±0.3% of trials).
The 17/20 participants who passed the criterion for the detection task could be separated
according to their estimation performance into two distinct groups (figure 3.4a): 12/20 partici-
pants who passed our criterion and performed well in the estimation task (population averaged
absolute error of 12.8±0.9°) and 5/20 participants who failed our criterion for the estimation
task, performing at near chance levels (with an average rms error of 77.0±4.9°, compared to an
average absolute error of 90° that would be expected if they made completely random estima-
tions). Figure 3.4b illustrates the estimation error response probability histograms for included
participants (blue) and excluded participants (red) in response to the high contrast stimuli. It
is clear from this plot that the excluded participants performed extremely badly at the estima-
tion task, with a distribution of estimation errors that was almost uniform (p = 0.19, 2-way
within-subjects ANOVA), even with the highly visible high contrast stimuli.
If excluded participants really were not attempting the estimation task at all, then we
thought it likely that they would click on the bar immediately during the estimation task, with-
out moving it from its initial (random) orientation. This is indeed what we found: on average
the excluded participants did not move the bar more than 1° from its initial position on 79±5%
of trials with the high contrast stimuli; significantly more than 7±1% of trials for included
participants (p<0.001 rank-sum test; figure 3.4c). Excluded participants also performed the
estimation task more quickly than included participants, further supporting the argument that
they were not really trying to do well in this task (average reaction time of 1.44±0.07s as op-
posed to 0.89±0.12s for the included versus the excluded participants; p = 0.027, rank-sum
test).
Our results suggest that rather than just performing worse in the estimation task due to
finding it difficult, excluded participants did not try to perform the estimation task at all: they
left the estimation bar in its initial position and performed at near chance levels, even with the
highly visible high contrast motion stimuli.
3.2.2 Estimates of motion direction when no stimulus present
We investigated whether participants learned to expect the most frequently presented motion
directions. To assess this, we analysed participants’ estimation responses on trials where no
stimulus was presented, but where they reported seeing a stimulus in the detection task, as
well as clicking on the mouse to estimate its direction. On average this occurred on 46±3
trials for each participant (10.8±2% of the total number of trials where no stimulus was pre-
sented). For this subset of trials, participants’ estimation response probability varied signifi-
cantly with motion direction, with a clear peak close to the most frequently presented motion
directions (±32°; p < 0.001, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA; figure 3.5a, grey). We quan-
tified the probability ratio that participants made estimates that were close to the most fre-

























































Figure 3.5: Estimation responses in the absence of a stimulus. (a) Probability distribution of
participants’ estimates of motion direction when no stimulus was present. Response distribu-
tions are plotted for all trials (blue), as well as the subset of trials where participants reported
detecting a stimulus (grey) and trials where they didn’t (red). Data points from either side of
the central motion direction have been averaged together in this plot, so that the furthest left
data point corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds
to the most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results are averaged over all par-
ticipants and error bars represent within-subject standard error. (b) Probability ratio (prel) that
individual participants estimated within 8° from the most frequently presented motion directions
(±32°) relative to other 16° bins, plotted for trials where the stimulus was undetected versus
trials where the stimulus was detected. prel was significantly greater than 1 for trials where
participants reported detecting stimuli (p = 0.005, signed rank test), but was only marginally so
when subjects failed to detect the stimulus (p=0.13). Participants were also significantly more
likely to estimate in the direction of the frequently presented motion directions on trials where
they reported detecting stimuli, versus trials where they did not (p = 0.012).
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quently presented motion directions, relative to other directions, by multiplying the probabil-
ity that they estimated within 8° of these motion directions by the total number of 16° bins:
prel ≡ p(θest =±32(±8)◦ |detected)×Nbins. This probability ratio would be equal to 1 if par-
ticipants were equally likely to estimate within 8° of ±32° as they were to estimate within other
16° bins. We found that the median value of prel was significantly greater than 1, indicating
that participants were biased to report motion in the most frequently presented directions when
no stimulus was presented (median(prel) = 2.7; p = 0.005, signed rank test, comparing prel to 1;
figure 3.5b).
As on a large proportion of trials the presented motion stimuli were moving in one of
two directions, it is possible that participants could have habituated to automatically move
the estimation bar towards one of these two directions, irrespective of their response in the
detection task (note that the initial bar position was randomized on each trial and thus biases
can’t arise from just leaving the mouse in its initial location). In this case we would also
expect their ‘no-stimulus’ estimation distributions to be biased towards the two most frequently
presented directions for trials where they did not detect a stimulus. However, on trials where
participants did not report seeing a stimulus in the detection task (but where they did click the
mouse while the stimulus was present to estimate its motion direction; on average this occurred
on 134±9 trials for each participant; 32±7% of the total number of trials where no stimulus
was presented), there was no significant variation in the estimation response probability with
motion direction (p = 0.12, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA; figure 3.5a, red). Further, for these
trials, participants were not significantly more likely to estimate close to the most frequently
presented motion directions than other motion directions (median(prel) = 1.28; p = 0.13, signed
rank test, comparing prel to 1; figure 3.5b). Indeed they were significantly more likely to report
motion in the most frequently presented motion directions when they also reported detecting a
stimulus, compared to when they did not (p = 0.012, signed rank test, comparing the values of
prel obtained for trials where participants either did or did not report seeing a stimulus in the
detection task; figure 3.21b).
An alternative possibility that could produce similar results, is that participants’ expecta-
tions influenced their behaviour in the detection task but not in the estimation task. Thus, in
the absence of a presented stimulus, they would be more likely to report detecting a stimulus
when they mistakenly perceived motion in one of the two most frequently presented motion
directions, although their estimation responses would be unaltered by their expectations. In
this case, participants’ estimation responses would be distributed uniformly when we looked
at data from all trials where no stimulus was presented (regardless of their response in the de-
tection task). This was not what we found: when we looked at data from all zero-stimulus
trials, participants estimation response probability varied significantly with motion direction
(p<0.001, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA; figure 3.5a, blue) and they were biased to report
Chapter 3. Effect of learned expectations on visual motion perception 45
motion in the two most frequently presented directions (median(prel) = 1.71; p < 0.001, signed
rank test comparing prel to 1). However, the size of this bias was reduced, compared to the
case when we looked only at trials where participants detected stimuli (p = 0.027, signed rank
test comparing the values of prel obtained for all trials with trials where participants reported
seeing a stimulus in the detection task).
A final possibility is that, when participants were uncertain about the stimulus motion di-
rection, they made estimations that were influenced by the stimulus presented immediately
beforehand. In this case, we would expect the observed biases in participants’ no-stimulus
estimation distributions to disappear when we excluded trials that were immediately preceded
by stimuli moving in the most frequently presented directions (±32°). However, when we ex-
cluded these trials from our analysis, participants’ zero-stimulus estimations (for trials where
they reported detecting a stimulus) were still strongly biased towards the two most frequently
presented directions (median(prel) = 2.11; p = 0.026, signed rank test, comparing prel to 1). It
should be noted, nonetheless, that there is a continuum between expecting the next stimulus to
be the same as the previous stimulus, and having an expectation based on experience of fur-
ther back in the past. While our results rule out the most trivial possibility – that participants’
expectations are influenced only by the immediately presented stimulus – further work would
be required to understand exactly how people integrate information about previously presented
stimuli to inform their expectations about new stimuli.
Taken together, our results indicate that the zero-stimulus biases we observed were not due
to simple ‘response strategies’, but rather, were perceptual in origin: participants ‘hallucinated’
motion in the most frequently presented directions when no stimulus was displayed.
Development of estimation bias when no stimulus present
To investigate how quickly participants’ ‘no-stimulus’ estimation biases developed, we eval-
uated the probability ratio that individual participants made estimates close to the most fre-
quently presented motion directions, relative to other directions, after every 100 trials (includ-
ing all responses up to that point; figure 3.6). For participants who had not reported detecting
stimuli on any trials where none was presented, this probability ratio was undefined, so these
data points were omitted from the plot (e.g. after 100 trials, only 4 participants were included,
11 participants were included after 200 trials, and 12 participants after 300 trials). After only
200 trials of the first session, the median probability ratio (prel) was significantly greater than
1, indicating that on trials where no stimulus was presented, but where participants reported
detecting a stimulus, they were biased to estimate motion in the most frequently presented
directions after only 200 trials. Thus, expectations about which motion directions were most
likely to occur were learned extremely rapidly, after only a few minutes of task performance.
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p = 0.25 p = 0.008 p = 0.002 p = 0.001 p = 0.001
Figure 3.6: Probability ratio that individual participants estimated within 8° from the most fre-
quently presented motion directions (±32°) relative to other 16° windows, for trials where no
stimulus was presented, but where they reported detecting a stimulus. This probability ratio is
calculated for each participant after every 100 trials (this calculation takes into account data from
all trials up to that point; here we show the first 500 trials from the first session only). Median
values are indicated by horizontal red lines, 25th and 75th percentiles by horizontal blue lines.
Dashed lines correspond to the ‘trajectories’ of individual participants’ ‘prel ’ values. p-values
indicate whether the probability ratio (‘prel ’) was significantly different from 1 at each point in
time.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of expectations on estimation biases. (a) Participants’ mean estimation bias
is plotted against presented motion direction. Data points from either side of the central motion
direction have been averaged together, so that the furthest left point corresponds to the central
motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to data taken from the two most
frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results are averaged over all participants and
error bars represent within-subject standard error. (b) The estimation bias for stimuli moving at
±48° (black) and ±16° (red) from the central motion direction, plotted against the estimation bias
at ±32°, for each participant. Again, data from stimuli moving to both sides of the central motion
direction has been averaged together, with the sign of the bias for stimuli moving anti-clockwise
from the central motion direction (i.e. -48°, -32° and -16°) reversed before averaging. The red
and black crosses mark the population mean of both distributions, with the length of the lines on
the crosses equal to the standard error.
3.2.3 Estimates of motion direction when stimulus present
We next asked whether participants’ learned expectations would bias their perception of real
motion stimuli. Figure 3.7a shows the population averaged estimation bias, plotted against
motion direction. In this plot, data points corresponding to presented stimuli moving to either
side of the central motion direction have been averaged together (making sure to reverse the
sign of the estimation bias when the presented stimuli was anti-clockwise from the central mo-
tion direction before averaging; see figure A.1 for an alternative version of this plot without
averaging across the central motion direction). The plotted curve has a negative slope around
+32°, which itself was unbiased. This indicates that estimations were attractively biased to-
wards stimuli moving at +32° (and by symmetry, also to motion at -32°). Estimates of the
central motion direction were unbiased, while estimates at +16° were positively biased, away
from the centre and towards stimuli moving at +32° (again, by symmetry, stimuli moving at
-16° were biased away from the centre, towards stimuli moving at -32°). Note that the apparent
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asymmetry in figure 3.2.3a is expected, due to the fact that the data points at 0° and 64° are
not equivalent: 0° lies midway between the two most frequently presented directions, while
+64° is on the edge of the distribution of presented motion directions (see figure 3.1). Over-
all, there was a significant effect of motion direction on the estimation bias (p < 0.001, 3-way
within-subjects ANOVA).
We wanted to quantify the extent to which individual participants’ estimates were biased
towards the most frequently presented motion directions. For a participant whose estimates
were attractively biased towards stimuli moving at +32°, we would expect estimates of stimuli
moving at +48° and +16° to be positively and negatively biased respectively, compared to
their estimation bias for stimuli moving at +32° (and by symmetry, we would also expect the
converse to hold for stimuli moving anti-clockwise from the central direction: for a participant
whose estimates were attractively biased towards stimuli moving at -32°, we would expect
estimates at -48° and -16° to be negatively biased and positively biased respectively, compared
to their estimation bias for stimuli moving at -32°). Figure 3.7b plots individual participants’
estimation bias for stimuli moving at ±48° and ±16° versus their estimation bias at ±32° (plotted
in black and red respectively). Note that, as with figure 3.7a, we averaged data from motion
directions moving to either side of the central motion directions in this plot, making sure to
reverse the sign of the bias for stimuli moving anti-clockwise from the central motion direction.
After doing this, the computed estimation biases at ±48° and ±16° were significantly smaller
and larger respectively than the bias at ±32° (p = 0.005 and p = 0.001 respectively, signed rank
test). This indicates that on average, participants were biased to estimate stimuli as moving in
directions that were closer to the most frequently presented motion directions (±32°) than they
actually were.
Stimuli in-between ±32° were expected to be biased by both frequently presented directions
and thus we expected that these directions should yield larger standard deviations in estimated
angles than those outside of this range. Figure 3.8 plots the population-averaged estimation
standard deviation versus stimulus motion direction. Again, for this plot, data points from
either side of the central motion direction have been averaged together. The estimation standard
deviation was greatest for the central motion direction at 0°, and smallest for motion directions
that were closer to the most frequently presented directions (±16°, ±32° and ±48°).There was
a significant effect of stimulus motion direction on the estimation standard deviation (p<0.001,
3-way within-subjects ANOVA).
If participants’ learned to expect stimuli moving at ±32◦ we might expect smallest esti-
mation standard deviation for stimuli moving in this direction, when their expectations agree
with their received sensory evidence, leading to a reduction in their uncertainty about the pre-
sented motion direction. However, we found smallest standard estimation standard deviation
for stimuli moving at ±48◦. A potential explanation for this could be that participants did not
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Figure 3.8: Effect of expectations on the standard deviation of estimations. The standard devi-
ation in participants’ estimation distributions is plotted against presented motion direction. Data
points from either side of the central motion direction have been averaged together, so that the
furthest left point corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corre-
sponds to data taken from the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results
are averaged over all participants and error bars represent within-subject standard error.
learn to expect stimuli moving at exactly±32◦, but rather were biased to expect stimuli moving
towards some other direction, between ±32◦ and ±48◦. This could also account for the small
positive estimation bias that we observed for stimuli moving at ±32◦ (figure 3.7 a). However,
it does not seem to be reflected in participants’ no-stimulus response distributions, whose peak
lies at ±32◦.
3.2.3.1 Effect of high contrast stimulus on estimate of subsequent stimulus motion di-
rection
We asked whether a presented high contrast stimulus influenced subjects’ perception of a sub-
sequently presented low-contrast stimulus. To test whether this was the case, we analyzed
subjects’ estimation responses for the subset of trials that directly followed a high contrast
stimulus. We quantified how subjects’ estimation bias varied as a function of the difference
between the direction of the presented stimulus and the previous high contrast stimulus, using
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
We found that a high contrast stimulus had no systematic effect on subjects’ estimation
bias for the following stimulus. 6 subjects exhibited a non-significant positive correlation co-
efficient (equivalent to a repulsive bias away from the high contrast stimulus), and 5 subjects
exhibited a non-significant negative correlation coefficient (equivalent to a repulsive bias away
from the high contrast stimulus). Only 1 out of 12 subjects exhibited a significant negative
correlation coefficient (r =−0.53, p< 0.001), signifying an attractive estimation bias towards
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Figure 3.9: Estimation bias at different contrasts levels. Participants’ estimation bias for the
higher contrast trials (red) and lower contrast trials (black) are plotted against presented motion
direction. Data points from either side of the central motion direction have been averaged to-
gether, so that the furthest left point corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical
dashed line corresponds to data taken from the two most frequently presented motion directions
(±32°). Results are averaged over all participants, and error bars represent the within-subjects
standard error.
the previously presented high contrast stimulus.
Estimation biases at different contrasts
To investigate how stimulus contrast affected participants’ estimation behaviour, we first fitted
psychometric curves to their detection responses:
pdetect (c) = γ+F (c)(1− γ) , (3.4)
where pdetect (c) represents the probability that a participant detected a stimulus presented at
a contrast c, γ is a constant representing the probability that a participant reported detecting
a stimulus when none was displayed (the ‘guess rate’), and F (c) is a cumulative normal dis-
tribution (specified by two parameters; the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding
normal distribution). We fitted this function to each participant’s detection response data, set-
ting γ equal to the fraction of trials where they reported detecting a stimulus when none was
presented, and fitting the two parameters of the cumulative normal distribution (F (c)) to the
data using a simplex algorithm (the Matlab function, ‘fminsearch’) that maximized their like-
lihood.
From the psychometric curves obtained for each participant, we selected a ‘threshold con-
trast’ ctrhesh for each participant, such that F (cthresh) = 0.75. We then divided participants’ es-
timation responses into two subsets: trials where the stimulus contrast was greater than cthresh,
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(referred to as ‘high contrast trials’) and trials where the stimulus contrast was less than cthresh
(referred to as ‘low contrast trials’). The population averaged mean luminance for the ‘low’ and
‘high’ contrast trials were 0.49±0.02cd/m2 and 0.61±0.02cd/m2 above background luminance
respectively.
Figure 3.9 plots participants’ estimation biases separately for ‘low contrast trials’ (black)
and ‘high contrast trials’ (red), versus the presented motion direction. Both curves exhibit a
qualitatively similar shape: at both contrast levels, estimations of motion stimuli far away from
the central motion direction (±64°) were biased towards the central motion direction. This
bias reversed close to the central motion direction, so that for both contrast levels, estimations
of motion stimuli presented at ±16° were biased away from the central motion direction, and
towards the most frequently presented motion directions (±32°).
Importantly however, the magnitude of the estimation biases for stimuli moving far away
from the central motion direction (±48° and ±64°) was much larger with the lower contrast
stimuli than with the higher contrast stimuli. Overall there was a significant interaction between
the effects of the two contrast levels and motion direction on the estimation bias (p < 0.001,
3-way within-subjects ANOVA).
There are two surprising features of figure 3.9. First, the bias at ±16◦ is the same for
both high and low contrast stimuli. Naively, we might expect a larger bias for the low contrast
stimuli, as participants’ sensory uncertainty would be larger, causing them to be more strongly
influenced by their expectations. However, this result could potentially be explained if, in the
low contrast condition, participants’ sensory uncertainty was large enough for their estimates
of motion direction to be influenced by their expectation for stimuli moving either clockwise
or anti-clockwise of the central motion direction. In this case, we would expect a smaller
estimation bias for stimuli moving at ±16◦, than if participants’ estimates were just influenced
by their expectation for stimuli moving in the closest expected motion direction.
Second, for high contrast stimuli, there is a positive bias away from the central motion
direction. As discussed earlier, this bias could reflect the fact that participants’ expect stimuli
moving further slightly further away from the central motion direction than ±32◦. However,
if this is the case, it is unclear why a similar positive bias is not observed for the low contrast
stimuli, unless participants’ learn different expectations for different stimulus contrasts.
In general, the estimation standard deviation was significantly larger at the lower contrast
level than at the higher contrast level (an average value of 17.8±1.7° at the higher contrast
level versus 14.4±1.3° at the lower contrast level; p = 0.017, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA).
However, there was no significant interaction between the effects of contrast level and pre-
sented motion direction on the estimation standard deviation (p = 0.10, 3-way within-subjects
ANOVA).
These results are qualitatively consistent with what we would expect if participants be-
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haved as ideal Bayesian observers. At decreased stimulus contrast the width of participants’
sensory likelihood function should increase, with a corresponding increase in their estimation
standard deviation. At the same time, participants’ estimates of motion direction should be
more strongly influenced by their expectations, leading to stronger biases towards the most
frequently presented motion directions, as we observed in our experimental data.
3.2.4 Detection performance and reaction time
We investigated how participants’ expectations influenced their performance in the detection
task. To do this, we measured the fraction of trials where participants both detected stimuli
and clicked on the mouse during stimulus presentation, as a function of motion direction (fig-
ure 3.10a). Participants were significantly more likely to detect stimuli moving in the most fre-
quently presented motion directions (71.5±2.5% detected at ±32° versus 64.2±2.5% detected
over all other motion directions; p<0.001 signed-rank test; figure 3.10b). Overall, there was a
significant effect of motion direction on the fraction detected (p = 0.002, 3-way within-subjects
ANOVA).
Another measure that could reflect how easily participants detected stimuli was their re-
action time in clicking the mouse during stimulus presentation. Thus, we measured partic-
ipants’ reaction times in the estimation task as a function of stimulus motion direction (fig-
ure 3.10c). For trials where they detected a stimulus, participants’ reaction time was signif-
icantly reduced for the most frequently presented motion directions, relative to other motion
directions (1924±86ms at ±32° versus 1991±85ms over all other motion directions; p < 0.001,
signed rank test; figure 3.10d). Overall, there was a significant effect of motion direction on
participants’ reaction time (p = 0.003, 3-way within-subjects ANOVA).
3.3 Modelling
To understand the nature of the biases in motion direction estimation that we observed, we
tested alternative models of how participants’ expectations could be combined with the pre-
sented stimulus to produce the observed response distributions. Two classes of models were
considered. The first class of model assumes that participants developed response strategies
that were unrelated to perceptual changes (section 3.3.1). The second class of model assumes
that participants solved the task using a Bayesian strategy, combining a learned prior of the
stimulus statistics (the expectation) with their sensory evidence (the actual stimulus) using
Bayes’ rule (section 3.3.2).
In section 3.3.1 & 3.3.2, we just consider participants’ behaviour in the estimation task.
Later, in section 3.3.5, we consider their behaviour in both the estimation and the detection
task. Finally, we use our Bayesian model to predict participants’ estimation responses on trials
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Figure 3.10: Effect of expectations on detection performance and reaction times. (a) The fraction
of trials where participants correctly detected a motion stimulus, plotted against the presented
motion direction. (b) The fraction of trials where participants correctly detected a stimulus,
averaged over all presented motion directions except for ±32°, plotted against the fraction of
trials where participants correctly detected a stimulus moving at ±32°, for each participant. (c)
Time taken for participants to click on the mouse during stimulus presentation, measured from
the initial presentation time. (d) Individual average reaction time for stimuli moving at ±32°,
plotted against the reaction time over all other motion directions. In panels (a) & (c), data
points from either side of the central motion direction have been averaged together, so that
the furthest left point corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line
corresponds to the most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results are averaged
over all participants and error bars represent within-subject standard error. In panels (b) & (d),
the black cross marks the population mean, with the length of the lines on the cross equal to the
standard error.
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where no stimulus was presented.
The small number of trials for each staircased contrast level, as well as the large degree of
overlap between the luminance levels for each staircase (see figure 3.3), meant that it was diffi-
cult to constrain the model parameters for each contrast level separately. Therefore, for all our
modelling work we analyzed trials from both staircased contrast levels together. Thus, future
modelling work will be required to quantify how subjects’ expectations alter their estimation
behaviour at different stimulus contrasts.
3.3.1 Multiple strategy ‘response-bias’ models
The first class of model assumes that participants’ behaviour can be attributed to a ‘response
bias’. The key assumption of these models is that participants follow different strategies on
different trials: for example, by making an unbiased estimate of motion direction on a fraction
of the trials, and by estimating one of the most frequently presented motion directions on other
trials.
The first model (‘ADD1’) assumes that when participants were unsure about which motion
direction they had perceived, they made an estimate that was close to one of the two most
frequently presented motion directions.
On each trial, participants make a ‘sensory observation’ of the stimulus motion direction,
θobs, that depends on their received sensory input. Given a stimulus moving in a direction θ,
the probability of observing motion direction θobs is described by a von Mises (circular normal)
distribution centred on the actual stimulus direction (θ) and with width determined by 1/κl:
pl (θobs|θ) = V (θobs;θ,κl) (3.5)
On most trials, participants are assumed to make a perceptual estimate of the stimulus mo-
tion direction (θperc) that is based entirely on their sensory observation: θperc = θobs. However,
on a certain proportion of trials, when participants are uncertain about whether a stimulus is
present or not, they resort to their ‘expectations’, making a perceptual estimate that is sampled
from a distribution of expected motion directions: pexp (θ). For simplicity, we parameterize
this distribution as the sum of two circular normal distributions, each with width determined




(V (θ;−θexp,κexp)+V (θ;θexp,κexp)) (3.6)
We accommodate for the noise associated with moving the estimation bar to indicate which
direction the stimulus is moving in, as well as allowing for a fraction of trials ‘α’, where par-
ticipants make estimates that are completely random. Thus, participants’ estimation responses
θest are related to the perceptual estimate θperc via:
p(θest |θperc) = (1−α)V (θest ;θperc,κm)+ α2π (3.7)
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Together equations 3.5, 3.6 & 3.7 determine the distribution of estimations:
p(θest |θ) = (1−α)
[






where ‘?’ denotes a convolution and ‘a(θ)’ determines the proportion of trials where partic-
ipants sample from the ‘expected’ distribution, pexp(θ). Free parameters that were fitted to
the estimation data for each participant were the centre and width of pexp (θ) (determined by
θexp & 1/κexp respectively), the width of pl (θobs|θ) (determined by 1/κl), the fraction of trials
where they made estimates by sampling from the pexp (θ) (a(θ)), the ‘motor’ noise in their
estimation responses (determined by 1/κm) and the fraction of trials where they made random
estimates (α).
The second ‘response-bias’ model (‘ADD2’) assumes a more complex strategy; that, when
participants are unsure about the stimulus motion direction, they make estimates that are pref-
erentially sampled from different portions of the ‘expected’ distribution, depending on the pre-
sented motion direction (θ).
As before, on a single trial, participants are assumed to make estimates that are either
equal to their sensory observation θobs, or sampled from a distribution of expected motion
directions. However, instead of sampling from a single distribution of expected motion direc-
tions (as was the case for the ADD1 model) participants are assumed to sample either from
panti−clockwise (θ) = V (θ;−θexp,κexp) or from pclockwise (θ) = V (θ;θexp,κexp), with a probabil-
ity that depends on the presented motion direction. For example, on a single trial, a participant
might be aware that the stimulus is moving ‘anti-clockwise from centre’, and they would be
more likely to sample from panti−clockwise (θ), than from pclockwise (θ). This more complex re-
sponse strategy results in a distribution of estimation responses given by:
p(θest |θ) = (1−α)
[
(1−a(θ)−b(θ)) pl (θest |θ)+ (3.9)





where ‘a(θ)’ and ‘b(θ)’ are additional free parameters that determine the proportion of trials
where participants sample from each distribution.
Model variants
We considered several different variants of the ADD1 and ADD2 models, which made differ-
ent assumptions about how participants’ response strategy varied with the presented motion
direction, and the way in which they sampled from pexp (θ). The model variants are as follows:
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• ADD1: 9 free parameters. The fraction of trials where participants sample from pexp (θ)
(parameterized by a(θ)) is assumed to vary for each presented motion direction (we
assume symmetry about the central motion direction, so that a(θ) = a(−θ)).
• ADD1reduced : 6 free parameters. The fraction of trials where participants sample from
pexp (θ) is assumed to vary linearly with the presented motion direction, as a(θ) = m|θ|+
c. A linear fit was chosen as it represents the ‘simplest’ possible parameterization for how
subjects response strategy could have varied with the presented motion direction.
• ADD1mode: 8 free parameters. On trials where participants are unsure of the stimulus
motion direction, we assume they make perceptual estimates that are equal to the mode
of the ‘expected’ distribution. This assumption is equivalent to setting ‘1/κexp’ to zero
(i.e. in the limit where κexp→ ∞).
• ADD1reduced,mode: 5 free parameters. A combination of the assumptions used in the
ADD1reduced and ADD1mode models, so that 1/κexp = 0, and a(θ) = m|θ|+ c
• ADD2: 14 free parameters. The fraction of trials where participants’ sample from
panti−clockwise (θ) and pclockwise (θ) (parameterized by a(θ) and b(θ)) is assumed to vary
for each presented motion direction.
• ADD2reduced : 8 free parameters. The fraction of trials where participants’ sample from
pexp (θ) is assumed to vary linearly with the presented motion direction: a(θ) = mθ+ c,
b(θ) = nθ+d
• ADD2mode: 13 free parameters. On trials where participants are unsure of the stimulus
motion direction, we assume they make perceptual estimates that are equal to the mode
of the ‘expected’ distribution (i.e. 1/κexp = 0)
• ADD2reduced,mode: 7 free parameters. A combination of the assumptions used in the
ADD2reduced and ADD2mode models, so that1/κexp = 0, a(θ) = mθ+c, and b(θ) = nθ+d
3.3.2 Bayesian model
The second class of model assumes that participants combine a learned prior of the stimulus
directions with received sensory information using Bayes’ rule. Unlike the previous models,
which assume that on a single trial participants rely either on their sensory observations or on
their expectations, the Bayesian models assume that on each trial participants combine their
sensory evidence and expectations to estimate the stimulus motion direction. A schematic of
this model class is shown in figure 3.11.
As before, we assume that on a single trial, participants make noisy sensory observations of
the stimulus motion direction (θobs), with probability, pl (θobs|θ) = V (θobs;θ,κl). Participants
Chapter 3. Effect of learned expectations on visual motion perception 57
etamitse ’lautpecrep‘sulumits esnopsernoitavresbo posterior distribution
‘sensory’ noise combine prior knowledge
 & sensory evidence




Figure 3.11: Bayesian model of estimation responses. The posterior distribution of possible
stimulus motion directions is constructed by combining prior knowledge about likely motion di-
rections (the expectation) with the available sensory evidence (based on a noisy observation,
θobs) probabilistically. A perceptual estimate is made by taking the mean of the posterior distribu-
tion. This posterior distribution is used to make a perceptual estimate (θperc). Additional ‘motor
noise’ is added to this perceptual estimate to produce the final estimation response (θest ).
are assumed to learn a prior distribution over motion directions (pexp (θ); parameterized as
in equation 3.6). We assume that this learned prior is combined with their received sensory
evidence using Bayes’ rule:
p(θ|θobs) ∝ pexp (θ) pl (θobs|θ) . (3.10)






θpexp (θ) pl (θobs|θ)dθ, (3.11)
where Z =

p(θexp) pl (θobs|θ)dθ. Qualitatively similar results were obtained when partic-
ipants were assumed to make perceptual estimates that were equal to the maximum of the
posterior distribution.
We accounted for the ‘motor noise’ associated with making an estimation response in the
same way as for the previous ‘response-bias’ models (equation 3.7). For the Bayesian model,
free parameters that were fitted to the estimation data for each participant were the centre
and width of the prior (determined by θexp & 1/κexp respectively), the width of the sensory
likelihood (determined by 1/κl), the ‘motor noise’ (determined by 1/κm) and the fraction of
trials where participants’ made random estimates (α).
Model variants
We considered two variants of the Bayesian model:
• ‘BAYES_var’: 9 free parameters. The width of the likelihood function (κl) could vary
with the presented stimulus motion direction.
• ‘BAYES’. 5 free parameters. κl was set to be the same for all presented motion directions.
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3.3.3 Fitting the model parameters
As the high contrast motion stimuli were clearly visible (correctly detected on 97±0.3% of
trials), we assumed that the perceptual uncertainty was close to zero for these stimuli (1/κl ≈
0). In this case, all of the described models predict that participants’ estimation responses
should be distributed according to:
p(θest |θ) = (1−α)V (θest ;θ,κm)+ α2π . (3.12)
We fitted the free parameters in this expression (κm and α) to participants’ estimation responses
with the high contrast stimuli (by maximizing the log-likelihood of the model parameters).
Estimates of participants’ motor noise obtained with the high contrast stimuli were used to fit
their estimation responses with the low contrast stimuli (under the assumption that the ‘motor-
noise’,1/κm, for each participant is independent of stimulus contrast).
As all three models only described participants responses in the estimation task, ignoring
their detection responses, we just looked at data where participants’ correctly detected a pre-
sented motion stimulus (see section 3.3.5 for a Bayesian model of the detection task). For
each model, we fitted the estimation responses for individual participants, by maximizing the













where θiest & θ
i
data denote the presented motion direction and estimation response on the i
th trial,
respectively. The likelihood function was maximized using a simplex algorithm (the Matlab
function ‘fminsearch’). We were concerned that for some participants, our model fits might
converge to local rather than global maxima. To reduce this possibility, we ran the model fits




exp were varied independently in 2°
increments, between 1° and 21°), selecting the model fit that produced the highest value for the
log-likelihood. The results obtained were also found to be robust to changes in all of the other
initial parameter values.
3.3.4 Model comparison
3.3.4.1 Statistical comparison of models
We assessed how well each of the models were able to account for participants’ estimation
distributions using a metric called the ‘Bayesian information criterion’ (BIC):
BIC =−2log(L)+ k log(n) , (3.14)
where, ‘L’ denotes the maximized value of the likelihood for the estimated model, ‘k’ is the
number of model parameters and ‘n’ is the number of data points. The first term of this expres-
sion describes how well the model is able to fit the data, while the second term represents a
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Figure 3.12: Model comparison. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) evaluated with each
model, subtracted by the BIC evaluated with the BAYES model, plotted separately for each
participant. Median values are indicated by horizontal red lines, 25th and 75th percentiles by
horizontal blue lines. A BIC value greater than zero indicates that the BAYES model provided
a better description of the estimation data. p-values indicate whether the BIC value for each
model is significantly different than the BIC value for the BAYES model (signed rank test).
penalty for including too much complexity in the model. Given two model fits, the model with
the lower BIC value is usually the one to be preferred (Schwarz, 1978).
Figure 3.12 plots, for each participant, the BIC obtained with each model, subtracted by
the BIC obtained with the BAYES model. The BIC values were significantly higher for all of
variants of the ADD1 model than for the BAY ES model (p=0.002, p=0.009, p=0.003, p=0.027,
for the ADD1, ADD1minimal , ADD1mode and ADD1minimal,mode models respectively; signed rank
test). Likewise, the BIC value was significantly higher for the BAY ES f ull model than for the
BAY ES model (p<0.001; signed rank test). For 3 variants of the ADD2 model the BIC value
was significantly higher than for the BAY ES model (p<0.001, p=0.034, p=0.005 for the ADD2,
ADD2minimal , and ADD2mode models respectively; signed rank test). However, there was no sig-
nificant difference between the BIC values obtained with the ADD2minimal,mode and the BAY ES
model (p=0.129; signed rank test).
To investigate the extent to which differences in the observed BIC values depended on the
‘k log(n)’ penalty associated with the number of model parameters, we plotted the difference
between the log-likelihood for the BAY ES model and the log-likelihood for each of the other
models (log(LBAY ES)− log(L); figure 3.13). For all of the models except for the ADD2mode and
the ADD2minimal,model models, the log-likelihood was not significantly different from the BAYES
model. The log-likelihood for the ADD2minimal and ADD2minimal,mode model was significantly
greater than the BAY ES model (p < 0.001 for both the ADD2minimal and the ADD2minimal,mode
models; signed rank test). Thus, while the BAY ES model exhibited smaller BIC values than
the response-strategy models, this difference was mainly due to the fewer number of model
parameters in the BAY ES model, rather than the quality of the model fit.
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Figure 3.13: Log-likelihood of the BAYES model, subtracted by the log-likelihood of each of
the other models. Each point corresponds to one participant. Median values are indicated
by horizontal red lines, 25th and 75th percentiles by horizontal blue lines. p-values indicate
whether the log-likelihood for each model is significantly different from the the log-likelihood for
the BAYES model (signed rank test).
3.3.4.2 Fits of estimation bias and standard deviation
To achieve a qualitative understanding of how the models were able to fit participants’ esti-
mation responses, we analyzed the average estimation bias and standard deviation obtained
with each of the models. In our previous analysis of the experimental data, we parameterized
participants’ estimation distributions as the sum of a circular normal distribution and a ‘flat’
background probability (the proportion of trials where they were assumed to make random esti-
mations). Participants’ estimation means and standard deviations were then taken as the centre
and width of the fitted circular normal distribution respectively. For consistency, we computed
biases and standard deviations from the estimation distributions predicted by each model in an
identical way.
Figure 3.14 shows the estimation bias and standard deviation obtained with the BAY ES
model, plotted alongside the experimentally measured estimation bias and standard deviation.
The BAYES model is able to provide a good fit of participants’ estimation biases, with an attrac-
tive estimation bias towards stimuli moving ±32◦ from the central motion direction. While the
predicted estimation standard deviation is larger than was observed experimentally, the BAY ES
model predicts that the estimation standard deviation should vary with the presented motion
direction in a qualitatively consistent way to the experimental data, with largest estimation
standard deviation for stimuli moving in the central motion direction.
We next consider the estimation bias and standard deviation obtained with the ADD2mode,minimal
model, which had the best BIC values out of all the ‘response-strategy’ models, and was
the only model whose BIC value was not significantly different from the BAY ES model (fig-
ure 3.12). The estimation biases predicted by the ADD2mode,minimal vary with the presented mo-
tion direction in a qualitatively manner to the experimental data (3.15a). The ADD2mode,minimal
model predicts a large estimation biases for stimuli moving in the central motion direction,
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Figure 3.14: Predicted biases (a) and standard deviations (b) for the BAYES model (red), plotted
alongside the experimental data (black). In both plots, data points from either side of the central
motion direction have been averaged together, so that the furthest left point corresponds to
the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to the most frequently
presented motion directions. Results are averaged over all participants and error bars represent
within-subject standard error.








































Figure 3.15: Predicted biases (a) and standard deviations (b) for the ADD2minimal reduced model
(red), plotted alongside the experimental data (black). In both plots, data points from either
side of the central motion direction have been averaged together, so that the furthest left point
corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to the
most frequently presented motion directions. Results are averaged over all participants and
error bars represent within-subject standard error.
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Figure 3.16: Predicted biases (a) and standard deviations (b) for the ADD2minimal reduced model
(red), plotted alongside the experimental data (black).
decreasing linearly with the presented stimulus direction . Thus, while the BIC value for the
ADD2mode,minimal model is not significantly different from the BAY ES model, the ADD2mode,minimal
is unable to capture certain key features of participants’ estimation behaviour. As with the
BAY ES model, the estimation standard deviation obtained with the ADD2mode,minimal model is
larger than what was observed experimentally (3.15b).
We next consider the estimation bias and standard deviation obtained with the ADD2mode
model, in which the fraction of trials where participants made estimates that were equal to either
one of the expected motion directions were free to vary with the presented motion direction
(figure 3.16). Unlike the ADD2mode,minimal model, the ADD2mode model was able to provide a
very good fit to participants’ estimation biases, with an attractive bias towards stimuli moving
in ±32◦ (figure 3.16a). As with the other models, the predicted estimation standard deviation
was larger than was observed experimentally (figure 3.16b).
Finally we looked at the estimation bias and standard deviation predicted by the ADD1
model (figure 3.17). Unlike the BAY ES and ADD2 models, the ADD1 model was unable to fit
the repulsive estimation bias away from the central motion direction when stimuli were moving
in ±16◦ (figure 3.17a). This can be explained by the fact that for the ADD1 model we param-
eterized the ‘expected’ distribution of motion directions, pexp(θ), to be symmetrical around 0°.
Thus, even in the extreme case where all responses are sampled from this distribution, there
would only be an attractive bias towards the central motion direction. As with the other mod-
els, the ADD1 model predicted estimation standard deviations that were larger than what was
observed experimentally (figure 3.17b).
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Figure 3.17: Predicted biases (a) and standard deviations (b) for the ADD1 model (red), plotted
alongside the experimental data (black).
3.3.4.3 Summary of model comparison
The BAY ES model exhibited a significantly lower BIC value than all of the competing models
apart from the ADD2mode,minimal model, whose BIC value was not significantly different from
the BAY ES model. The main reason that the BAY ES model exhibited lower BIC values was
due to the fewer number of parameters; the log-likelihood for the other models was similar,
and in some cases better than for the BAY ES model.
The BAY ES model was able to provide a good qualitative description of how participants’
estimation biases and standard deviation varied with the presented motion direction. In con-
trast, many of the response bias models were unable to reproduce certain key aspects of the data.
The ‘response strategy’ model with the lowest BIC value (the ADD2minimal,mode model), pre-
dicted a large estimation bias away from the central motion direction, which was not observed
in the data. This discrepancy came about due to the assumptions that the ADD2minimal,mode
makes about how participants vary their response strategy depending on the presented motion
direction. Without these assumptions (as in the ADD2 model), participants’ estimation biases
can be well fitted by the response strategy model. However, this comes at the expense of an ad-
ditional 5 parameters, and thus a significantly larger BIC value. The simplest class of response
strategy models (ADD1) models could not reproduce the repulsive estimation biases away from
the central motion direction that we observed experimentally.
3.3.5 Modelling the detection task
We constructed a Bayesian model to describe participants’ behaviour in both the estimation and
the detection task (BAYES_dual). The motivation for this model was twofold. First, we were
concerned that participants’ behaviour in the detection task could have altered their behaviour
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in the estimation task. Therefore, it was important to check whether our model of participants’
behaviour in the estimation task only (BAYES) gave consistent results to a model that described
their responses in both the estimation and the detection task (BAYES_dual). Second, we wanted
to investigate whether participants’ behaviour in the detection task could be explained within a
Bayesian framework.
On a single trial, stimuli move in a direction θ, and can be either present (s = 1) or
not present (s = 0). Participants make sensory observations {θobs,sobs} with a probability:
pl (θobs,sobs|θ,s). They are assumed to evaluate the posterior probability distribution over s
and θ using Bayes’ rule:
p(θ,s|θobs,sobs) ∝ pl (θobs,sobs|θ,s) pexp (θ,s) . (3.15)
For simplicity, sensory observations of whether the stimulus is present (sobs) are assumed to
be independent of sensory observations of motion direction (θobs), given the presented stimulus
(defined by θ and s), so that the likelihood function can be factorized as follows:
pl (θobs,sobs|θ,s) = pl (θobs|θ,s) pl (sobs|θ,s) . (3.16)




2π if s = 0
V (θobs;θ,κl) if s = 1.
(3.17)
Thus, for trials where no stimulus is presented, we assume that participants are equally likely
to observe the stimulus to be moving in any direction.
The likelihood function over s is parameterized as:
pl (sobs = {0,1}|θ,s) =
{1− c,c} if s = 0{1−d,d} if s = 1. (3.18)
Our previous Bayesian model of participants’ estimation responses did not provide a better
fit to the data when κl was allowed to vary with the presented motion direction (figure 3.12).
Thus, for the BAYES_dual model presented here, we assumed that the shape of the likelihood
function does not vary with the presented motion direction (i.e. ‘κl’ and ‘d’ are fixed).




2π (1−b) if s = 0
b
2 (V (−θexp,κexp)+V (θexp,κexp)) if s = 1,
(3.19)
where ‘b’ denotes the prior probability that a stimulus is presented.
Participants are assumed to perform the detection task by taking the maximum of the
posterior distribution on each trial (as ‘sperc’ is a discrete binary variable, it does not make
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.18: Participants’ learned prior over the presented motion directions, predicted by the
BAYES model (a) and the BAYES_dual model (b). Data points from either side of the central
motion direction have been averaged together in both plots, so that the furthest left data point
corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to the
most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results are averaged over all participants
and error bars represent within-subject standard error.
sense to estimate the mean of the posterior). Thus, they judge the stimulus to be present if
p(s|θobs,sobs)> 0.5, and absent otherwise/
To be consistent with our previous BAYES model, we assume that participants make esti-












pl (sobs|s) pl (θobs|θ,s) pexp (θ,s)dθ, (3.20)
where Z = ∑1s=0

pl (sobs|s) pl (θobs|θ,s) pexp (θ,s)dθ ensures that the posterior probability
distribution is normalized. As with the BAYES model, we obtained qualitatively similar results
when we assumed that participants’ made estimates that were equal to the maximum of the
posterior, instead of the mean. We accounted for the ‘motor noise’ associated with making
an estimation response in the same way as for the previously described models (equation 3.7).
In total, the BAYES_dual model had 7 free parameters that were fitted to the data for each
participant: α, κl , c, d, θexp, κexp, and b.
Model parameters were fitted to the data using a maximum-likelihood procedure (as in
section 3.3.3). Parameters were fitted to both participants’ estimation and detection responses
on trials where a stimulus was presented. Note that participants’ responses on trials where
no stimulus was presented were not used to fit the model parameters. Thus, the predicted
estimation behaviour on these ‘no stimulus’ trials could be used to validate the model (see
later).
























Figure 3.19: Fraction of motion stimuli that were detected, plotted against presented motion
direction. Model fit is plotted in black, experimental data is plotted in red. Data points from
either side of the central motion direction have been averaged together, so that the furthest
left point corresponds to the central motion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds
to data taken from the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Results are
averaged over all participants and error bars represent within-subject standard error.
3.3.5.1 Shape of the prior
Figure 3.18a & b plot the shape of participants’ learned prior, required by the BAYES model
and the BAYES_dual model, respectively, to fit the experimental data. The exact shape of the
predicted distributions varied between the two models: the BAYES model predicted a broader
distribution than the BAYES_dual model. Indeed, even within each model, there were consider-
able variations in the location and width of the peaks between individual participants. However,
the shape of the population averaged ‘learned prior’ distributions was qualitatively similar for
both models: with a peak lying close to the frequently presented directions (±32°), and falling
off at the central motion direction (0°) and to either side of the frequently presented directions
(greater than +64° or less than -64°). Notably, both of these distributions had a qualitatively
similar shape to the true stimulus distribution (figure 3.1).
3.3.5.2 Fit of participants’ detection and estimation responses, when stimulus present
The BAYES_dual model provided a reasonable qualitative fit for participants’ responses in the
detection task (a mean absolute error of 1.50±0.58% detected; figure 3.19). The model exhib-
ited increased detection performance for the most frequently presented motion directions, simi-
lar to what was observed experimentally (the model predicted 71.2±1.6% detected at ±32° ver-
sus 64.8±1.5% other motion directions compared to experimental observations of 71.5±2.5%
detected at ±32°, versus 64.2±2.5% for other motion directions). However, there is some dis-
crepancy between the model predictions and the data at±48◦, where the model predicts a larger
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Figure 3.20: Estimation bias (a) and standard deviations (b) obtained with the BAYES_dual
model (which also models the detection task; blue) plotted alongside the BAYES model (black),
and the experimental data (red). Data points from either side of the central motion direction
have been averaged together, so that the furthest left point corresponds to the central motion
direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to the most frequently presented motion
directions (±32°). Results are averaged over all participants and error bars represent the within-
subject standard error.
detection performance than was observed experimentally. Overall, these results appear con-
sistent with the hypothesis that participants used a Bayesian strategy to perform the detection
task.
The estimation bias and standard deviation predicted by the BAYES_dual model is shown
in figure 3.20 (blue), plotted alongside the predictions from the BAYES model (black) and
the experimental data (red). Similar to the BAYES model, the BAYES_dual model provided a
good fit for both participants’ estimation biases and standard deviations (mean absolute error of
0.83° & 1.33°, for the fits of the estimation bias and standard deviation respectively; compared
with 0.75° & 2.17° obtained with the BAYES model).
We considered whether the detection task could have influenced participants’ behaviour
in the estimation task. For example, the BAYES_dual model predicted increased detection
performance for the most frequently presented motion directions, so that stimuli perceived as
moving in directions that were similar to the frequently presented motion directions would
be more likely to be detected. As a result, the size of the attractive estimation bias towards
frequently presented motion directions would be increased when we looked only at trials where
stimuli were detected.
This interaction between the detection and the estimation task could also have been present
in our analysis of the estimation responses of real participants. However, for the BAYES_dual
model, the detection task was found to have a relatively minor influence on the magnitude
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Figure 3.21: Predicted estimation response probability distributions for trials where no stimulus
is presented, but where participants reported detecting a stimulus. Model predictions (grey;
BAYES_dual model, see supplementary materials for details) are plotted alongside the exper-
imental results (red). Data points from either side of the central motion direction have been
averaged together in this plot, so that the furthest left data point corresponds to the central mo-
tion direction, and the vertical dashed line corresponds to the most frequently presented motion
directions (±32°). Results are averaged over all participants and shaded error bars denote the
within-subject standard error.
of the estimation bias, for trials where a stimulus was detected (verified by comparing the
magnitude of the predicted estimation biases for trials where the stimulus was predicted to
be detected, versus the magnitude of the predicted estimation biases for all trials). Therefore,
while it is possible that there could have been a small interaction between the two tasks, our
modeling work suggests that participants’ behaviour in the detection task had a small, and
possibly negligible, impact on the experimentally measured estimation biases.
3.3.5.3 Predicted estimation responses in the absence of a stimulus
We were interested to see whether the prior and likelihood distribution that we derived to fit par-
ticipants’ response distributions when a stimulus was presented could explain their estimation
behaviour when no stimulus was presented. To do this, we used the BAYES_dual model, with
parameters fitted to participants’ responses when stimuli were present, to predict participants’
estimation responses on trials when no stimulus was present.
Figure 3.21 shows the estimation distributions predicted by the BAYES_dual model for
trials where there was no stimulus present, but where participants detected a stimulus (black),
plotted alongside the experimentally measured distribution (red). The average ‘zero-stimulus’
estimation distribution predicted by the model provided a good fit for the population averaged
estimation distributions, with an R2 value of 0.71. The behaviour of individual participants was
also well predicted by the model: the fits for participants’ zero stimulus estimation distributions
had a positive R2 value for 8 out of 12 of them. For these participants, the median R2 value was
Chapter 3. Effect of learned expectations on visual motion perception 69
0.65 (0.46, 0.83; 25th & 75th percentiles). The fact that the majority of participants’ behaviour
in the absence of a stimulus could be predicted from their estimation responses in the presence
of a stimulus, provides strong support for hypothesis that performed the task using a Bayesian
strategy, combining their learned expectations with their sensory evidence using Bayes’ rule.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Summary of results
We found that participants quickly and automatically developed expectations for the most fre-
quently presented directions of motion. On trials where no stimulus was presented, but where
participants reported seeing a stimulus, they were strongly biased to report motion in the two
most frequently presented motion directions (figure 3.5). This bias could not be explained as
due to any particular ‘response-strategy’. Participants’ perception of real motion stimuli was
also influenced by their learned expectations: they showed increased detection performance
for the most frequently presented motion directions (figure 3.10), and estimated stimuli to be
moving in directions that were more similar to the most frequently presented motion directions
than they really were (figures 3.7). Participants’ estimation behaviour was well described by a
model which assumed that they solved the task using a Bayesian strategy, combining a learned
prior of the stimulus statistics with their sensory evidence in a probabilistic way (figures 3.12).
Finally, our model of participants’ behaviour in the presence of a stimulus was able to predict
their estimation responses when no stimulus was presented (figure 3.21).
3.4.2 Learning to ‘expect’ frequently presented motion directions
Participants rapidly learned to expect the likely stimuli within just a few minutes of task-
performance. One byproduct of such rapid learning was that because participants learned which
motion directions were expected within very few trials, it was difficult for us to measure the
short term time-course and dynamics of learning (figure 3.6). In section 5.2 we discuss how
our work could be extended to investigate how expectations are acquired over time.
Other psychophysical studies have shown that rapidly learned expectations influence per-
ception of bistable stimuli (Haijiang et al., 2006; Sterzer et al., 2008). In common with our re-
sults, these studies found attractive perceptual biases towards participants’ expectations. How-
ever, while these studies looked at perception of relatively complex visual features, such as
whether a stimulus was rotating (Sterzer et al., 2008), our experiment looked at perception of
simple unambiguous features, which are likely to be processed at a lower level in the visual hi-
erarchy, such as cortical area MT (Newsome et al., 1989). Whether similar neural changes are
responsible for the effects of expectations on perception of both simple and more complicated
stimulus features is an open question.
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Previous studies have also reported that visual ‘hallucinations’ can be induced by top-down
expectations (Zhaoping and May, 2007; Grossberg, 2000). In particular, our finding, that par-
ticipants perceived motion in expected directions when nothing was presented (figure 3.5),
is similar to what has been reported previously by Seitz et al. (Seitz et al., 2005b). Seitz et
al. found that after extended training in a psychophysical task, participants reported seeing dots
moving in the trained direction even when no stimulus was displayed. However, an important
difference between our results and the experiment of Seitz et al. was the time taken for these
hallucinations to develop: in the study of Seitz et al. it took around 8 1hr sessions for par-
ticipants to perceive motion in the trained direction when there was nothing there, while we
observed this effect within the first 200 trials. Thus, given the large differences in timescale,
it seems unlikely that the observed no-stimulus biases were produced by the same underlying
phenomena in both cases.
3.4.3 Bayesian model
In our experiment, participants learned the statistics of the presented motion directions. In
Bayesian terms, this corresponds to learning a prior distribution of the motion stimuli. Bayesian
theory tells us how prior knowledge should be combined with sensory inputs to make optimal
estimates (Jaynes, 1986) (section 1.2). Our results can thus be interpreted in the context of
two questions: 1) are participants able to learn a prior about motion stimuli in the course of
our experiment?; 2) is this prior combined optimally with participants’ sensory observations to
lead to motion estimates?
We constructed a simple model of participants’ estimation behaviour, which assumed that
on each trial they combined their sensory evidence (based on a noisy sensory measurement
of motion direction) with a learned prior distribution of ‘expected’ motion directions, using
Bayes’ rule (figure 3.11). This model provided a good fit to participants’ estimation biases
and standard deviations (figure ??). Interestingly, the quality of the fit to the data did not
decrease when the width of the likelihood was held constant with presented motion direction
(figure 3.12). The learned prior (figure 3.18) was found to be qualitatively similar in shape to
the true stimulus distribution (figure 3.1), indicating that participants were able to rapidly learn
a multi-modal prior over motion direction.
In our experiment, there was a large degree of overlap between the luminance of the two
staircased contrast levels (determined by running staircases on the detection performance).
Thus, we separated participants’ estimation responses into ‘low’ and ‘high’ contrast trials, de-
termined by the contrast of each individual trial, rather than the staircased contrast level that
they were a part of. We found that the standard deviation in participants’ motion direction
estimates was largest for low contrast stimuli. In addition, participants exhibited larger es-
timation biases towards frequently presented motion directions with the low contrast stimuli
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(figure 3.2.3.1).
These results are qualitatively consistent with what we would expect if participants behaved
as Bayesian observers. At low contrast levels, participants’ sensory uncertainty should increase
(i.e. corresponding to an increase in the width of their likelihood function). As a result, their
learned prior should have a stronger influence on their estimates of motion direction, resulting
in increased estimation biases. Unfortunately however, we were not able to well fit participants’
estimation behaviour at each contrast level using our Bayesian model, as there there were too
few data points per experimental condition to adequately constrain the model. Future work,
using more experimental trials for each contrast level, could investigate how the perceptual
biases induced by a learned prior vary with stimulus contrast (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006a).
We reasoned that if participants were indeed behaving as Bayesian observers, then the prior
and likelihood derived from their estimation responses when a stimulus was present should
predict their estimation behaviour when no stimulus was present. This is indeed what we
found: the majority of participants’ zero-stimulus estimation distributions were well fitted by
the model (figure 3.5). Thus, while ‘hallucinating’ motion when none is there could potentially
be disadvantageous in some everyday situations (Seitz et al., 2005b), in the context of our
experiment, it is just what we would expect for an ideal Bayesian observer who sought to
minimize their estimation error in the face of perceptual uncertainty.
We compared our Bayesian model with various ‘response bias’ models, which assume that
participants respond according to different strategies on different trials: either relying entirely
on their sensory observations, or on their expectations. These models were worse at describing
the estimation data than the Bayesian model (larger BIC values; figure 3.12), leading us to rule
them out as an explanation for participants’ behaviour in the estimation task.
Our finding that participants responded according to a ‘single-strategy’ Bayesian model
does not necessarily imply that the biases we observed were perceptual in origin. For example,
it is possible that participants altered their overall behavioral strategy in order to incorporate
knowledge about which motion directions were most likely, while the perceptual appearance
of the presented stimuli remained unchanged. Indeed, distinguishing between biases that oc-
cur at the perceptual or decision-making level is a very difficult task to perform psychophysi-
cally (Schneider and Komlos, 2008) (see section 2.3.1).
However, our modeling work does suggest that participants’ combined their expectations
with their sensory observations in a non-trivial way. Specifically, on each trial participants did
not rely solely on either their expectations or their sensory observations, but rather, they made
their estimations based on a combination of both of these sources of information. Further, we
noted that if the observed estimation biases were due to a change in behavioural strategy, this
must have occurred at a largely subconscious level, as most participants were unable to indicate
the two motion directions that had been most frequently presented, with a large proportion
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(9 out of the 12 participants included in our analysis) reporting either that there were equal
number of stimuli moving in all directions, or that most of the stimuli were centered around
a single motion direction. Also, our personal observations setting up the experiment was that
lab personnel often perceived patterns of moving dots in zero contrast trials, leading us to the
conclusion that experimental subjects experienced the same “hallucinations”.
3.4.4 Eye movements
In the experiment of Sekuler & Ball (Ball and Sekuler, 1982), subjects reported that they expe-
rienced their eye movements being involuntarily ‘pulled’ in the direction of the stimulus. Thus,
it was suggested by the authors that mechanisms controlling eye movements might be capable
of responding to very low luminance motion stimuli, and thus, that the resulting eye move-
ments could be used by participants to help them correctly detect stimuli that were otherwise
imperceptible. Similarly, it is possible that subjects’ eye-movements could have contributed to
the changes in detection performance and reaction time that we observed. That is, if subjects
were biased to move their eyes in ‘expected’ motion directions, then this could have resulted
in decreased detection thresholds for these motion directions.
However, the effect of subjects’ eye-movements on their estimates of motion direction is
not clear. Naively, we might expect that, if participants were biased to move their eyes in
expected motion directions, then this would produce estimation biases away from the expected
motion directions (as the motion component in this direction would be reduced, relative to the
motion of the eye), instead of the attractive estimation biases that we observed. On the other
hand, if participants were moving their eyes in the expected motion direction, they could have
used proprioceptive or efference copy information to aid their judgements of stimulus motion
direction, which would lead to a bias towards the expected motion directions.
To investigate how expectations alter motion perception and eye-movements, Krauzlis et
al. conducted an experiment in which subjects were required to report which out of two hori-
zontal directions stimuli were moving in (Krauzlis and Adler, 2001). Interestingly, Krauzlis
et al. found that subjects’ eye-movements and perceptual decisions tended to be the same on a
trial-by-trial basis. Further, they found that a sensory cue indicating the direction that stimuli
were most likely to be moving, caused a similar shift in subjects’ eye-movements and percep-
tual decisions (towards the cued direction). On the basis of these results, Krauzlis et al. postu-
lated that prior expectations alter the activity of motion-selective neurons that are read out by
both the oculomotor and perceptual systems.
However, it is possible that in the experiment of Krauzlis et al., subjects’ eye-movements
were biased by the presented cue itself, rather than by their expectations about the stimulus
motion direction. This is because the same effect would be observed if there was a a tendency
for subjects to look at the presented cue. To control for this effect, it would be interesting
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to measure subjects’ eye-movements in our experiment, in which subjects’ expectations are
manipulated implicitly, through the stimulus statistics.
3.4.5 Interaction between tasks
Previously, it has been found that performing a discrimination task on stimulus motion direction
can bias participants’ estimation responses (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007). We asked whether
a similar interaction between tasks could have occurred in our experiment. Specifically, we
asked whether participants estimation biases could have come about as a result of changes
in their detection behaviour. To illustrate how this could happen, consider the case where
participants’ expectations alter their detection responses, without altering their estimation re-
sponses. Thus, if participants were more likely to detect a stimulus when they perceived it to
be moving in ‘expected’ directions, their estimation distributions would appear to be biased to-
wards these directions when we looked only at trials where a stimulus was detected. However,
this bias would disappear when we looked at estimation responses from all trials, regardless
of participants’ detection responses, which is not what we find experimentally (there was no
significant difference between the estimation biases calculated from trials where participants
detected stimuli, and from all trials; p = 0.71, 5-way within-subjects ANOVA).
However, if, on trials where participants did not detect a stimulus, they treated the estima-
tion task as meaningless and provided random estimation responses, then on average we would
still observe a bias towards the expected directions. This strategy would allow that participants
to behave in a ‘self-consistent’ way in both tasks (Stocker et al., 2006): when they have settled
on the hypothesis that there is no stimulus present, it makes little sense for them to scrutinize
which direction it is moving in. However, as discussed earlier, participants’ detection perfor-
mance varied relatively weakly with motion direction, with an population averaged difference
in detection performance of only 5.9±1.0% between the two most frequently presented motion
directions, and other directions (figure 3.10a). Thus, it seems unlikely that the highly signif-
icant variation in estimation biases observed experimentally (varying by 14.6±2.9° between
stimuli moving at ±16° and ±64°; figure 3.7a) could be brought about by such small changes
in detection performance.
3.4.6 Relation to motion-aftereffect illusion
Our finding that subjects exhibited attractive estimation biases towards frequently presented
motion directions is at odds with the commonly reported ‘motion aftereffect’ where people
exhibit repulsive estimation biases away from a motion stimulus presented immediately be-
forehand (see (Anstis et al., 1998) for a review).
We asked whether the reason that we did not observe any repulsive estimation biases was
because the presented stimuli were low contrast, and thus not strong enough to induce sensory
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adaptation. To test this, we analyzed subjects’ estimation biases on trials directly following a
high contrast motion stimulus (section 3.2.3.1). However, we found that even the high contrast
stimuli had no effect on subjects’ perception of subsequently stimuli: 11 out of the 12 included
subjects did not exhibit a significant estimation bias towards or away from the previously pre-
sented high contrast stimulus.
Recent analysis of our data indicates that on trials where no stimulus is presented, subjects
exhibited a slight tendency to report stimuli moving in the opposite direction from expected,
indicating that there may have been a small motion aftereffect (Vincent Valton, personal com-
munication). Note however, that if motion aftereffect illusion caused subjects to occasionally
report motion in the opposite direction from the previous stimulus, then this would not qualita-
tively alter their trial averaged estimation bias on trials where stimuli were presented.
A possible reason that we did not observe a strong motion aftereffect in our data could
have been due to the relatively large inter-stimulus-interval (‘ISI’) which allowed motion se-
lective neurons to ‘recover’ following short-term adaptation from the previous motion stimulus.
This hypothesis is supported by a psychophysical study conducted by Kanai et al. (Kanai and
Verstraten, 2005), who found that varying the ISI between an adaptor and test stimulus can
produce in qualitatively different perceptual biases: repulsive biases are observed for a short
ISI, attractive biases for a long ISI.
In our experiment, subjects’ were free to move their eyes during stimulus presentation.
Thus subjects’ eye-movements could be an alternative or contributing factor to seeing a bias
towards the expected direction, rather than a motion aftereffect. Indeed, previous studies have
suggested a close relation between subjects’ eye movements and the motion aftereffect illusion,
with some studies suggesting that the illusion is stronger when eyes are fixated (???).
We modelled subjects’ behaviour using a simple Bayesian model, which hypothesized that
subjects’ combined their learned expectation for frequently presented motion directions with
their received sensory input using Bayes’ law. While our model was able to account for the
attractive estimation biases observed in our experiment, it is worth noting that, in its present
form our model cannot account for the repulsive estimation biases observed during the motion
aftereffect.
In chapter 5 we discuss ways in which Bayesian models could be able to account for repul-
sive estimation biases observed during motion adaptation. One possibility is that exposure to
novel stimulus statistics may cause subjects to alter their likelihood function that describes how
presented stimuli give rise their observed sensory estimate, as opposed to their prior, which de-
scribes the probability that different stimuli are presented. Unlike changes in the prior, changes
in the likelihood function may lead to repulsive biases away from a frequently presented stim-
ulus (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006b). In general the timescale over which subjects’ alter their
prior expectations or their likelihood function will depend on how rapidly they expect different
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aspects of their world to change (see section 5.2 for further discussion).
An alternative possibility is that we learn an internal model that describes how local and
global image properties combine to generate our received sensory input (Schwartz et al., 2007).
Thus, repulsive perceptual biases would emerge because people try to ‘factor out’ the global
image statistics (i.e.. the spatiotemporal context) to estimate local image properties (i.e. the
difference between a stimulus and its spatiotemporal context). We discuss this class of models
further in section 5.1.
Chapter 4
Goal-orientated attention as
reward-driven optimization of sensory
processing
In this chapter, we propose a normative framework for considering why and how attention
alters the responses of visual neurons. To account for the effect of behavioural demands on
visual processing, we hypothesize that the nervous system learns an internal model that pre-
dicts how both the sensory input and the reward received for performing different actions are
determined by a common set of explanatory causes. We postulate that this internal model is
in general imperfect and that attentional processes correspond to its temporary optimization
for the task at hand. A simple normative model based on this idea is able to predict a number
of task-dependent changes to the responses of visual neurons, including modulation of neural
contrast responses functions, sensory tuning curves and center-surround interactions. Our re-
sults demonstrate how a diverse range of experimentally observed task-dependent effects are
predicted as a result of functional principles, providing a new perspective on previous phe-
nomenological models of goal-directed visual attention.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Simulated visual stimuli and behavioural task
In many experimental investigations of goal-directed visual attention, a monkey is instructed
(often via a visual cue) that a particular spatial location is ‘task-relevant’, and thus, should be
attended. In order to receive a reward in the task, the animal is then required to make responses
that are contingent on stimuli presented at this location, while ignoring distractor stimuli pre-
sented at other locations (Luck et al., 1997; Reynolds et al., 2000; Williford and Maunsell,
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of the detection task. Presented stimuli (y) are represented by binary
variables, each indicating whether a stimulus is present at a particular location. Stimuli combine
to produce the sensory input (x; black curve). One or more locations are selected as ‘target’
locations in the detection task (the target is unknown to the agent at the start of the task). The
agent gives a response (a) indicating whether a stimulus is present at a target location, based
on their sensory input and their learned model of reward. Correct responses are followed by a
reward (r). Inset is the corresponding graphical model of the task.
2006; Roberts et al., 2007). To capture some of the main aspects of these experiments, we
simulate a visual detection task, in which an agent is presented with (one or more) stimuli at
various locations, and has to report whether a stimulus is present at a single ‘target’ location
(figure 4.1). The agent receives a unitary reward for a correct response in the task, and no
reward otherwise. Note that in our simulations the agent is not explicitly told where to attend
to: stimuli are equally likely to be presented at all locations, and the agent must learn which
locations are behaviourally relevant (i.e. the target location(s)) through feedback in the task.
The sensory input statistics in our model are described by a binary latent variable model (Puer-
tas et al., 2010). Presented stimuli are represented by binary hidden variables (yi ∈ {0,1}),
with each variable representing a different spatial location (for example, yi = 1 indicates that
a stimulus is present at the ith spatial location). There is an equal probability for stimuli to be






p(yi) , p(yi = 1) = α. (4.1)
where ny denotes the number of spatial locations, and α denotes the probability that a stim-
ulus is presented at any particular location (α was chosen to be identical to the prediction
for p(yi = 1) given by the agent’s internal model, before attentional optimization; see section
4.1.2.1).
Stimuli combine non-linearly to generate the sensory input signal received by the agent (x),


























Figure 4.2: Basis functions used to generate the received sensory input (for the initial simu-
lations, where stimuli which included a spatial but not a featural dimension). Each plot shows
a single column of the basis function, ‘A’. Individual plots represents the mean sensory input
generated by a single active y-unit. Note that the basis used to generate the sensory input are




{Ai jy j}+ γi, (4.2)
where γi is a Gaussian noise variable (with zero mean and variance σ2), and A is an nx× ny
matrix of basis functions.
The basis functions (columns of A) were chosen so that a stimulus presented at a single
location activated several neighbouring sensory inputs. Sensory inputs (components of x) were
labelled with nx equally spaced values between −π and π (producing a vector of spatial loca-
tions; ‘x̃’). Likewise, each of the y-units (components of y) was labelled with ny equally spaced
values between −π and π (producing a vector of ‘preferred’ spatial locations; ‘ỹ’). Elements
of A were given by:
Ai j = exp
(




where k is an integer, set so that−π< (x̃i− ỹ j +2πk)< π (so that the stimulus space is circular
and there are no edge effects), and λA determines the width of the basis functions. Columns
of A are plotted in figure 4.2. Each plot can be interpreted as the mean sensory activation
produced by a stimulus presented at one particular spatial location.
One or more spatial locations, indexed by I, were chosen as ‘target’ locations in the task.
The detection target (t ∈ {0,1}) was classified as present if a stimulus was present at at least
one of the target locations (t = 1 if ∃i ∈ I : yi = 1). The agent was required to give a response
indicating whether they believed the target stimulus was present or not (a = 0 or 1 for a rejection
or detection response respectively). They received a unitary reward for a correct response, and
no reward otherwise:
r =
0 if a 6= t1 if a = t. (4.4)
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4.1.2 Bayesian model of visual processing and task performance
To perform the task, the agent has to use their received sensory input (x) to estimate the reward
(r) associated with each possible action (a). We assume that they do this by learning a proba-
bilistic model that describes how both the reward and sensory input are generated by a common
set of hidden causes (Sahani, 2004). The assumed goal of the visual system is to compute the
posterior distribution over the hidden causes, given the received sensory input. This informa-
tion, encoded in the firing rates of visual neurons, is then used by the agent to estimate the
reward associated with each action. In section 4.1.2.1, we describe the agent’s internal model
of their sensory inputs; in section 4.1.2.2, we describe their internal model of reward; and in
section 4.1.2.3 we simulate the visual neuron responses.
We hypothesize that attentional processes continuously adapt the agent’s internal model
in order to improve their predictions of the received reward for performing different actions.
Section 4.1.2.4 describes in detail how the agent’s internal model is optimized towards the task
in our simulations.
4.1.2.1 Agent’s generative model of sensory inputs
The agent uses a hierarchical internal model to infer the hidden causes of their received sensory
input (figure 4.3a). Thus, in contrast to the simulated experiment, where spatially localized
stimulus features are presented independently of each other, the agent assumes that there is
a higher level of statistical structure, such that certain image features are more likely to be
presented together than others (see section 4.1.3 for further discussion).
In the agent’s internal model, high-level hidden variables (z) are assumed to generate lower-
level hidden variables (y), which in turn generate the received sensory input (x). The joint
probability distribution for this model is of the form:
p(x,y,z|θ) = p(x|y,θ) p(y|z,θ) p(z|θ) , (4.5)
where θ denotes the parameters of the agent’s internal model of the sensory inputs.
All hidden variables are binary (yi ∈ {0,1}, zi ∈ {0,1}), while the observed data (x) are
continuous. For mathematical simplicity, we apply the constraint that a maximum of one z-unit
can be active at a time, with equal probability associated with all units:
p
(
zi = 1,z/i = 0|θ
)
∝ ρ/nz, p(z = 0|θ) = 1−ρ, (4.6)
where nz denotes the number of z-units in the model, and ρ denotes the probability that one of
the z-units is on.
Given z, the y-units are assumed to be conditionally independent (p(y|z,θ)= ∏nyi=1 p(yi|z,θ)),
with a probability of being active given by:























ψ = {w, w0}
Figure 4.3: Agent’s internal model of the sensory input and reward. (a) The agent learns a hier-
archical model, where high-level hidden variables (z-units), corresponding to complex spatially
distributed image features (e.g. objects/faces), are assumed to determine the state of lower-level
hidden variables (y-units), corresponding to simple spatially localized image features (e.g. ori-
entation/motion direction), which generate the received sensory input (x). High-level hidden
z-variables are also assumed to generate the reward received (r) for performing different ac-
tions (a) in the task. During task performance, the agent updates parameters that predict how
the reward depends on the high-level hidden variables in their model (ψ = {w,w0}), as well as
parameters that determine the probability individual y-units are active (θ = b0) (b) Putative map-
ping of probabilistic model onto neural architecture. Arrows denote the direction of feedforward
processing (both direct and indirect). Incoming sensory signals are first processed in low and
intermediate visual areas, such as V4 and MT, before being sent to higher level sensory areas,
such as the inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex (IT and PFC). These high-level sensory areas
project to regions in the basal ganglia, such as the substantia nigra colliculus (SNc) and ventral
tegmental area (VTA), which compute the expected reward for performing different actions.











Figure 4.4: Basis functions used for agents’ internal model of their sensory inputs in the initial
simulations, where stimuli which included a spatial but not a featural dimension. Each plot shows
the probability that the agent assumes different y-units are active, given a single active z-unit:
p(yi = 1|z j) = sig(bi j−bi0) (before task optimization, with bias terms ‘bi0’ set to their initial
values).
where sig(x) = (1+ exp(−x))−1, bi is an nz×1 basis vector, and b0i is a scalar bias term.
The basis vectors bi were setup so that when a given z-unit is active, there is an increased
probability for neighbouring y-units to be active. Components of z were labelled with nz equally
spaced values between −π and π (‘z̃’). Elements of bi were given by:
bi j = bmax exp
(




where λB denotes the width of the basis function, and bmax determines how strongly z-units
determine whether the y-units are on. Figure 4.4 plots the conditional probability that each of
the y-units are on, for a given active z-unit.
The agent’s internal model that predicts how the sensory input (x) is generated by the hid-
den causes (y) was set to be identical to the ‘true’ data generation process described previously
(see equations 4.2 & 4.3).
At the beginning of the task, the true probability that each y-unit was on was set to be
equal to the agent’s internal model (α = p(yi = 1|θinitial)). Consequently, the only difference
between the agent’s model and the true model generating the sensory inputs were the second-
order statistics describing the probability that different y-units are on at the same time: for the
‘true’ model, all y-units were independent, while for the agent’s internal model there was a
higher probability that adjacent y-units were simultaneously active.
4.1.2.2 Agent’s generative model of reward
We assume that the agent learns an internal model that predicts how the received reward de-
pends on their performed action, and the state of ‘high-level’ hidden variables in their inter-
nal model (figure 4.3a). Their model of the detection task includes a binary ‘target variable’
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(t ∈ {0,1}), that depends on the state of the z-units in their internal model. Given z, they assume
that the probability of the target being present is:
p(t = 1|z,ψ) = sig(wT z−w0) , (4.9)
where w (an nz×1 vector), and w0 state how the target variable depends on each of the z-units.
A reward of r = 1 is predicted if a = t, and no reward (r = 0) otherwise (equation 4.4). The
agent does not initially know the true location of the detection target: w and w0 have to be
learned online through task-feedback (see section 4.1.2.4).
After receiving a sensory input, the predicted reward for making a detection response is
proportional to the posterior probability that the detection target is present (and conversely, for
a rejection response, the probability that the target is not present):
Q(a;x,θ,ψ) = 〈p(t = a|z,ψ)〉p(z|x,θ). (4.10)
We assume that the agent makes the response associated with the highest predicted reward.
Thus, if the posterior probability that the target is present is greater than 0.5, the agent should
make a detection response; otherwise, they should make a rejection response.
4.1.2.3 Visual neuron firing rates
Figure 4.3b illustrates a putative mapping of the probabilistic model used in our simulations
onto the neural architecture. The assumed role of the visual system is to infer the posterior
probability distribution over the hidden causes. The posterior distribution, encoded in the pop-
ulation activity of visual neurons, is then transmitted to areas of the brain that are responsible
for predicting the received reward for performing different actions, allowing the agent to make
an appropriate response in the task.
For our simulations, we assume that mean firing rate of a single neuron in the visual cortex
encodes the posterior probability that a single hidden cause is active. Thus, the firing rate of
the ith visual neuron can be computed directly from Bayes’ rule:












where y/i represents a vector of all the components of y, except for the i
th component, and the
summation is taken over all possible hidden states.
For our simulations, there were sufficiently few latent variables that we were able to per-
form the summation over the latent states directly. However, if there is a large number of
hidden variables, this summation will become intractable, and an approximate algorithm must
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be used. Shelton et al. describe a biologically plausible algorithm that could be used to per-
form approximate inference on a binary latent variable model similar to the one used in our
simulations (Shelton et al., 2011; Puertas et al., 2010).
The stimulus selectivity of a given neuron is largely determined by the basis function of the
hidden variable that it encodes. In other words, if a neuron encodes for the presence of a hidden
variable that is assumed to generate a specific pattern of sensory activation, then this pattern of
sensory activation will indicate that the latent variable is active, and the neuron will respond
with a high firing rate. The basis functions used in our simulations were spatially localized
(figure 4.4), meaning that model neurons were selective for stimuli at a specific spatial location
(called their receptive field, ‘RF’). The basis functions of the low-level y-units were more
spatially localized than the high-level z-units (compare figure 4.4 a & b), the neurons encoding
the y-units had smaller RFs than neurons encoding the z-units. Note however, that in general
a neuron’s RF will not be identical to the basis function of the encoded variable: while basis
functions are an invariant property of the generative model, the recorded RF will depend on the
type of stimulus that is used to activate the neuron.
4.1.2.4 Attentional optimization
We postulate that the role of goal-orientated visual attention is to alter the agent’s internal
model so as to improve their predictions of the received reward (at the potential cost of learning
a worse internal model of the received sensory inputs). To do this, we adapt the parameters of
their internal model (θ and ψ) online, in order to maximize the average log-probability of the
received reward. After each trial, model parameters are updated according to:
θnew← θ+ηi∂θli (θ,ψ) , ψnew← ψ+ηi∂ψli (θ,ψ) . (4.12)
where η denotes the rate of learning. In appendix B, we show that the derivative of the online
objective function can be written as follows,
∂ψli(θ,ψ) = 〈∂ψ log p(ri|ai,s,ψ)〉p(s|xi,ri,ai,θ,ψ) (4.13)
∂θli(θ,ψ) = 〈∂θ log p(s,xi|θ)〉p(s|xi,ri,ai,θ,ψ)−〈∂θ log p(s,xi|θ)〉p(s|xi,θ). (4.14)
For the parameters to converge on stable values, we used a learning rate that decreased as a
function of the trial number, according to: η = η0/(1+ i/n0) (where i is the trial number, and
η0 and n0 are parameters that determine the initial learning rate and how fast it decays, set to
0.05 & 104 respectively). Learning was terminated after a fixed number of N trials (set to 105),
after which the model parameters were seen to converge on stable values.
To simulate the effect of attention on model neuron responses, we compared the responses
of model neurons before and after learning. Note that, our focus was on investigating the effects
of attentional optimization on model neuron responses, rather than the temporal dynamics of
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the attentional optimization process itself. Indeed, while we assume that attentional modulation
of visual neuron responses are learned online based on feedback in a task, in reality the visual
system could be able to switch its attentional state more quickly, based on previous experience
in different tasks (see section 4.3 for further discussion).
We postulated that over the short timescales associated with visual attention, only the prior
probability that individual hidden y-units are active varies (determined by the bias terms, b0i,
in equation 4.7), while other aspects of the internal model are unchanged. The gradient of the
objective function used to update b0i is given by:




Note that evaluating this expression only requires computing first-order statistics, such as the
mean activation of the y-units. In comparison, updating the basis functions (bi and A) would
require computing second order statistics, which are harder to estimate from a limited supply
of noisy data.
Because the y-variables are embedded within a hierarchical Bayesian model, changing the
bias term, b0i is not directly equivalent to altering the agent’s internal ‘prior’. However, it will
have a similar effect, altering the marginal probability, p(yi|θ) =

p(yi|z,θ) p(zi)dz, without
changing the structure of the model (i.e. which y-units are generated by a given active z-unit).
Indeed, we note that in a hierarchical model there is not a sharp cut-off between the ‘prior’
and ‘likelihood’ function: altering the likelihood that different y-units are activated by a given
high-level z-unit (via the basis function, bi) will act to change the agent’s ‘prior probability’
that different y-units are active when z is unknown.
While the agent is assumed to initially know the general structure of the task (i.e. that they
receive a unitary reward for detecting a visual target), they do not know in advance where the
target is (w0 and w are both set to zero initially). These parameters (ψ ≡ {w0,w}) are learned
online on the basis of the reward received for performing different actions. The objective
function gradient used to update w and w0 is given by:
〈∂wi log p(r|a,z)〉 = 〈zi
(
r− sig(wT z−w0))〉 (4.16)




4.1.3 Summary of model assumptions
In order to make concrete predictions about how attention should alter visual neuron responses,
we made had to make certain assumptions about the neural code, agent’s internal model, and
the modulatory effects of attention. Here we summarize the assumptions that are critical for
our results, providing a brief theoretical justification, and outlining how each assumptions in-
fluences the results of our simulations.
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• Neural code. We assume a very simple neural code, in which the firing rate of each
visual neuron is directly proportional to the posterior probability that a single latent
variable is active. This choice of code is important for our simulations, as it leads to
an expression for neural firing rates which has a similar functional form to previous
divisive normalization models of neural responses (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Caran-
dini et al., 1997). In these models, neural firing rates are evaluated by dividing their
feedforward excitatory drive by a suppressive factor that depends on the summed ac-
tivity nearby neurons. In our model, divisive normalization emerges from Bayes’ law
(equation 4.11), due to the fact that the posterior probability for a hidden variable to be
active (p(yi = 1|x)) is evaluated by dividing the joint distribution over hidden and ob-
served variables (p(yi = 1,x)) by the marginal probability for the observed sensory input
(p(x)). In section 5.3 we compare and contrast the neural code used in our simulations
to previously proposed neural codes.
• Sparse stimulus statistics. We assume that the agent learns a ‘sparse’ internal model,
in which there is a small prior probability for any particular hidden cause to be active
(i.e. p(yi = 1|θ) 1). The theoretical justification for this comes from natural image
statistics, which are well accounted for by sparse models (Berkes et al., 2007; Olshausen
and Field, 1996). In our simulations, the sparse prior produces strong competition be-
tween different explanations of the received sensory input, which is reflected in the divi-
sive suppression of neural responses (see section 4.2.4).
• Non-linear stimulus combination rule. The agent learns an internal model in which
stimuli are assumed to combine non-linearly, according to a ‘max’ combination rule
(equation 4.2). Indeed, while many previous generative models of visual processing
have assumed a linear combination rule, arguably, a strongly nonlinear ‘max’ combina-
tion rule provides a better description of how features combine in natural images (Lücke
and Sahani, 2008). In our simulations, a nonlinear combination rule was required to
produce neural responses that saturated below their maximum values when the stimulus
contrast was high (see figure 4.7). To see why this is the case consider what happens
when the agent receives a high amplitude sensory input (i.e. components of x have high
values). A high amplitude sensory input can be well explained by a linear model (where
xi = ∑ j Ai jy j +γi) if multiple hidden units are active. Thus, if the agent uses a linear inter-
nal model, they will ascribe a high posterior probability for multiple hidden to be active
simultaneously (i.e. the posterior probability, p(yi = 1|x), will saturates at ∼ 1). How-
ever, with a nonlinear ‘max’ rule (xi = max j{Atruei j y j}+ γi), multiple hidden variables do
not combine to produce a higher amplitude sensory input. Thus, different hidden vari-
ables compete to explain the data. Thus, if the agent uses an internal model with a ‘max’
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combination rule, the posterior probability that they ascribe to individual hidden units
will remain below 1, even when the amplitude of the sensory input is high.
• Internal model structure. The agent learns a hierarchical internal model, in which
high-level hidden variables (z), that correspond to the global structure of the sensory in-
put, are assumed to determine the state of low-level hidden (y), that correspond to the
local features of the sensory input. This model structure is designed to reflect the struc-
ture of natural images, in which complex objects are made up of simple image features,
which give rise to the observed sensory input (Karklin and Lewicki, 2005; Reichert et al.,
2011a). The agent assumes that only the high-level latent variables determine the reward
that will be received for performing different actions. This model structure could allow
the agent to quickly adapt to new behavioural contexts, as the action that they should
perform in any given task will depend on a relatively few number of high-level hidden
variables. However, in our simulations, we investigate a situation when this internal
model structure is suboptimal: when the image features that are relevant to the task are
more spatially localized than the high-level features in the agent’s internal model. In
our work, it is this mismatch between the structure of the agent’s internal model and the
behavioural task that drives attentional modulation of visual neuron responses.
• Attention only alters ‘bias-terms’ in the internal model. We postulate that over the
short timescales associated with visual attention, the prior probability that individual hid-
den variables are active can vary (determined by the bias terms, b0; although see previous
section), while the image features represented by the latent variables (determined by the
basis functions) is fixed. As a result, attention modulates the responses of model neurons
to presented stimuli, but does not fundamentally change their stimulus selectivity. Our
assumption can be justified functionally from the fact that updating the bias terms only
requires estimating first-order statistics, which can be evaluated quicker and more reli-
ably than the second-order statistics that are required to update the basis functions (see
4.1.2.4). More generally, how much attention should alter different aspects of the agent’s
internal model will depend on several different factors, including the rate at which dif-
ferent aspects of the world vary (discussed in section 5.2.3), and the trade-off between
short-term optimization in a specific task, and generalization across many different tasks
(discussed in section 5.1.2).
• Binary latent variable model. We modeled the stimulus statistics using binary latent
variable model. We chose this form of model for simplicity, in order to simulate a simple
task where where subjects were rewarded for correctly detecting a stimulus. Recent
work suggests that a binary latent variable model also provides a good description of
natural scene statistics (Puertas et al., 2010). However, it is worth considering how this
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choice of model could have affected our simulations of neural responses as a function of
varying stimulus contrast. In figure 4.7 we plot the responses of model neurons while
continuously varying the amplitude of the sensory input. As stimulus contrast is not
represented by the agent, increasing the amplitude of the sensory input is interpreted as
increased evidence that a binary latent variable is ‘on’, and the model neuron response
(given by ri ∝ p(yi = 1|x)) increases towards a saturating value. In a more sophisticated
model, the agent could learn a joint distribution describing both the probability that a
stimulus is present and its contrast. Now, if we assume that the primary goal of the early
visual system is to encode the components that make up an image, we should integrate
over all possible stimulus contrasts to recover the distribution p(yi = 1|x). Intuitively,
such a model should produce qualitatively similar results - a high amplitude sensory
input will still indicate a high probability that a stimulus is present. However, future
theoretical work will be required to see whether this is true, and thus whether our results
generalize to an internal model that includes contrast as a latent variable.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Attentional modulation of neural population response
The responses of visual neurons to a given visual stimulus can be manipulated experimentally
via the presented stimulus statistics (determining which stimuli are expected; often communi-
cated via visual cues) (Posner et al., 1980), or the reward delivered for performing different
actions in a task (determining which stimuli are deemed relevant to the task, and thus attended
to) (Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005). Previous ‘task-independent’ Bayesian models of visual pro-
cessing, in which the internal model is learned and adapted based on the stimulus statistics
alone, can only deal with the first case (Hyvärinen et al., 2005; Simoncelli and Olshausen,
2001). In contrast, the framework presented here, where the agent learns an internal model of
both the stimulus and the reward statistics, can account for both stimulus and reward-dependent
changes to visual processing. Here, we focus on the latter case, with stimuli equally likely to be
presented at all locations, but where only stimuli at certain locations are relevant in determining
the actions that the agent must perform to receive a reward.
For the agent’s internal model of the sensory input statistics to be altered by the reward
structure of the task, there must be some mismatch between their internal model and the exter-
nal environment (i.e. if the internal model is already a perfect description of the world, it cannot
be further optimized). We postulate that, due to the complexity of real-world environments, this
will often be the case. In our simulations, we assume that the image features that are relevant
to the task (which correspond to the y-units in the agent’s internal model) are more spatially
localized than the image features used by the agent to choose which action to perform (the
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Figure 4.5: Influence of spatial attention on neural population response. (a) Bottom panel: each
plot corresponds to the sensory input generated by a stimulus presented at a single location.
Sensory input produced by a stimulus at the target location is plotted with a solid black line. For
clarity, sensory inputs are generated without noise. Box: each plot corresponds to the neural
population response at low (bottom) and high (top) levels of visual processing with a stimulus
presented at a single location, without (left) and with (right) attention directed towards a central
target location. (b) Prior probability that each of the low-level hidden causes are active, without
(black) and with (red) spatial attention directed towards the target location (vertical dashed line).
(c) Response of a high-level neuron, plotted as a function of the presented stimulus location,
without (black) and with (red) attention directed towards its preferred location (dashed line).
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z-units in their internal model). Such a model mismatch might occur because the agent tries to
learn a simple model of the behavioural task, in which the action’s that they should perform de-
pend on a limited number of spatially distributed image features. While useful in allowing the
agent to quickly learn new tasks, this model structure could result in suboptimal performance
in experiments that use very simple and/or spatially localized stimuli (e.g. orientated gratings,
or coherent motion).
We now describe how the responses of visual neurons in our model towards a stimulus
presented at a single location are modulated as a result of attentional optimization towards a
detection task. Note that the image statistics and behavioural task used in our simulations are
highly simplified, and are designed to provide a ‘proof-of-principle’ as to how task-dependent
modulation of neural responses can be modelled within a Bayesian framework.
As discussed previously (section 4.1.2.3), when a stimulus is presented at a specific spatial
location (figure 4.5a, bottom panel, below box), it activates a small number of ‘mid-level’
visual neurons (corresponding to y-units in the agent’s internal model) that are selective for
stimuli at this location (figure 4.5a, bottom left panel inside box). In contrast, ‘high-level’
visual neurons (corresponding to z-units in the agent’s internal model), with larger receptive
fields (RFs) respond similarly to stimuli presented at many different locations (figure4.5a, top
left panel inside box).
The agent uses the responses of high-level visual neurons to choose which action to per-
form. Because the activity of these neurons does not vary strongly with the presented stimulus
location (figure 4.5c, black), the agent will perform suboptimally at detecting whether a stimu-
lus is present at a particular task-relevant location (see next section).
To simulate the effects of goal-directed attention, internal model parameters were learned
online to optimize the agent’s performance in the task (see section 4.1.2.4). After optimization,
the agent learned to associate an increased prior probability for a stimulus at the target location
(figure 4.5b). As a result, the sensitivity of mid-level neurons tuned towards this location was
increased (figure 4.5a, bottom right panel inside box), and high-level neurons became more
selective for stimuli presented at the target location (figure 4.5a, top right panel inside box).
While the agent’s learned prior did not match the true stimulus statistics – in reality, stimuli
were equally likely to be presented at all locations – after attentional optimization the firing
rate of high-level visual neurons was a better predictor of whether a stimulus was present at the
task-relevant spatial location, allowing the agent to improve their performance in the task.
4.2.2 Behavioural performance
In our model, the agent chooses which action to perform based on the inferred posterior prob-
ability that the detection target is present, given their sensory input (p(t = 1|x)). We wanted to
quantify how well they are able to discriminate whether the target was present, independently
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Figure 4.6: Receiver operating characteristic curves, indicating how well the agent is able to
classify whether the detection target is present or not. There are three conditions: the ideal
case (true model underlying task; blue); a fixed model of how the hidden causes generate the
sensory input, but a variable model of how they generate the detection target (fixed θ, variable
ψ; red); a variable model of how the hidden causes generate both the sensory input and the
detection target (variable θ, variable ψ; black). AUC values (area under the ROC curves) give a
summary statistic of how well the agent is able to classify whether the detection target is present
or not.
of the reward associated with correct detections or rejections. To do this, we plotted receiver
operating characteristic curves (ROC curves; figure 4.6) directly from the agent’s estimates of
p(t|x) (obtained from 2×104 simulated trials). The area under the ROC curve (AUC) provides
a measure of performance that is independent of the threshold used for classification (Fawcett,
2006).
We consider three conditions: (i) the ideal observer, using the ‘true’ model underlying
the task (blue dashed curve); (ii) where the agent can alter their internal model of how the
hidden causes generate the detection target (i.e. ψ can vary), but not how they generate the
sensory input (i.e. θ is fixed; figure 4.6, red dashed curve) and (iii) where the agent can alter
their internal model of how the hidden causes generate both the reward and the sensory input
(variable ψ and θ; figure 4.6, black dashed curve).
The worst performance is obtained when the agent cannot alter θ (AUC f ixed = 0.78). Vary-
ing θ allows the agent to improve their performance above this worst case (AUCvariable = 0.83),
although their performance is still worse than ideal (AUCideal = 0.90). It is unsurprising that the
agent cannot perform optimally in our simulations, as we imposed a strong mismatch between
their internal model and the true model underlying the task (compare figure 4.3a and figure 4.1,
inset). As we assume that they are only able to alter their internal model by changing the prior
probability that individual hidden units are on (via b0), they are not able to improve their model
so that it is the same as the true model underlying the task. However, they are able improve
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Figure 4.7: Attentional modulation of neural contrast response function. (top panels) Prior prob-
ability assumed by the agent that each of the hidden causes are active, without attention (black),
or with either a narrow (left) or a broad (right) focus of attention. The attended spatial region is
represented by the blue shaded area. (bottom panels) Model neuron response, as a function of
the amplitude of a sensory input at the preferred location, without attention (black) or with either
a narrow (c) or a broad (d) focus of attention (red).
their performance so that it is better than the worst case scenario, with fixed θ.
How strongly goal-directed attention improves behavioural performance will depend on
many factors which determine how well the internal model in the brain can account for the
behavioural task. In the work presented here, our focus is to understand how visual neuron
response properties are altered by the behavioural context of presented stimuli, rather than how
attention alters task-performance.
4.2.3 Attentional modulation of neural contrast response function
There have been a number of controversies about how goal-directed attention alters sensory
neural responses. A prominent example is attention-dependent changes to the firing rates of
V4 neurons with varying stimulus contrast. Previous experiments have reported very different
findings: Williford et al. observed a ‘response gain’ effect, with increases in neural firing rates
for all stimulus contrasts (Williford and Maunsell, 2006), while Reynolds et al. observed a
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‘contrast gain’ effect, consistent with an increase in the effective stimulus contrast (Reynolds
et al., 2000) (figure 2.4). Reynolds & Heeger proposed a phenomenological model to account
for these differences, arguing that they were due to variations in the relative size of the focus
of attention and the stimulus (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009): a narrow focus of attention would
give rise to a response gain effect, while a broad focus of attention would give rise to a contrast
gain effect (see section 2.3.2). We use our normative model to ask why attention might alter
neural responses in this way.
To manipulate the size of the attentional focus, we varied the number of target locations in
the detection task. We simulated two experimental conditions: one with a single target location
(‘narrow attentional focus’), and another, with multiple neighbouring target locations (‘broad
attentional focus’). When the agent optimized their internal model towards a detection task
with one target location, they learned to associate an increased prior probability that hidden
causes representing stimuli at this location were active (figure 4.7a). With multiple targets,
there was a broader change in their learned prior, with increases in the prior probability for
hidden causes representing all of the target locations (figure 4.7b).
In our simulations, V4 neurons correspond to hidden variables at an intermediate level of
the agent’s internal model (i.e. components of y). To obtain neural contrast response functions
(CRFs), we plotted the mean firing rate of a model neuron while varying the amplitude of a
sensory input centred at its preferred location (x = c×ai, where ai is the ith column of A, and ‘c’
represents the stimulus contrast). The resulting CRF was qualitatively similar to experiment,
increasing monotonically at intermediate sensory input amplitudes, before saturating at high
amplitudes. The effect of spatial attention was also consistent with experiment: directing a
narrow focus of attention towards the presented stimulus location increased the response of a
neuron tuned to this location for all sensory input amplitudes; a broad focus of attention only
increased the response of this neuron at intermediate sensory input amplitudes (figure 4.7c & d
respectively).
Why does attention alter CRFs as it does in our model? In our work, neural firing rates
have a direct functional meaning; they represent the probability that different hidden causes are
responsible for producing the observed sensory input. Therefore, we can understand the effects
of attention on neural responses directly in terms of how it alters the probability that the agent
accords to different ‘explanations’ of the sensory input (figure 4.8).
When the amplitude of the presented sensory input is low, directing either a narrow or a
broad focus of attention towards the presented stimulus location increases the inferred proba-
bility that a hidden cause representing this location is active, while decreasing the probability
that no hidden causes are active (figure 4.8a & b). Consequently, the firing rate of a model
neuron tuned to a low amplitude sensory input is increased by both a narrow and a broad focus
of attention (figure 4.7c & d).
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Figure 4.8: Possible explanations of the sensory input, as a function of its amplitude. We
consider three types of explanation: those where (i) the hidden cause representing the target
location is active; (ii) another hidden cause is active; (iii) all hidden causes are inactive. The
probability accorded to each explanation is plotted against the amplitude of a sensory input
centred at the target location, without attention (black) or with a narrow (a) or a broad (b) focus
of attention directed towards this location (red). At small amplitudes, both sizes of attentional
focus increase the inferred probability that the hidden cause representing the attended location
is active, reflected by an increase in the response of a model neuron tuned to this location.
At large amplitudes, varying the size of the focus of attention produces qualitatively different
effects. A narrow attentional focus (a) increases the inferred probability that a hidden cause
representing the target location is active, while decreasing the probability that other hidden
causes are active. A broad attentional focus (b) leaves the probability associated with these two
competing explanations unchanged. Thus, at high sensory input amplitudes, the response of a
model neuron tuned to the attended location is increased for a narrow, but not for a broad focus
of attention.
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In contrast, when the amplitude of the sensory input is high, there is negligible probability
accorded to the possibility that no hidden causes are active. In this case, a narrow attentional
focus increases the inferred probability that a hidden cause representing the presented stimulus
location is active, while decreasing the probability that other hidden causes are active (fig-
ure 4.8a). A broad attentional focus, on the other hand, does not alter the probability associated
with these two competing explanations (figure 4.8b). Consequently, the firing rate of a model
neuron tuned to a high amplitude sensory input is increased by a narrow, but not by a broad
focus of attention (figure 4.7c & d).
4.2.4 Relation to ‘normalization model of attention’
The predictions of our model are qualitatively similar to the ‘normalization model of attention’,
proposed by Reynolds & Heeger (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009) (described in section 2.3.2).
Understanding how their model relates to ours requires writing out the expression for neural
firing rates, which are evaluated using Bayes’ rule:












where y/i represents a vector of all the components of y, except for the i
th component.
We assume that the agent learns a sparse model, with a small prior probability that any par-
ticular y-unit is active. Therefore, we can approximate the previous expression by discounting
all hidden states where more than one y-unit is active at the same time:









where yi denotes a hidden state with only one active y-unit (i.e. yi ≡ (0, . . .0,1,0 . . .0) with
only yi = 1), and y0 denotes a hidden state with all y-units inactive (i.e. y0 = 0). We can
rewrite this expression in the form:
p(yi = 1|x)∼ AiEi (x)
1+∑
ny
j=1 A jE j (x)
, (4.21)





and Ai = p(yi)p(y0) . Attention alters the prior probability that the indi-
vidual y-units are on, increasing the value of Ai for neurons that are tuned to attended stimuli.
Ei (x) is determined by the sensory input alone, and does not depend on the attentional state of
the agent.
The numerator in equation 4.21 (‘Ai (b0)Ei (x)’) represents the ‘excitatory component’ of
activity, and depends on the dot product between the model neuron basis function and the
presented sensory input (aTi x), as well as the prior probability that the i
th hidden unit is active
Chapter 4. Goal-orientated attention as reward-driven optimization of sensory processing 95































amplitude of sensory input
attend away
attend RF









Figure 4.9: Model neuron contrast response functions, approximated using equation 4.21, which
only considers hidden states with a maximum of one active y-unit. The model neuron response
is plotted as a function of the amplitude of a sensory input at its preferred location, without
attention (black) or with either a narrow (c) or a broad (d) focus of attention (red) directed towards
this location.
(closely related to Ai (b0)). The response of the model neuron is suppressed by a divisive
normalization factor, ‘1+1+∑
ny
j=1 A jE j (x)’, which depends on the summed excitatory activity
over the population of model neurons. In our simulations, attending to the preferred location of
the ith model neuron alters b0, so as to increase the prior probability that the ith hidden unit is
active. The resulting change to Ai (b0) produces a multiplicative scaling of the excitatory term
in the numerator of equation 4.21, as well a change in the degree of suppression from other
model neurons (through changes to the divisive normalization factor).
Equation 4.21 is closely related to the expression for the neural firing rates proposed by
Reynolds & Heeger in their ‘normalization model of attention’ (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009).





where E (x) represents the excitatory component of the response, A (x) represents the attention
field, S (x) represents the suppressive component of the response, obtained by summing the
excitatory activity of neurons across many locations (S (x) = s(x) ∗ (A (x)E (x)), where ‘∗’
denotes a convolution), and σ is a constant, determining the slope of the contrast response.
To see how well the responses of the model neuron responses are approximated by equa-
tion 4.21 we used it to evaluate the model neuron contrast response functions, with either a nar-
row or a broad focus of attention directed towards the presented stimulus location (figure 4.9).
The CRFs obtained under this approximation are very similar to the CRFs obtained using the
full posterior distribution (figure 4.7). In particular, the effect of attention is qualitatively simi-
lar in both cases, with a narrow focus of attention increasing the model neuron response at all
stimulus contrasts, while a broad focus of attention only increases the model neuron response
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Figure 4.10: Influence of spatial and feature-based attention on the population response. (a & b) Prior
probability assumed by the age t that each of the hidden causes are active, without attention (black), or
with spatial (a) or feature-based (b) attention. (c) Neural population response in the absence of attention
(black), or with attention directed towards the presented stimulus feature (blue) or spatial location (red).
(d) Average neural firing rate of a population of V4 neurons, with (red) and without (blue) spatial attention
directed towards the RF (adapted from McAdams & Maunsell, 1999). (e) Average neural firing rate of
a population of MT neurons with (red) and without (blue) feature-based attention directed towards the
presented motion direction (adapted from Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004).
neuron at intermediate contrasts.
4.2.5 Attentional modulation of sensory tuning curves
We investigated how attention alters neural tuning curves in our model. To do this, we extended
our model to include both a featural and a spatial dimension. We altered the basis functions
that determined the image features represented by the hidden units, so that each model neuron
(corresponding to a component of y) was selective to both a stimulus feature (e.g. orientation,
or motion direction) and a spatial location.
Every sensory input (component of x) was allocated a ‘feature’ label (consisting of 2 lists of
nx/2 equally spaced values between −π and π; x̃1), and a ‘spatial’ label (nx/2 lists of 2 spatial
locations, (0,π); x̃2). The y-units were labelled in the same way: each with a corresponding
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spatial location and feature (ỹ1 and ỹ2 respectively). Elements of A were given by:
Ai j = exp
(
−(x̃i1− ỹ j1 +2πk)2
2λ2f tr
+




where λ f tr and λspt are parameters determining the width of the basis function along feature
and spatial dimensions respectively. The basis functions for the z-units were calculated in the
same way as for the previous simulations (see section 4.1.2.1), with all z-units allocated a
feature but not a spatial label (i.e. ỹi was replaced by the ‘feature’ label, ỹi1). We set, λ f tr = 1.2
& λspt = 2 (see next section for discussion of how we set λspt). We also increased the model
sparsity, setting ρ = 0.3 & bmax = 2 (so that p(yi = 1|θinit) ≈ 0.02). This increase in sparsity
was required to produce robust surround suppression for the simulations described in the next
section (but was not critical for simulating the feature tuning curves).
We simulated two experimental conditions. In the first condition (‘spatial attention’), one
of two spatial locations was selected as a target in the detection task. In the second condi-
tion (‘feature-based attention’), only certain features were chosen as targets. Spatial attention
caused the agent to associate a high prior probability that hidden variable representing the at-
tended location were active, but a uniform prior probability that hidden variables representing
different features were active (figure 4.10a). Conversely, feature-based attention caused the
agent to associate a high prior probability that hidden variables representing attended features
were active, but a uniform prior probability that hidden variables representing both spatial lo-
cations were active (figure 4.10b).
Attending towards the presented stimulus location increased the responses of neurons tuned
to this location, with no sharpening in the population response (figure 4.10c, red). Similar ef-
fects have been observed experimentally in visual area V4 when attention is directed towards a
particular spatial location (McAdams and Maunsell, 1999). In contrast, we found that attend-
ing to the presented stimulus feature produced a sharpening in the population response; the
responses of model neurons that were selective for the attended feature showed increased most
strongly by attention (figure 6c, blue). Martinez-Trujillo & Treue reported a similar effect in
visual area MT when animals were directed feature-based attention towards a particular motion
direction (Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004).
Also consistent with the experimental findings of Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, our model
predicted a small suppression in the responses of model neurons tuned to ‘unattended’ fea-
tures (Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004). In our model, this suppression came about because
the agent accorded greater probability to the possibility that the sensory input was produced by
hidden causes representing attended features, at the expense of a reduction in the probability
that it was produced by hidden causes representing other, unattended, features.
A notable difference between our simulation results and the experimental data shown in
figure 4.10c & d is that the firing rate of neurons that are unselective for the presented stimulus






















































































Figure 4.11: Attentional modulation of centre-surround suppression. (a) Schematic of test stim-
uli. Neural responses were measured with either a single stimulus presented at their RF (top)
or with stimuli presented at both their RF centre and surround (bottom). (b) Response of a
model neuron to a stimulus presented in the RF centre (blue), surround (black), or at both the
RF centre and surround (red), without attention, or with attention directed towards the RF centre
(attend centre) or surround (attend surround). (c) Fractional change in model neuron response
when a second stimuli is presented in the surround, for each of the three attentional conditions.
feature is zeros, while experimentally, they exhibit at a non-zero baseline firing rate. Our model
could be altered to produce this behaviour by altering the structure of the agent’s internal model
so that the mean sensory activation is non-zero when no stimulus features are present (i.e. when
y = 0). This alteration would allow us to further distinguish between the effects of spatial and
feature-based attention, as feature-based attention should produce a reduction in the baseline
firing rate of neurons that are unselective for the presented stimulus feature.
Experimentally, it has been shown that attention-dependent suppression of neural responses
is particularly strong when there are multiple stimuli within the cell’s RF (Moran and Desi-
mone, 1985; Reynolds et al., 1999). Although we do not explicitly model this effect, it is easy
to see how it could come about for our model. When there is one stimulus within a cell’s RF,
directing attention away or towards the presented stimulus will induce a multiplicative change
to the neuron’s response, by altering the numerator in equation 4.21. When two stimuli are
present within the cell’s RF, attending towards one of the stimuli will also alter suppression
that comes from the other stimulus, via the denominator in equation 4.21, resulting in larger
changes in the neuron’s response. Indeed, this effect was demonstrated by Reynolds & Heeger
in their normalization model of attention (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009).
4.2.6 Attentional modulation of centre-surround interactions
The responses of neurons in the visual cortex are modulated by stimuli located outside of
their classical RF, that do not evoke a response when presented alone. Typically, presenting a
stimulus outside of a neuron’s RF suppresses its response, compared to when there is only a
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single stimulus presented within its RF; a phenomenon called ‘surround suppression’ (Seriès
et al., 2003). Sundberg et al. found that, in visual area V4, attending to a stimulus located
within the RF reduces the suppressive influence of a stimulus presented at the surround, while
attending to the surround increases this suppression (Sundberg et al., 2009).
We used the setup described in the previous section to measure the degree of surround
suppression in our model in the absence of attention, or with attention directed to either the RF
centre or the surround (figure 4.11a). By definition, a stimulus in the RF surround should not
elicit a response when presented alone, although it may suppress the response of a neuron to
a stimulus simultaneously presented in the RF. To reproduce this behaviour in our model we
needed to specify the spatial width of the basis functions (λsptl): if it was too large, surround
stimuli would elicit a response when presented alone; too small, and there would be no surround
suppression (we found that λsptl = 2, produced the required behaviour; figure 4.11a).
Consistent with experiment, directing attention towards the RF increased the model neuron
response towards a single stimulus presented within the RF, while decreasing the suppression
from a second stimulus presented at the surround (figure 4.11b & c). Directing attention to
the surround did not significantly alter the model neuron response when a single stimulus was
presented within the RF, but did increase the suppression caused by a second stimulus presented
at the surround (figure 4.11b & c). In both attentional conditions, the response of the model
neuron to a stimulus presented at the surround alone was negligible.
As before, in order to understand how surround suppression comes about in our model, we
consider the probability accorded to different ‘explanations’ of the sensory input by the agent.
When a stimulus is presented at the RF centre alone, there are two likely causes of the resulting
sensory input: a stimulus at the RF centre, or no stimulus (with probabilities pcentre & pnone;
figure 4.12a, inner circle). In contrast, the sensory input produced by stimuli at both the RF
centre and surround can be accounted for in multiple ways (figure 4.12a, outer circle). Because
the agents internal model is assumed to be ‘sparse’ (i.e. there is a small probability that any
particular hidden cause is active) (Olshausen and Field, 2004), the ‘true’ cause of the sensory
input (stimuli at both the RF centre and the surround) is deemed unlikely (pboth is small).
Instead, they associate equal probability to two alternative explanations: a single stimulus at
the RF centre, or the surround (psurr = pcentre). Overall, presenting a second stimulus at the
surround decreases pcentre, while only slightly increasing pboth, resulting in a reduction in the
firing rate of the corresponding model neuron (as f ∝ pcentre + pboth).
The effect of attention in our model is to alter the prior probability associated with stimuli
at different locations by the agent. In general, the influence of such a perceptual prior will be
strongest when there is large uncertainty about the causes of the sensory input. This uncertainty
could be due to sensory noise (e.g. at low contrast), or an ‘ambiguous’ stimulus, where the
sensory input is equally likely to be interpreted in more than one way (e.g. the Necker cube
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Figure 4.12: Influence of attention on competing explanations of the sensory input, with or
without a stimulus presented outside of the RF. Possible explanations are divided into four
categories: those where (i) there is an active hidden cause at the RF centre, but not the surround
(pcentre; blue); (ii) there is an active hidden cause at the RF surround, but not the centre (psurr;
green); (iii) hidden causes at the RF centre and surround are both active (pboth; yellow); (iv)
neither are active (pnone; red). (a) In the absence of attention, a stimulus at the surround (outer
circle) produces a sensory input that is equally well explained by a single active hidden cause at
either the RF centre or surround (pcentre = psurround). As a result, there is a reduction in pcentre,
compared to when a stimulus is only present at the RF (inner circle), and a suppression in the
firing rate of the corresponding model neuron ( f ∝ pcentre + pboth). (b) Attending to the surround
does not alter the competing explanations when a stimulus is presented at the RF centre alone
(inner circle), but has a strong effect when a second stimulus is presented at the surround (outer
circle), biasing the agent to interpret the sensory input as due to a hidden cause at the surround
(increased psurr, and decreased pcentre ). This results in an increase in the degree of surround
suppression. (c) The converse effect occurs when attention is directed to the centre, resulting
in decreased surround suppression.
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illusion (Gershman et al., 2009)). In our model, a single stimulus presented at the RF gives
rise to an ‘unambiguous’ sensory input, in the sense that, assuming a stimulus is present, the
sensory input can only be explained in one way: due to a single stimulus located at the RF
(figure 4.12a, inner circle). As a result, the probability accorded to the different explanations
of the sensory input is not strongly altered by spatial attention (figure 4.12b & c, inner circles).
In contrast, stimuli presented at both the RF centre and surround give rise to an ‘ambiguous’
sensory input, which is equally well accounted for by a single stimulus at the RF centre, or the
surround (figure 4.12a, outer circle). Consequently, attention-dependent changes to the agents
perceptual prior have a large effect in biasing which of these two explanations is preferred,
strongly increasing the inferred probability that a stimulus is present at the attended location.
Thus, directing attention towards a second stimulus presented at the surround produces a large
decrease in pcentre (figure 4.12b), resulting in an increase in the degree of surround suppression
(as f ∝ pcentre + pboth). The converse effect occurs when attention is directed towards the RF
centre (figure 4.12c), resulting in decreased surround suppression.
4.2.7 Attention and perceptual transfer
One advantage of learning an internal model that predicts how hidden causes in the world
generate the received sensory input, is that this model may be used by the agent to perform
many different behavioural tasks. As a result, however, changes in the internal model that take
place in order to improve performance in a particular task will alter the agent’s performance in
other tasks as well.
In our simulations, the agent learned to associate an increased prior probability that hidden
causes representing ‘target’ locations were active (figure 4.5b), resulting in improved detec-
tion performance for stimuli presented at these locations (figure 4.6). However, in addition to
improving detection performance, this learned prior will also alter the agent’s estimation be-
haviour, so that stimuli are judged as being closer to attended locations than they actually are.
This effect is similar to the perceptual estimation biases reported in chapter 3, where partici-
pants’ learned prior induced an attractive estimation bias towards frequently presented motion
directions (figure 3.7). However, in contrast to our psychophysics results, the changes in the
agent’s prior predicted by our model do not reflect the ‘true’ stimulus distribution, as stimuli
were equally likely to be presented at all locations. Instead, changes to the agent’s prior take
place in order to compensate for a mismatch between the agent’s internal model, in which spa-
tially distributed image features are believed to generate the received reward, and the actual
task, in which spatially localized image features determine the received reward. Thus, changes
in the perceptual prior that result in improved performance in the detection task may lead to
suboptimal perceptual biases and decreased accuracy in an estimation task. We are currently
conducting psychophysics experiments to test this prediction.
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Figure 4.13: Discrimination task. (a) Schematic of task. The agent has to discriminate whether a
motion stimulus is moving to the left or the right of a discrimination boundary. (b) After optimiza-
tion towards the discrimination task, the agent learns to associate an increased prior probability
for stimuli moving perpendicular to the discrimination boundaries.
In general, the nature of the perceptual bias that occurs will depend on both the behavioural
task and presented stimuli (as well as the structure and form of the agent’s internal model; see
section 5.1). For example, in a recent psychophysics experiment, Jazayeri et al. found that
when subjects are required to discriminate which side of a boundary a stimulus is moving
in, they exhibit a repulsive estimation bias away from the discrimination boundary (Jazayeri,
2007).
We adapted our model to investigate the perceptual biases predicted by our model after
optimization towards a discrimination (figure 4.13a) rather than a detection task (figure 4.1).
Presented stimulus statistics were the same as for our previous simulations (section 4.1.1),
with the exception that only one y-unit was present at a time, with equal probability for all
units (p(yi = 1) = 1/Ny). The y-unit’s in our model represented different stimulus motion
directions. Due to the circular basis functions used in our simulations (see section 4.1.2.1),
there were effectively two discrimination boundaries (between blue and grey motion directions
in figure 4.13a). A binary variable (t ∈ {0,1}) denoted whether stimuli were moving to the left




: yi = 1, t = 1 otherwise).
The agent was required to report whether the presented stimulus was moving to the left or right
of the discrimination boundary (i.e. whether t = 0 or 1), with correct responses followed by an
immediate reward (r = 1 if a = t, r = 0 if a 6= t).
After optimizing their internal model towards the discrimination task (section 4.1.2.4), the
agent learned to associate a decreased prior probability for hidden causes representing stim-
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uli moving towards the discrimination boundaries, and increased prior probability for stimuli
moving in other directions (figure 4.13b). In our model, this change in the agent’s learned prior
improves the agent’s performance in the discrimination task by increasing the sensitivity of
low-level hidden units that are most useful in determining whether stimuli are presented to the
left or right of the discrimination boundary. While we did not explicitly model the estimation
task, this learned prior will be expected to induce a repulsive estimation bias away from the
discrimination boundaries (towards spatial locations with highest prior probability), which is
consistent with the experimental results of Jazayeri et al. (Jazayeri, 2007). As with the results
of Jazayeri et al., the magnitude of this estimation bias should increase when there is a high
degree of perceptual uncertainty, for example with low coherence or low contrast stimuli.
Jazayeri et al. proposed that the repulsive perceptual biases that they observed could be
explained by task-dependent changes in the ‘decoder’, which preferentially weights signals
from neurons tuned to motion directions away from the discrimination boundaries. In contrast,
in our model, a repulsive perceptual bias would come about due to increases in the gain of
low-level visual neurons (e.g. in MT) that are tuned to stimuli moving away from the discrim-
ination boundaries (Scolari and Serences, 2009). While in reality, attention will likely alter
neural responses at multiple stages of visual processing, our work cautions against attributing
the psychophysically observed perceptual biases as entirely due to changes in the high-level
‘decoder’, as we show that similar perceptual biases may be produced by changes to the re-
sponses of low-level visual neurons.
Rather than providing a quantitative fit to the results of Jazayeri et al., our aim was to
demonstrate in principle, how qualitatively different perceptual biases are produced by dif-
ferent behavioural tasks (e.g. attractive biases for a detection task, repulsive biases for a dis-
crimination task). We show that, contrary to the standard view of visual attention, which is
usually thought to select a particular spatial location or visual feature for increased processing,
task-dependent changes to visual processing can be complex; and very far from the typical
‘spotlight’ analogy of visual attention.
4.3 Discussion
An important goal in visual neuroscience is to understand why the response properties of vi-
sual neurons are the way they are. We extended previous statistical models of visual pro-
cessing (Hyvärinen, 2010) to account for the effect of behavioural demands on visual neuron
responses, hypothesizing that the brain learns a probabilistic model that predicts how both the
sensory input and reward received for performing different actions are determined by a com-
mon set of hidden causes (Sahani, 2004). This framework has two main advantages. First,
it has predictive power: in theory, changes to neural responses should be predicted as a di-
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rect consequence of the presented stimuli and behavioural task. Second, predicted changes to
neural responses have a direct functional meaning: they correspond to changes in the believed
causes of the sensory input.
To predict how goal-directed attention should modulate neural responses, we needed to
make certain assumptions. First we assumed that the firing rate of each neuron encodes the
probability that a particular hidden cause contributed to generating the received sensory in-
put. Second we assumed that the agent learns a ‘sparse’ model, with a small prior probability
that any particular hidden cause is active (Olshausen and Field, 2004). This was required
to produce surround suppression in our model, which came about due to competition between
different possible causes of the sensory input. Third we assumed that the internal model is hier-
archical (Karklin and Lewicki, 2005), with high-level hidden causes assumed to be responsible
for generating the received reward. Finally, we assumed that attention alters the sensitivity of
individual neurons (by changing the prior probability that hidden causes are active), but not the
network connectivity (the basis functions). These assumptions are not new, but on the contrary,
are often included in phenomenological and mechanistic models of attention (Reynolds and
Heeger, 2009; Ghose, 2009; Lee and Maunsell, 2009). However, in contrast to these models,
we justify our assumptions from functional principles, in order to provide insight into ‘why’
goal-directed attention alters visual neuron responses as it does.
Our model predicts a range of task-dependent changes to neural responses that are quali-
tatively consistent with experimental observations in low to mid-level areas of the visual cor-
tex: modulation of neural contrast response functions (figure 4.7), sensory tuning curves (fig-
ure 4.10) and centre-surround suppression (figure 4.11). Both the predictions and mathemat-
ical formulation of our model bear strong similarities to the ‘normalization model of atten-
tion’, proposed by Reynolds & Heeger (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). In common with our
work, Chikkerur et al. recently showed that Reynolds & Heeger’s model can be derived using
a Bayesian framework (Chikkerur et al., 2010) (section 2.3.2). However, while Chikkerur et
al. explicitly specified an ad hoc attentional prior, in our work, task-dependent changes to the
internal model are learned automatically, to improve predictions of the received reward.
Several studies have tried to explain visual attention in Bayesian terms, under the hypothe-
sis that it corresponds to changes in the perceptual prior (Dayan and Zemel, 1999; Rao, 2005;
Chikkerur et al., 2010; Yu and Dayan, 2005b; Yu et al., 2009). However, in these studies,
attention-dependent changes to the prior were either specified explicitly (Dayan and Zemel,
1999; Rao, 2005; Chikkerur et al., 2010), or learned from the statistics of stimuli presented
during the task (Yu and Dayan, 2005b; Yu et al., 2009). In contrast, we investigate how visual
processing is influenced by behavioural demands, in the absence of any changes to the pre-
sented stimulus statistics. Within our proposed framework, behavioural demands alter visual
processing when there is a mismatch between the internal model and the external environment.
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We hypothesize that such a mismatch occurs when task-relevant stimuli are more localized
than the high-level features in the agent’s internal model. In this case, attention will alter visual
processing to improve predictions of the received reward, at the possible expense of learning a
worse model of the sensory inputs.
In addition to improvements in behavioural performance, we predict that attention-dependent
changes to the learned prior should alter the agent’s performance in other tasks, giving rise to
estimation biases such as those observed in our psychophysics experiment (chapter 3). How-
ever, in contrast to the estimation biases that we observed in our experiment, our model predicts
that estimation biases should be induced by changes to the behavioural task alone, in the ab-
sence of any changes to the presented stimulus statistics. A similar effect could underlie longer
term perceptual biases that are observed experimentally. For example, the owl is systematically
biased to estimate sounds as coming from directions closer to their centre of gaze than they ac-
tually are. Fischer et al. showed that this perceptual bias is consistent with Bayesian estimation,
with a prior that favours central directions (Fischer and Peña, 2011). However, as this prior is
defined relative to the position of the owl, it cannot correspond to the true distribution of sound
directions in the world, but instead must represent the ‘relevance’ of the different directions.
To fit the joint distribution over the reward and sensory input, model parameters should be
learned to maximize the objective function:
L(θ,ψ) = ∑
i
[log p(ri|xi,ai;θ,ψ)+ log p(xi|θ)] . (4.24)
As the sensory input (xi) will typically have many more dimensions than the received reward,
the second term of equation 4.24 will usually dominate learning. In line with this, we found
that, when models parameters were learned in order to maximize equation 4.24, the received
reward had a negligible influence on the internal model that was learned.
Previous work has mostly focussed on the case where the internal model model is learned
in order to maximize the log-probability of the received sensory input (equivalent to maxi-
mizing the second term of equation 4.24). In an exception to this, Sahani (2004) considered
representational learning with an objective function similar to equation 4.24 (Sahani, 2004).
Sahani postulated reward-dependent ‘weighting terms’ that determine the relative magnitude
of the first and second terms of the objective function (although he did not specify how these
weightings should depend on the reward). Sahani’s work provides an interesting framework
for considering how the behavioural relevance of the received sensory input could influence
representational learning. However, Sahani did not investigate the implications of the frame-
work for sensory neural responses. Our work can be seen as an extension to Sahani’s; we show
that, under certain assumptions about the internal model in the brain, the framework can be
used to make experimentally testable predictions about the affect of visual attention on neural
responses.
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We were interested in how behavioural demands influence sensory processing, rather than
the presented stimulus statistics per se. Therefore, we studied how the internal model adapts
in order to improve predictions of the received reward (by maximizing the first term of equa-
tion 4.24), regardless of how well it predicts the received sensory input (the second term of
equation 4.24). However, in general, the agent will have to achieve a balance between opti-
mizing the internal model towards current task-demands, and learning a good representation of
the sensory inputs that allows generalization across different tasks. We discuss this further in
section 5.2.
In our work, the agent learned to predict the probability distribution over the received re-
ward, given the performed action and received sensory input (p(r|x,a;θ,ψ)). However, they
only used the mean of this distribution (〈r〉p(r|x,a;θ,ψ)) to choose which action to perform. Thus,
the agent learned information about the high-order reward statistics that was not required to
perform the task, which could be inefficient. In comparison, in most reinforcement learning
algorithms the agent learns to predict the mean reward associated with each action, while ne-
glecting higher order reward statistics (Sutton and Barto, 1998). However, there are certain
reasons why it may be advantageous for the agent to learn about more than just the expected
reward. First, the agent’s belief about the higher-order reward statistics will play a role in deter-
mining how the internal model is learned. For example, the received reward will have a much
stronger influence in driving changes in the internal model if the predicted reward distribution
is very narrow. Second, the agent may want to optimize more than just the expected reward; to
avoid bankruptcy, a poker player might seek to limit the variance in their takings, in addition
to maximizing their long-term gains.
At present, it is unknown how (or indeed, whether) probability distributions are repre-
sented in the brain (Fiser et al., 2010; Shelton et al., 2011; Deneve, 2008a; Ma et al., 2006). A
current area of debate is whether neural firing rates encode samples from a probability distri-
bution (Fiser et al., 2010; Shelton et al., 2011); or parameters, such as the mean and variance
of the distribution (Deneve, 2008a; Ma et al., 2006). In our simulations, we assumed that
mean firing rates are proportional to the probability that individual hidden causes contributed
to generating the received sensory input. While this coding scheme was chosen for simplicity,
it produces means firing rates that are qualitatively consistent with a ‘sampling’ code (Shel-
ton et al., 2011). Meanwhile, certain parametric codes, such as the coding scheme proposed
by Deneve et al. (Deneve, 2008a), predict mean firing rates that are qualitatively consistent
with our model (i.e. they scale monotonically with the posterior probability that encoded latent
variables are ‘active’).
We investigated short term effects of behavioural context, focussing specifically on visual
attention. We hypothesized that over these timescales, only the sensitivity of individual neu-
rons (the prior) varies, while the network connectivity (the basis functions) remains constant.













Figure 4.14: Hypothetical internal model, in which a latent variable (c) denotes the current
behavioural context, which determines the prior distribution over hidden causes (p(s|c)) and
the agent’s model of the task (p(r|a,s,c)). The agent can use their received sensory input and
reward to infer the current behavioural context, enabling the focus of attention (determined by
p(s|c)) to be shifted more rapidly than if they had to learn the task from scratch.
This restriction could be removed to investigate changes that take place over longer timescales.
Currently, the relationship between different types of sensory learning (e.g. ‘attentional’ (Eck-
stein et al., 2004; Jiang and Chun, 2001) versus ‘perceptual’ learning (Fahle, 2005; Seitz et al.,
2009)), and how they depend on the training paradigm, is an active area of research. Hopefully,
our framework could contribute towards this debate.
In our work attention needs to be learned; it requires optimizing the response properties of
sensory neurons based on feedback in a task. This is a good description of what must happen
when an animal is presented with a novel task. However, attention can also be directed quickly,
without requiring task-feedback. To account for this, we could extend our model by including
additional latent variables in the agent’s internal model which represent different behavioural
contexts. Thus, the agent could use their received sensory input and/or task-feedback input
to ‘infer’ that appropriate behavioural context, allowing them to direct their attention more
quickly than if they had to learn the behavioural context from scratch (figure 4.14).
We put forward a very general framework for predicting how task-demands should alter
visual processing. We then showed that, given certain assumptions about the internal model
and behavioural task, this framework predicts attention-dependent changes to neural responses
that are consistent with existing phenomenological models of attention. However, although the
assumptions of our model are based on functional principles, in order to truly ‘derive’ the ef-
fects of attention it would be desirable construct a more sophisticated model of natural images,
in which the model parameters are learned directly from natural image statistics (as opposed
to artificial data). In the past, this approach has been highly successful in understanding the
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passive properties of visual neurons. Hopefully, in the future, it could be used to make quan-




In this chapter, we discuss three broad issues that have important implications for our work: the
structure and form of the internal model, how the internal model should be updated to deal with
new information about the environment, and the neural implementation of Bayesian inference.
We then state the main conclusions of the thesis, and discuss the relevance of our work to
the questions posed in our literature review (chapter 2): why are goal-orientated attention and
expectations necessary, how are they controlled, and what is their effect on visual processing
and perception?
5.1 Structure and form of the internal model
What information is encoded by sensory neurons? A normative approach to this question in-
volves asking what information ‘should’ encoded if visual processing were adapted towards the
environment. Thus, rather than studying sensory processing directly, the researcher begins by
constructing a probabilistic model that is able to capture the statistical structure of natural im-
ages. Ideally, the model can then be used to make neurophysiological or perceptual predictions,
to be tested experimentally.
However, due to the complexity of real-world environments, the visual system is unlikely
to learn a perfect model of how hidden causes in the world generate the received sensory input;
in most cases there will be some mismatch between the internal model, and the true structure
of the environment. In chapter 4 we argued that, faced with such a mismatch, the visual system
should prioritize aspects of the model that are important in determining behaviour. Under
this assumption, we investigated how the internal model should adapt in response to changing
task-demands.
More generally however, behavioural demands may also play a role in determining how
the internal model is learned in the first place, during evolution and development. For example,
the visual system could allocate a disproportionate number of neurons to encode behaviourally
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Figure 5.1: (a) Checker-board illusion. In the left panel, the square marked ‘B’ appears to be
lighter than the square marked ‘A’. The right panel shows that A and B are in fact identical.
(b) Tilt illusion. The presence of the surround stimulus, tilted 15◦ anti-clockwise from vertical
causes the central (vertical) stimulus to appear tilted clockwise. It has been proposed that the
underlying functional explanation for this tilt illusion is very similar to the checker-board illusion.
relevant sensory dimensions. This idea is supported experimentally: in one of the few experi-
mental tests of the ‘efficient coding hypothesis’, Machens et al. found that grasshopper auditory
neurons are optimized to encode behaviourally relevant sounds, such as communication sig-
nals, rather than the sounds that are found in their natural habitat (Machens et al., 2005). Thus,
an interesting direction for future research would be to investigate how the nervous system is
optimized towards ‘natural reward statistics’, as well as sensory input statistics (Montague and
King-Casas, 2007).
5.1.1 Dependence of perceptual biases on the internal model
The form of the internal representation will determine how perception of visual stimuli is in-
fluenced by their statistical context. For example, consider the classic checker-board illusion
shown in figure 5.1. In this illusion, a square that is located within a shaded region of the image
(B) is perceived as being brighter than a square located at an illuminated region of the image
(A), despite the fact that they are both identical. If the goal of visual processing were to infer
the absolute brightness at each point in the image, then this illusion would be paradoxical;
if anything, the fact that neighbouring pixels are likely to be of a similar brightness should
cause the square located within the shaded region to appear darker than it actually is. How-
ever, the illusion can be explained if we assume that the visual system takes into account the
level of illumination (a global property, that will tend to be statistically coordinated for nearby
regions of the image), to infer the surface reflectance at each point in the image (typically, a
local property). Thus, in figure 5.1, a square located in a shaded region of the image is judged
as having a higher reflectance than another square, of identical greyscale, located in an illumi-
nated region of the image. That is, what seems like an incorrect judgement about brightness (or
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adaptor test
Figure 5.2: Tilt after-effect. After looking at the grating on the left for at least 30 seconds, the
grating on the right should appear tilted clockwise.
greyscale), in fact corresponds to correct inference about the surface reflectance of the objects
that generated the image.
A similar argument was put forward by Schwartz et al. to explain the tilt illusion, where
a central orientated stimulus is perceived to be tilted away from its surrounding visual context
(figure 5.1b) (Clifford et al., 2000; Schwartz et al., 2009). If the goal of visual processing
were to infer the local orientation at each point in the visual scene, then the surrounding visual
context should have the opposite effect; the central stimulus should appear tilted towards the
surrounding context. Instead, Schwartz et al. proposed that the visual system learns a generative
model that describes how the local image structure (analogous to reflectance) is combined
with the global image structure (analogous to illumination) to generate the received sensory
input (Simoncelli and Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz and Simoncelli, 2001; Schwartz et al., 2006).
The global structure does not have a direct physical interpretation, but corresponds to features
such as orientated textures and edges, which cause the orientation of nearby locations to be
statistically correlated. Thus, perceptual biases such as the tilt-illusion come about because
the visual system takes the global image structure into account (dictated by the orientated
surround in figure 5.1b) to infer the local structure at each point in the image. Analogous to
the checker-board illusion, incorrect judgements about the orientation of the central stimulus
in figure 5.1b correspond to correct inferences about its local structure (i.e. the difference in
orientation between the centre and surround).
There are strong similarities between the perceptual biases produced by the temporal and
spatial context of visual stimuli (e.g. compare the ‘tilt after-effect illusion’ shown in figure 5.2
with the ‘tilt-illusion’ shown in figure 5.1b). Consequently, it has been suggested that similar
functional principles could underlie both types of perceptual bias (Schwartz et al., 2007). For
example, the model of Schwartz et al. (2009) can be adapted to explain how changes in tempo-
ral context give rise to the tilt after-effect illusion (figure 5.2) (Wainwright et al., 2001). First,
assume that people learn a generative model describing how local temporal structure combines
with global temporal structure, to generate the received sensory inputs. The global tempo-
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ral structure would correspond to temporal correlations in sensory signals. Analogous to the
tilt-illusion, perceptual illusions would come about because the visual system takes the global
temporal structure into account, in order to infer the local temporal structure at each moment in
time. Thus, incorrect judgements about the orientation of the test stimulus in the tilt after-effect
illusion (figure 5.2) would correspond to correct judgements about its local temporal structure
(i.e. subjects infer the difference in orientation between the adaptor and the test stimulus).
The issues raised by these studies are relevant to both our psychophysics and modeling
work. In our psychophysics experiment, we modelled subjects’ behaviour by assuming that
they performed perceptual inferences about the stimulus motion direction. Under this assump-
tion, our model predicted attractive estimation biases towards frequently presented motion di-
rections, similar to what was observed experimentally. However, previous experiments have
reported that the qualitative effects of spatiotemporal context on perceived stimulus orientation
vary with contrast: attractive estimation biases are observed at low contrasts, while repulsive es-
timation biases are observed at high contrasts (Roberts and Thiele, 2008). Our simple Bayesian
model can not account for the repulsive biases that occur at high contrast. Thus, understanding
how spatiotemporal expectations alter the perception of high contrast, as well as low contrast
stimuli, may require a richer description of the subject’s internal representation; informed by
the statistical structure of natural images.
In our modeling work, the agent learned to associate an increased prior probability for
behaviourally relevant stimuli, leading to the prediction that people should exhibit an attractive
estimation bias towards attended stimuli. However, as discussed, the perceptual bias that is
predicted will depend on the form of the internal model; if instead, we were to assume that
the agent learned a more complex internal model, describing how the local image structure is
combined with global image structure, we might expect similar changes in the prior to produce
qualitatively different perceptual biases, away from the attended stimulus.
5.1.2 Influence of internal model structure on generalization & specificity of
learned expectations
The form of the internal model will also determine how subjects’ prior belief about the likely
motion directions generalize to alter their perception of stimuli that differ in one or more sen-
sory dimensions (e.g. colour, or speed). For example, if subjects use an internal model in
which ‘colour’ and ‘motion direction’ are assumed to be independent (p(colour,direction) =
p(colour) p(direction)), then their learned expectations over motion direction will give rise
to biases in the perceived motion direction that are independent of the stimulus colour. Con-
versely, if subjects use an internal model where ‘colour’ and ‘motion direction’ are represented
jointly (p(colour, direction)), then their learned expectations over motion direction will give
rise to perceptual biases that depend on the stimulus colour.
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Gekas et al. adapted our experiment to investigate the specificity of stimulus expectations
acquired through exposure to distinctly different motion direction distributions, differentiated
by colour (Gekas et al., 2011). Presented stimuli could be either red or green: green stimuli
were presented most frequently moving in one of two directions; red stimuli were presented
with equal frequency moving in all directions. Consistent with our experimental results, Gekas
et al. found that subjects learned to expect the two most frequent motion directions, with at-
tractive estimation biases towards these directions, as well as hallucinations when no stimulus
was presented. Interestingly, subjects exhibited similar estimation biases for both stimulus
colours, despite the fact that the distribution of presented motion directions was different for
each colour. Further, subjects’ estimation distributions for trials when no stimulus was pre-
sented did not depend on whether they reported seeing a red or a green stimulus. These results
led Gekas et al. to conclude that subjects learned a single prior distribution over motion direc-
tion, without taking into account the differences between the stimulus distributions for each
colour.
Subjects’ inability to learn that the distribution of presented motion directions depended on
stimulus colour led them to perform suboptimally in the psychophysics task of Gekas et al. A
possible normative explanation for this behaviour comes from the fact that in most real-world
situations, stimulus colour is unrelated to motion direction. Thus, while subjects’ prior beliefs
for colour to be independent of motion direction leads to suboptimal performance in tasks in-
volving artificial stimulus statistics, it could reflect optimal adaptation towards the statistics
of the environment. However, this normative explanation seems to be contradicted by a well
known illusion called the ‘McCullough effect’, where the perceived colour of a black and white
grating is altered after a brief exposure to a coloured grating with a similar orientation (McCol-
lough, 1965). This interaction between perceived colour and orientation suggests that people
learn a joint representation of colour and orientation. It is difficult to justify this representation
on normative grounds: why would subjects’ learn that motion direction and colour are inde-
pendent, but not orientation and colour? A more parsimonious for these effects can be made
on anatomical grounds: while neurons in the ventral stream encode both colour and orienta-
tion (Johnson et al., 2008), it has been postulated that motion direction and colour are processed
separately, within the dorsal and ventral pathways respectively (Mishkin et al., 1983) (although
see (Thiele et al., 2001)). Indeed, this discussion highlights a limitation in the normative ap-
proach: to provide a complete account of visual processing, ideal observer models should be
combined with algorithmic constraints, such as anatomical or metabolic constraints faced by
the visual system (Marr, 1982).
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5.2 How is the internal model altered by experience?
In this thesis, we investigate how visual processing adapts in response to changes in the statis-
tics and behavioural relevance of received sensory inputs. However, in both our experimental
and theoretical work, we focus on characterizing ‘what’ is learned, rather than the learning
process itself. In our psychophysics experiment, the rapid speed with which people learned
which stimuli to expect prohibited us from measuring its time-course. In our modeling work,
we analyzed the predicted changes to visual neuron responses following optimization in a be-
havioural task, but did not study how this attentional modulation is ‘learned’ when the agent is
presented with a novel task (Chun, 2000; Dayan et al., 2000). Thus, an obvious extension to
our work would be to investigate the process by which prior beliefs are learned from sensory
experience and task-feedback.
5.2.1 Frequentist versus Bayesian learning algorithms
In a frequentist ‘maximum-likelihood’ (ML) learning algorithm, internal model parameters (θ)





log p(xi|θ) , (5.1)
where the summation is taken over a bock of N trials and xi denotes the sensory input or reward
received on the ith trial. For an online learning algorithm, model parameters could be updated
after each trial, according to:
θnew = θ+η∂θ log p(xi|θ) , (5.2)
where η denotes the learning rate. With a suitable choice of step-size (η), θ should converge
on a local maximum of L(θ) after many trials.
An alternative, Bayesian, learning algorithm requires that the subject represents the pos-
terior probability distribution over θ, given the received sensory input: p(θ|X t) (where X t =
(x1, . . . ,xt) denotes all the inputs up until time t). On receiving a new sensory input (xt+1), the
ideal observer should adapt their belief about the internal model parameters according to:
p(θ|X t+1) = p(xt+1|θ) p(θ|X t) . (5.3)
Most previous statistical models of visual processing assume that the agent learns a single
set of internal model parameters, using a maximum likelihood algorithm (Hyvärinen, 2010).
To facilitate comparison with this body of work, we used a similar modelling framework;
we assumed that the agent learns a single set of internal model parameters, updated online
according to equation 5.2.
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When there is a large set of training data (we used 105 trials in our simulations), the ML
and Bayesian learning algorithms will usually give very similar predictions (i.e. p(θ|X t)→
δ(θ−θML) as t → ∞). However, with a limited supply of unreliable training data, this will
not be the case. Further, both learning algorithms make different predictions about how the
agent should update their prior belief on each trial. For the ML learning algorithm, the learning
rate is determined by a free parameter, η. In contrast, for the Bayesian learning algorithm, the
learning rate is constrained by the received sensory input itself. With the Bayesian learning
algorithm, the learning rate will depend on the agent’s prior uncertainty about the internal
model parameters, as well as their prior beliefs about how fast the world changes (see section
5.2.3).. Thus, when the agent is faced with a new environment and receives ‘unexpected’
sensory inputs (i.e. p(xt) =

p(xt |θ) p(θ|X t−1)dθ is small), they will learn to associate a
greater degree of uncertainty over θ. As a result, new sensory inputs will have a stronger
influence in altering their prior beliefs, giving rise to fast learning. As they learn the statistics
of their new environment, the uncertainty in their estimate of the internal model parameters
will decrease, with a corresponding decrease in the learning rate.
Future work investigating how prior beliefs are learned from experience could compare
the predictions of both learning algorithms, with the aim of making predictions that can be
tested psychophysically (Yu and Dayan, 2005b; Yu et al., 2009). As well as improving our
understanding of the learning process itself, this work could be used to address deeper questions
about how people use and structure environmental knowledge. That is, to what extent do people
represent uncertainty about the ‘structure’ of their environment (i.e. model parameters/model
class), in addition to uncertainty about the stimulus features (i.e. hidden variables)?
5.2.2 Psychophysical measurement of learning dynamics
In our psychophysics experiment, subjects learned to expect the likely stimuli within very few
trials (figure 3.6), making it difficult for us to measure the short term time-scale and dynamics
of learning. One way around this would be to use a more complex stimulus distribution, so
that learning occurred more slowly. Alternatively, we could alter our experiment by repeatedly
changing the stimulus distribution. For example, after a fixed number of trials, we could alter
the frequently presented motion directions, so that participants had to relearn the stimulus
distribution. As a result, we would be able to collect more data from trials in which rapid
learning took place, allowing us to measure its dynamics and time-course more accurately.
However, we would have to be careful to consider the effect of subjects’ previously learned
expectations, which would influence how they learned the new stimulus distribution.
Eckstein et al. conducted a psychophysics experiment to investigate how humans alter their
prior expectations based on feedback in a task (Eckstein et al., 2004). In their experiment, sub-
jects had to localize a target stimulus of unknown identity, presented at one of several locations.
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After each trial, they were provided with feedback about the location of the target, which they
could use to update their prior belief about its identity. Learning took place over blocks of 4
trials, after which the target identity was changed. Eckstein et al. compared subjects’ perfor-
mance in the task to an ideal Bayesian observer, who updated their prior beliefs according to
equation 5.3. Similar to our results, Eckstein et al. observed rapid learning over blocks of only
4 trials. However, they found that human learning was slower than would be predicted for an
ideal Bayesian observer, with subjects relying more heavily on their previous decisions in the
task than the provided feedback, and with virtually no learning on trials following a previous
incorrect response. This work shows how the concept of an ideal Bayesian observer can be
used to give insight into human perceptual learning. While Eckstein et al. looked exclusively
at changes in perceptual performance, their experiment could be adapted to investigate how
perceptual biases, such as those observed in our experiment, are acquired.
5.2.3 Influence of learning algorithm on perceptual biases that develop over dif-
ferent timescales
In chapter 3 we showed that subjects learn to expect frequently presented stimulus features,
resulting in attractive estimation biases towards these features (figure 3.7). However, under dif-
ferent circumstances, changes in the presented stimulus statistics have been found to produce
qualitatively different types of perceptual bias. For example, prolonged exposure to a visual
pattern, such as an orientated grating, can result in sensory adaptation, where subsequently
presented stimuli are perceived as being more dissimilar to the original (‘adaptor’) stimulus
than they actually are (Levinson and Sekuler, 1976; Schwartz et al., 2007; P Seriès and Simon-
celli, 2008) (figure 5.2). Perceptual adaptation is usually accompanied by a reduction in the
sensitivity of visual neurons that are tuned to the adaptor stimulus (Carandini, 2000). Simi-
lar effects have also been observed over longer time scales. For example, after several hours
of looking through a camera that selectively filters out a specific orientation, subjects exhibit
increased perceptual sensitivity for the filtered orientation (Zhang et al., 2009). This contrasts
with our results, where subjects exhibited increased perceptual sensitivity for motion directions
that were observed more frequently (figure 3.10).
The perceptual biases observed in our experiment were accounted for by assuming that
subjects learned to associate an increased prior probability for frequently presented stimuli (fig-
ure 3.18). However, a similar short-term change in the perceptual prior cannot account for the
repulsive biases that are observed as a result of sensory adaptation (although see section 5.1.1).
Instead, it is possible that these repulsive biases are associated with a change in the observer’s
likelihood function, that predicts how hidden causes in the world generate the received sensory
input (Buiatti and van Vreeswijk, 2003; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006b; Schwartz et al., 2007).
For example, a subject looking through a camera that filters out a particular orientation might
Chapter 5. Discussion 117
(correctly) deduce that there has been a change in how their sensory inputs are generated, such
that a stimulus presented at the filtered orientation gives rise to a weaker sensory signal than the
same stimulus presented at some other orientation. To compensate for this change, the subject
could alter their likelihood function, so that a weak sensory signal at the filtered orientation
was believed to be generated by the same hidden cause as a stronger sensory signal at some
other orientation. While this change in the subject’s likelihood function would help to optimize
visual processing while they were looking through the camera, it would lead to suboptimal
perceptual biases when the camera was removed.
Under what conditions should people exhibit attractive biases associated with ‘expecta-
tions’, as opposed to repulsive biases associated with ‘adaptation’? While numerous examples
of both attractive and repulsive perceptual biases are found in the experimental literature, we
are far from having a clear answer to this question. One factor that could be important is the
timescale over which changes in the stimulus statistics occur. For example, if the level of il-
lumination, which determines how visual signals are produced by hidden causes in the world,
typically varies more quickly than the distribution of hidden causes, then the ideal observer
should attribute short-term changes in the stimulus statistics to a change in the level of illumi-
nation, and longer-term changes in the stimulus statistics to changes in the prior distribution
over the hidden causes. In this case, over short timescales the ideal observer would alter their
likelihood function, giving rise to repulsive perceptual biases, while over longer timescales they
would alter their prior, giving rise to attractive perceptual biases. Experimental support for this
idea was provided by Kanai & Verstraten, who found that varying the time interval between
an adaptor and a test motion stimulus caused a reversal in the direction of subjects’ estimation
biases (Kanai and Verstraten, 2005). When there was only a brief time interval between the
adaptor and test stimulus, subjects exhibited a repulsive bias, and were more likely perceive
the test stimulus moving in the opposite direction to the adaptor. With a longer time interval,
subjects exhibited an attractive bias, and were more likely perceive the test stimulus moving in
the opposite direction to the adaptor.
In general, whether the agent should alter their likelihood function over shorter or longer
timescales than their prior, will depend on the temporal structure of the environment. Thus,
under the assumption that the visual system is optimized towards the natural environment, the
speed at which different aspects of the internal model vary in time in response to changes in
the presented stimulus statistics will be determined by the temporal structure of natural sensory
signals. Consequently, future work studying the temporal statistics of natural movies or image
sequences, could be used to predict the changes in the agent’s internal model, and thus, the
perceptual biases, that occur over different timescales.
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5.2.4 Reward-driven learning: relation to reinforcement learning & decision the-
ory
In chapter 4 we posited that the purpose of visual processing is to represent sensory informa-
tion in a way that facilitates interaction with the environment. Previous work has hypothesized
that the visual system achieves this goal by learning a probabilistic model that predicts how
hidden causes in the world generate the received sensory input (Olshausen and Field, 1996;
Hyvärinen, 2010). Visual processing would then consist of inferring the hidden causes that
generated a given sensory input. An implicit assumption underlying this work is that the hid-
den causes of natural sensory signals are of direct behavioural relevance to the organism. Thus,
the visual system is assumed to take advantage of the inherent structure of natural sensory sig-
nals to learn a sensory representation that is useful for performing many different behavioural
tasks (Gershman and Niv, 2010).
However, in some cases the image features that are relevant to a particular task may differ
from the hidden causes learned by the agent. We hypothesized that the visual system deals
with this eventuality by adapting the internal model to optimize performance in the current
task, at the possible expense of learning a worse model of the received sensory inputs. That
is, we assumed that over short timescales the internal model (parameterized by {θ,ψ}; see
section 4.1.2.4) adapts to improve its predictions for the received reward (p(r|x,a;θ,ψ)), re-
gardless of how well it predicts the received sensory inputs (p(x;θ)). However, this learning
procedure has certain weaknesses. First, the behavioural task will typically be highly labile
and provide limited constraints on the internal model, compared to the bulk of the visual in-
put. Second, optimizing the internal model towards a particular behavioural task will likely
reduce its ability to generalize across different tasks. It is possible that these problems are
reflected in human behaviour: for example, repeated practice in a behavioural task can lead
to ‘negative transfer’, where performance in a different task is reduced (Seitz et al., 2005a)
(see section 4.2.7). Further work will be required to understand how the visual system com-
bines information from sensory signals and task-feedback to adapt towards current behavioural
demands, while maintaining its ability to generalize across different behavioural contexts.
A number of researchers have used ideas from reinforcement learning and decision theory
to investigate how reward is represented in the brain, and how decisions are made in the face
of uncertainty (Schultz et al., 1997; Doya, 2008; Dayan, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Schultz,
2006). However, relatively little work has studied how the reinforcement task influences the
sensory representation itself, which is usually treated as a fixed input to the model. To ad-
dress this question, we chose to start from a standard theoretical account of unsupervised
representational learning, which has been used previously to study the response properties of
visual neurons (Sahani, 2004; Hyvärinen, 2010). In the future, it would be interesting to inves-
tigate how unsupervised learning algorithms can be combined with a reinforcement learning
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framework, to optimize interaction with the environment. For example, in complex real-world
environments, traditional reinforcement learning algorithms often behave very badly, and thus
it may be advantageous for the agent to use prior knowledge about the statistical structure of
real-world tasks and sensory signals to help simplify learning (Courville et al., 2006; Gershman
and Niv, 2010).
5.3 Neural implementation of Bayesian inference
A large body of behavioural evidence suggests that humans take uncertainty into account when
making perceptual inferences about the world (Knill and Richards, 1996b; Rao et al., 2002).
As a result, researchers have begun to ask how Bayesian inference might be implemented in
the brain. This research addresses two basic questions: how are probability distributions repre-
sented by populations of spiking neurons, and how do neural circuits implement probabilistic
inference and learning with these representations? While a number of probabilistic neural
codes have been proposed, at present there is little consensus over which of these is the most
plausible, or indeed, better supported by experimental data. Here, we give a brief overview of
the main classes of model, explaining how they relate to our work.
5.3.1 Probabilistic population coding
A conventional view of neural coding is that a population of neurons encodes information about
a stimulus, s, through their firing rates, r. Thus, the presented stimulus value can be estimated
from the population response (ŝ = g(r)) (Seung and Sompolinsky, 1993; Pouget et al., 1998).
In contrast, probabilistic population codes hypothesize that the neural population response (r)
encodes the posterior probability distribution over possible stimulus values, given the received
sensory input (p(s|x)).
A well-known example of a probabilistic population code is ‘gain encoding’ (Ma et al.,
2006, 2008). In this coding scheme, individual neurons are assumed to encode a stimulus s with
a mean firing rate fi (s) and Poisson-like noise. With homogeneous bell-shaped tuning-curves,
a given stimulus will produce an activity profile (a plot of neural firing rates versus preferred
stimulus value) that has a single peak close to the neuron that is tuned to the presented stimulus.
‘Gain encoding’ posits that the mean of the posterior distribution is encoded by a weighted sum
of the neural activities (roughly related to the peak of the activity profile), while the variance
of the distribution is related to the magnitude of the activity profile; larger responses would
correspond to a smaller variance (figure 5.3). Pouget and colleagues have shown that this
coding scheme can be used to provide a simple implementation of probabilistic computations,
such as cue combination (Ma et al., 2006) and optimal decision making (Beck et al., 2008).
However, this and related work (Zemel et al., 1998; Jazayeri and Movshon, 2006; Ma et al.,
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Figure 5.3: Schematic of a ‘gain encoding’ scheme (adapted from (Ma et al., 2006)). (a) The left
panel shows the population response, r, to a stimulus whose value is s = 20. Neural firing rates
are plotted as a function of their preferred stimulus value (i.e. the stimulus that corresponds
to the peak of their tuning curve). The right panel shows the posterior probability distribution
over s, decoded from the population response using Bayes’ theorem. With Poisson-like neural
variability, the variance of the posterior distribution (σ2) will be inversely proportional to the am-
plitude of the population response (g). (b) Decreasing the amplitude of the population response
increases the width of the encoded distribution.
2006) has mostly studied how neural populations encode simple low-dimensional stimulus
features (although see (Sahani and Dayan, 2003) for an exception). Thus, it is not clear how
these codes scale to encode high-dimensional stimuli such as those used in our simulations
(where there are 20 sensory inputs, each corresponding to a single stimulus dimension), where
exact Bayesian inference is likely to be intractable.
Deneve proposed that probabilistic information is encoded through the spike times of in-
dividual neurons, rather than their mean firing rates (Deneve, 2008a,b). In common with our
work, Deneve hypothesized that the visual system learns a generative model that predicts how
binary hidden causes give rise to the received sensory input. While we assumed that individ-
ual neurons encode the posterior probability that hidden variables are active (p(si = 1|x)), in
Deneve’s model, they encode the log-odds (log p(si=1|x)p(si=0|x) ). Deneve hypothesized that neurons
implement a form of predictive coding: each new spike signals an increase in the log-odds
that cannot predicted from the neuron’s previous spiking output. The neural firing rates pre-
dicted by Deneve’s model are qualitatively similar to our model: the firing rate of individual
neurons correlates with the probability that the encoded hidden variable is active. In common
with our work, Deneve et al. predict surround-suppression of visual neuron responses when a
stimulus is presented outside of the classical RF (Denéve et al., 2008; Denève and Lochmann,
2009; Lochmann and Deneve, 2011). In the future, a neural implementation of our attentional
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model, based on the spiking code proposed by Deneve et al., could be used to investigate the
effects of attention on the spiking statistics and temporal dynamics of sensory neurons (see
also, section 5.3.3).
5.3.2 Sampling representation of the posterior distribution
Recently, it has been hypothesized that the brain represents the posterior probability distri-
bution using a sampling code, where neural responses encode samples from the underlying
distribution (Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Fiser et al., 2010). Thus, rather than being inter-
preted as ‘noise’, neural response variability would encode uncertainty in the believed causes
of the sensory input. One advantage of this proposal is that, as many classical statistical neural
networks use an implicit sampling representation (Hinton and Sejnowski, 1986; Hinton et al.,
1995), it is reasonably well understood (although not trivial) how a sampling code could be
used to implement learning and representation of a high-dimensional hidden state space (Fiser
et al., 2010). However, at present, there has been little work of a more biological bent, showing
how probabilistic sampling could be implemented within a realistic neural network (although
see (Moreno-Bote et al., 2011; Buesing et al., 2011)).
Several papers have investigated how a sampling code could be distinguished experimen-
tally. At the behavioural level, it has been proposed that perceptual bistability, in which the ap-
pearance of a presented stimulus oscillates between different competing interpretations, could
come about as a result of probabilistic sampling from the posterior (Schrater and Sundareswara,
2007; Reichert et al., 2011b; Gershman et al., 2009; Moreno-Bote et al., 2011). At the neural
level, a sampling representation predicts a close relation between stimulus-evoked and sponta-
neous neural activity (Fiser et al., 2010). In general, if the internal model is well matched to
the external environment, the average posterior distribution should be very similar to the prior,
through the identity: 〈p(s|x)〉p(x) = p(s). Thus, if evoked and spontaneous neural activities
encode samples from the posterior and the prior distributions, respectively, they should also
be very similar (Fiser et al., 2010). This prediction has been verified experimentally through
electrophysiological recordings of visual cortical activity in awake ferrets (Berkes et al., 2011).
Interestingly, the observed similarity between spontaneous and evoked activity was both spe-
cific for natural scenes and increased with the animals’ age, suggesting that the internal model
adapts during development to better reflect the statistics of the environment.
In general, drawing samples from a high-dimensional probability distribution is a challeng-
ing problem. In machine learning applications, this is often done using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithms, where samples are drawn relative to the current state, and thus,
the resulting sequence of samples forms a Markov chain. A limitation of MCMC algorithms
is that nearby samples are often highly correlated, so that many samples are needed to repre-
sent the posterior. To deal with this limitation, Shelton et al. proposed a biologically plausible
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approximate inference algorithm that combines both deterministic and sampling-based approx-
imations (Shelton et al., 2011). Neurally, their algorithm can be interpreted as a feed-forward
preselection of the relevant state space (which selects the hidden-states that have a reasonable
probability of occurring), followed by a neural implementation of MCMC, to evaluate the pos-
terior over the relevant states. By reducing the size of the hidden-state space, preselection
ensures that fewer samples are needed to capture the posterior distribution.
Shelton et al. implemented their algorithm in a binary latent variable model that was very
similar to the generative model used in our simulations (section 4.1.2.1). Therefore, a straight-
forward extension to our work, would be to use the ‘select and sample’ algorithm proposed
by Shelton et al. to construct a biologically plausible sampling implementation of our model.
While the predictions for the mean firing rates would be unchanged, the sampling dynamics
would make predictions about the variability of neural responses, that are not captured by our
present work (Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003). Thus, we could investigate how the predicted
attention-dependent changes to neural variability and interneuronal correlations compare to
what is observed experimentally (Mitchell et al., 2007; Cohen and Maunsell, 2009).
In our work, learning the parameters of the internal model requires evaluating the posterior
distribution over the hidden causes, given both the sensory input and reward, p(s|x,r). As
pointed out by Sahani (Sahani, 2004), it may be biologically infeasible to evaluate this proba-
bility distribution directly (appendix C). However, following Sahani, we show that a sampling
approximation, in which samples drawn from the posterior distribution, p(s|x), are multiplied
by a reward-dependent weighting factor, can be used to construct a biologically plausible learn-
ing algorithm. This algorithm has an interesting neural interpretation. First, visual neurons
would encode samples from the posterior distribution, providing input for later brain areas re-
sponsible for controlling behaviour. Second, after performing an action, a reward-dependent
weighting signal would project back to the sensory cortices, modulating learning. While this
learning algorithm is described in fairly abstract terms in our work, a detailed biological imple-
mentation, which specified how the reward-dependent feedback is computed and represented in
the brain, could be used to make predictions about top-down control of attentional modulation
and learning in sensory cortices (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
5.3.3 Why the neural code matters for theories of attention
In this thesis, we hypothesized that attention is required due to resource constraints at the
computational level, which lead to a mismatch between the agent’s internal model and the
external environment. In contrast, a neural implementation of our model could be used to
investigate how attention is driven by low-level resource constraints, such as the metabolic cost
of generating a spike (Laughlin, 2001; Lennie, 2003).
For example, in Deneve’s model, a free (‘spike-threshold’) parameter determines how much
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the log-odds for the encoded variable (log p(si=1|x)p(si=0|x) ) have to increase before a spike is triggered;
a smaller threshold produces a more accurate code, but at the cost of an increased number
of spikes (Deneve, 2008a). Thus, by dynamically altering the spike-threshold, so that it is
reduced for neurons that encode task-relevant stimuli and increased for neurons that encode
task-irrelevant stimuli, attention could act to increase the accuracy of the neural representation
for task-relevant stimuli while leaving the total number of spikes unchanged1.
In contrast to our work, where attention-dependent changes in the internal model alter the
encoded posterior distribution, here, attention would alter the neural representation of the pos-
terior, but not the posterior distribution itself. These different types of attentional modulation
are not mutually exclusive: changes to the internal model could occur alongside changes to
the neural code. Indeed, an interesting question is how these different levels interact: how do
low-level constraints influence the internal model, and how does the internal model constrain
the low-level neural implementation (Gershman and Wilson, 2010)?
5.4 Conclusions
In this thesis, we use a combination of psychophysical experiments and theoretical work to
investigate how visual perception and neural responses are influenced by the statistical and be-
havioural context of presented stimuli. In the literature, contextual changes to visual process-
ing are given a number of different labels (including ‘adaptation’, ‘expectations’, ‘perceptual
learning’ or ‘attention’), depending on the perceptual or neurophysiological changes that are
observed, and the timescale over which they develop. However, the distinction between these
cognitive phenomena is often not clear-cut. Further, in trying to understand how they differ, it
is easy to get caught in a circular argument. For example, if repulsive perceptual biases are al-
ways attributed to sensory ‘adaptation’ and attractive perceptual biases to ‘expectations’, then
it should be no surprise that adaptation and expectations are found to produce repulsive and
attractive perceptual biases, respectively!
In this thesis we treat ‘attention’ and ‘expectations’ as descriptive terms that refer to the
perceptual and neurophysiological consequences of varying stimulus statistics and behavioural
demands. We define them operationally: changes in perception and neural responses that de-
pend on the presented stimulus statistics are defined as due to a subjects’ expectations; changes
that depend on the subject’s behavioural demands are defined as being due to goal-orientated
attention.
We argue that a Bayesian framework for modelling sensory processing provides a useful
language for addressing many questions about how and why visual processing is altered by
stimulus context. In this framework, the visual system is assumed to learn an internal model
1Of course, there would have to be a corresponding change in the dynamics of upstream neurons that ‘read-out’
from the neural population (P Seriès and Simoncelli, 2008).
Chapter 5. Discussion 124
that predicts how explanatory causes in the world generate the received sensory input. We
postulate that changes in visual processing associated with expectations and attention reflect
optimization of this internal model towards sensory input statistics, and behavioural demands.
An interesting experimental question, is how readily people’s prior beliefs about the world
adapt in the light of new sensory information. We provide psychophysical evidence indicating
that people’s prior beliefs are highly adaptable. We find that people quickly adapt their prior
expectations following exposure to novel stimulus statistics, and that these learned expectations
alter their perception of simple visual features as well as inducing hallucinations when no
stimulus is presented.
Another open question is how the internal model is influenced by the behavioural rele-
vance, as well as the statistical context of visual stimuli. This question is crucial for modeling
visual attention: attentional modulation of neural responses and perception can occur as a re-
sult of changing behavioural demands, in the absence of any changes to the stimulus statistics.
We extend previous Bayesian models of visual processing to account for this, hypothesizing
that the nervous system learns an internal model that predicts how the sensory input and reward
received for performing different actions are generated by a common set of hidden causes. This
internal model is assumed to adapt continuously in response to changes in the reward and stim-
ulus statistics. We find that a simple model based on these ideas is able to predict a number of
observed effects of attention on visual neuron responses.
Despite the potential of Bayesian models for understanding context-dependent changes
to visual processing, a number of basic questions need to be answered before these models
represent a truly predictive framework. For example, both the form of the internal model and
the neural implementation of Bayesian inference is largely unknown (chapter 5). However,
rather than representing a weakness of the modeling framework, the fact that its predictions
depend on assumptions about the internal representation and neural code, may ultimately be a
strength. It suggests that experimental observations about how perception and neural responses
are influenced by stimulus statistics and behavioural demands could be used in the future to
constrain Bayesian models of visual processing; thus, helping to answer fundamental questions
about about how environmental information is structured and represented in the brain.
Appendix A
Unfolded data











































Figure A.1: Average estimation bias (a) and standard deviation of estimation responses (b),
plotted against stimulus motion direction. In both plots, results are averaged over all participants



















Figure A.2: Probability distributions of participants’ estimates of motion direction when no stim-
ulus is present. The two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°) are indicated by
vertical dashed lines. Responses were divided into trials where participants reported detecting
a stimulus (blue) and trials where they didn’t (red). Results are averaged over all participants
and error bars represent within-subject standard error.
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Appendix B
Gradient of the objective function
To update the parameters of the agent’s internal model, we need to compute the gradient of the
online objective function:
∂l (θ,ψ) = ∂ log p(r|a,x,θ,ψ) . (B.1)
























= 〈∂ log p(r,s|a,x,ψ,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ)
= 〈∂ log p(r|s,a,x,ψ,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ) + 〈∂ log p(s|x,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ).
The second term in this expression can be expanded as:
〈∂ log p(s|x,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ) = 〈∂ log p(s,x|θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ)−∂ log p(x|θ)
= 〈∂ log p(s,x|a,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ)−〈∂ log p(s,x|θ)〉p(s|x,θ),
where we have used the identity, ∂ log p(x|θ) = 〈∂ log p(s,x|θ)〉p(s|x,θ). Substituting this back
into the expression for the derivative of the objective function, gives:
∂l (θ,ψ) = 〈∂ log p(r|s,a,ψ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ)
+〈∂ log p(s,x|a,θ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ)−〈∂ log p(s,x|θ)〉p(s|x,θ).
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Finally, taking the partial derivative with respect to either θ or ψ returns the expressions
shown in the main text:
∂ψl(θ,ψ) = 〈∂ψ log p(r|a,s,ψ)〉p(s|x,r,a,θ,ψ) (B.2)




It is possible that information about both the reward and the sensory input will not be simulta-
neously available to the organism. In this case they will not be able to compute the posterior
distribution of hidden states, conditioned on both the sensory input and the reward (p(s|x,r,a)),
required to update the model parameters (equations 4.13 and 4.14). This can be dealt with us-
ing an importance sampling approximation proposed by Sahani Sahani (2004). Consider the
expectation of a function of the hidden states, g(s), over p(s|r,x,a):
〈g(s)〉p(s|xn,rn,an) =
∑s g(s) p(rn|s,an) p(s|xn)
∑s p(rn|s,an) p(s|xn)
. (C.1)
We can approximate this expectation using a sampling algorithm, with Nsamp samples of s,













where wl represent the importance weights, wl ∝ p(r|sl,a) (normalized so that wl = 1). In
summary, the expectation over p(s|x,r,a), can be computed by sampling from the posterior
distribution p(s|x), and weighting each sample by a factor wl , depending on the received re-
ward.
We suggest the following neural algorithm for learning the model parameters:
1. The firing rates of visual neurons encode samples from the posterior distribution of hid-
den causes, given the received sensory input (sl ∼ p(s|x,θ)).
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2. These samples are used to estimate the mean reward associated with each action they
might perform (V (a;x,ψ,θ) ∝ ∑
Nsamp
l=1 〈r〉p(r|a,sl ,ψ); possibly encoded in the basal ganglia).
The agent performs the action with the highest predicted reward (â = argmaxa (V (a;x,ψ,θ))).
3. A reward is received, and used to calculate the importance weights for each sample
(wl ∝ p(r|a,sl,ψ)). This information is propagated back to earlier sensory areas, to
facilitate learning.
4. Synaptic weights (and/or the sensitivity of individual neurons) are updated to follow the
gradients, ∑
Nsamp
l=1 (wl−1)∂θ log p(sl,x|θ) and ∑
Nsamp
l=1 wl∂ψ log p(r|sl,x,a,ψ). The impact
of each sample on learning is weighted by a reward-dependent factor (wl), fed-back from
areas in the brain which encode reward (e.g. basal ganglia).
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